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Abstract
Essays in Development Economics
by
Erin M Kelley
Doctor of Philosophy in Agricultural and Resource Economics
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Jeremy Magruder, Chair
This dissertation presents a three-part study in development economics. Each
chapter investigates how technological innovations enable firms and individuals to
overcome problems of asymmetric information - whether it be monitoring devices
to help firms overcome problems of moral hazard; online job-boards to overcome
search and matching frictions for job-seekers; or new agricultural techniques to
increase information diffusion within social networks.
The first chapter examines the problem of moral hazard in employer–employee
contracting and how this may be an important barrier to firm efficiency and growth
in the developing world. To do so, we run an RCT with a fleet of 255 minibuses
(matatus) in Nairobi, Kenya, where we introduce monitoring devices that track
real-time vehicle location, daily productivity, and safety statistics. We randomize
whether minibus owners have access to these monitoring data using a novel mobile
app. This information allows owners in the treatment group to observe a more
precise signal of driver effort, the amount of revenue drivers collected in fares, and
the extent to which the driver engages in reckless driving. We find that treated
vehicle owners modify the terms of the contract by decreasing the rental price
they demand. Drivers respond by working more hours, decreasing behaviors that
damage the vehicle, and under-reporting revenue by less. These changes improve
firm profits and reduce management costs, thereby helping treated firms grow. The
device also improves owners’ trust in their drivers, which drivers say makes their
job easier. Finally, we investigate whether these gains to the company come at
the expense of passenger safety, in an environment where accidents are common.
While we do not find any evidence that conditions deteriorate, offering detailed
information on driving behavior also does not improve safety. Only by incentivizing
drivers through an additional cash treatment do we detect safety improvements.
The second chapter investigates how agents in a social network can be encour-
aged to obtain information from outside their peer groups. Using a field experiment
in rural Bangladesh, we show that demonstration plots in agriculture — a tech-
nique where the first users of a new variety cultivate it in a side-by-side comparison
with an existing variety — facilitate social learning by inducing conversations and
information sharing outside of existing social networks. We compare these im-
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provements in learning with those from seeding new technology with more central
farmers in village social networks. The demonstration plots — when cultivated by
randomly selected farmers — improve knowledge by just as much as seeding with
more central farmers. Moreover, the demonstration plots only induce conversations
and facilitate learning for farmers that were unconnected to entry points at base-
line. Finally, we combine this diffusion experiment with an impact experiment to
show that both demonstration plots and improved seeding transmit information to
farmers that are less likely to benefit from the new innovation.
Finally, the third chapter explores the impact of online job platforms on labor
market frictions in India. In recent years innovative job market information systems
have emerged in order to match recent graduates with employers via integrated
websites and call center based platforms. We use a randomized control trial to
evaluate the ability of such job-portals to ease search frictions in India. We partner
with Job Shikari, an online platform operating primarily in Northern India, and up-
load a randomly selected sample of recent vocational training graduates onto their
platform. A second subset of graduates are uploaded to the platform, and receive
“priority status", which means they subsequently receive many more text messages
than their peers about potentially job opportunities. We find that being uploaded to
the job portal has a negative impact on the probability of being employed, but no
significant impacts on job-search. The treatment priority group experiences a less
strong disemployment effect, but is much more likely to respond to the treatment
by migrating to urban centers. These results differ by job-seekers’ observable char-
acteristics such as age and martial status. We interpret our results as evidence that
the impact of job-portals depends significantly on job-seekers beliefs about what
the job-portal can do for them, rather than just on how well the platform can match
the job-seeker with a particular job.
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1 | The Impact of Monitoring Tech-
nologies on Contracts and Em-
ployee Behavior: Experimental
Evidence from Kenya’s Transit
Industry
Chapter abstract: Agency theory suggests that moral hazard in employer–
employee contracting constrains firm profits. We use a randomized controlled
trial to empirically evaluate how information and communication technologies
(ICT) can mitigate moral hazard and enable firms to design more efficient
contracts which increase profits and engender business growth. Specifically, we
study a fleet of 255 minibuses (matatus) in Nairobi, Kenya, where we introduce
monitoring devices that track real-time vehicle location, daily productivity,
and safety statistics. We randomize whether minibus owners have access to
these monitoring data using a novel mobile app. This information allows
owners in the treatment group to observe a more precise signal of driver effort,
the amount of revenue drivers collected in fares, and the extent to which
the driver engages in reckless driving. We find that treated vehicle owners
modify the terms of the contract by decreasing the rental price they demand.
Drivers respond by working more hours, decreasing behavior that damages
the vehicle, and under-reporting revenue by less. These changes improve firm
profits and reduce management costs, thereby helping treated firms grow. The
device also improves owners’ trust in their drivers, which drivers say makes
their job easier. Finally, we investigate whether these gains to the company
come at the expense of passenger safety, in an environment where accidents
are common. While we do not find any evidence that conditions deteriorate,
offering detailed information on driving behavior also does not improve safety.
Only by incentivizing drivers through an additional cash treatment do we detect
safety improvements.
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1.1 Introduction
Firms design contracts to ensure their employees exert the profit-maximizing level
of effort. In the presence of moral hazard, however, firms cannot condition the terms
of the contract on important dimensions of employee behavior, including effort and
output. Firms respond by relying on “second-best" self-enforcing incentive contracts
or coercive measures to align agents’ interests with their own (Hölmstrom, 1979;
Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hart and Holmstrom, 1987; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
In theory, firms can overcome these frictions by investing in monitoring technologies
that reduce information asymmetries and reveal the performance of their workers
more accurately (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Hölmstrom, 1979; Hubbard, 2003). In
practice, however, the impact of these technologies on contracts is unclear: the
presence of institutional and managerial frictions may limit employers’ ability to
leverage the additional information needed to change the contract and employees’
behavior.
This paper studies the impact of moral hazard on labor contracting, and pro-
ductivity, and the extent to which improved monitoring eases these frictions. We
also investigate whether monitoring technologies subsequently improve firm prof-
its, and worker well-being. We implement a randomized control trial where we
introduce a novel monitoring device to a subset of firms operating in Kenya’s transit
industry. The industry is dominated by thousands of small-scale entrepreneurs who
own a few minibuses (“matatus") that run on designated routes. These matatus
are the only reliable form of transportation and serve 70% of Nairobi’s four million
commuters daily.1 We recruited 255 owners operating along 9 major commuter
routes to participate in the study, and we randomly selected 125 to be part of the
treatment group. The monitoring device was fitted to all the matatus in our sample,
but only transmitted data to minibus owners in the treatment group.2 We developed
our own device because available alternatives on the market were either too costly,
or not sophisticated enough. Our device records and transmits via a mobile app the
location of the vehicle, the number of kilometers driven, and the number of hours
the ignition was on. While the owner does not know the number of passengers that
boarded the vehicle, they can use this information to monitor drivers’ operations
throughout the day and to gain a more precise estimate of total daily revenue.
The contracting environment we study here is not unique to Kenya or trans-
portation, as the dynamics that characterize this space are prevalent in many other
settings, including agriculture and the service industry. First, employers (owners)
cannot observe the amount of revenue their employees (drivers) collect, nor the
amount of effort drivers invests. Second, drivers in this setting are from relatively
poor households, and they cannot afford to walk away without pay on days when
total revenue is low nor can they pay for repairs when the vehicle is damaged,
1Similar transit systems are present in Mexico (peseros), the Philippines (jeepney’s), Indonesia
(tuk-tuks), India (rickshaws), and Tanzania (dala-dala’s), among others.
2The drivers were present during the installations of the devices, but they were not informed
about whether the owner was in the treatment group or not.
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meaning that in practice they have limited or no liability to the owners. Drivers
are known to run away from accidents so they can avoid being held accountable
by owners or the police. In light of these constraints, firms have overwhelmingly
opted for fixed-rent contracts (locally referred to as a “target" contract) with limited
liability. The owner specifies an amount of revenue that the driver must deliver
by the end of the day, net of fuel expenses. According to the contract, the driver
should deliver the fixed rent (“target") amount if the revenue they collect exceeds
the target (keeping any revenue they earn above it). If the earnings are below the
target, the contract stipulates that the driver must hand over all of the revenue they
earned.
In order to understand the impact of the device, we adapt a standard principal-
agent framework to reflect the actual employer-employee relationships within this
network. In the absence of a monitoring technology, the model predicts that drivers
will engage in a number of behaviors that are sub-optimal from the firm’s perspec-
tive. First, drivers under-report revenue so they can be sure to walk away with
slightly more income than they would otherwise. Note: rampant cheating is kept in
check by owners who threaten to punish and ultimately fire drivers who are caught
under-reporting. Second, drivers under-supply effort on days when they are un-
likely to make the target price. On these particular days, drivers know they will not
be the residual claimant and reap the benefits of higher effort. Third, drivers engage
in more damaging driving than what owners would optimally choose. Damaging
driving refers to the maneuvers drivers make that may damage the vehicle. These
actions include driving on the shoulder of the road, or veering off the designated
route onto roads that are more bumpy and damaging to the vehicle. The driver
engages in such damaging behavior because he reaps the benefits in terms of higher
revenue, without bearing any of the downside risk (the limited liability constraint
binds).
We model the introduction of the new technology as increasing: 1) the precision
of the owner’s signal about total revenue and 2) the probability the owner detects
damaging driving. This has implications for the owners’ choice of contract and
drivers’ behavior, which we test in our data. According to the model, the monitoring
technology reduces drivers’ information rents and lowers their utility. Owners
recognize this outcome and compensate by reducing the target. Empirically, we
have some suggestive evidence that owners steadily reduce the target throughout
the study period. By the last month of the study, the target set by treatment owners
is approximately 4.1% lower than the target set by control owners.
The model then predicts that drivers’ behavior is affected along three key di-
mensions. First, the drivers’ incentive to lie about the total amount of revenue they
collected is reduced, which means that we should see lower under-reporting. We
confirm this prediction in our data: under-reported revenue falls by approximately
100 shillings (1 USD) per day (a 16% decrease). Second, the model predicts that
drivers will increase their effort to compensate for the income they lose from lower
under-reporting. In parallel, as the target falls, drivers also have an incentive to
increase their effort because they can become the residual claimant more easily.
We capture a precise measure of effort through the tracking device, which powers
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on and off with the matatu, and consequently find that the number of hours the
vehicle is on the road increases by 1.4 hours per day (a 9.9% increase). Finally, we
expect the driver to reduce instances of damaging driving because they are more
likely to be caught by the owner. We proxy damaging driving by the amount of
repair costs the owner incurs, and we find these decrease by 200 shillings (2 USD)
per day (46%) by the last month of the study. We have evidence to suggest this
outcome comes from fewer instances of driving on alternate routes that are bumpy.
Next, we investigate the effect of these changes on firm profitability. We find that
profits increase by 13%, which is primarily driven by lower repair costs. These gains
in firm profits more than offset the cost of the device, suggesting that a tracking
device like the one we designed for this study would be a worthwhile investment if
it were available on the market. Owners also report that monitoring their drivers
has become significantly easier, and they trust their drivers more, consistent with
a reduction in management costs. Subsequently, we ask whether this improved
profitability and better management fueled business growth. We find that treatment
owners have 0.145 more vehicles (11% increase) on average than control owners
by the end of the study. This suggests that inadequate monitoring may represent
an important barrier to firm growth in low-income countries.
It is also important to investigate whether these benefits to the firm come at the
expense of their workers. The introduction of ICT has generated some debate in
low-income countries. On the one hand, there is a concern that these technologies
concentrate all of the bargaining power in the hands of the employer. We do see
some evidence of this as the amount of revenue drivers can under-report falls,
and drivers work more (although their salary per hour stays the same). However,
proponents of these new technologies suggest that they increase employers’ trust
in their employees, which makes for better managers (Pierce, Snow, and McAfee,
2015). We have some suggestive evidence of this in our data. In a qualitative
survey we conducted six months after the experiment concluded, we find that 65%
of drivers said the tracking device made their job easier (26% said nothing changed).
This suggests that the effects of new technologies on worker well-being are nuanced,
despite the net benefit they represent for firms.
These first results demonstrate how alleviating moral hazard affects operations
within the firm. However, the presence of monitoring devices can also have ef-
fects outside of the firm, as profit-maximizing behavior by firms and their employ-
ees may impose negative externalities. In public transportation systems, moni-
toring technologies are often used to check and limit instances of unsafe driving.
Kenya’s matatu sector is notorious for its poor safety standards: drivers often over-
accelerate, speed, stop suddenly, and turn sharply in order to collect more pas-
sengers.3 Our monitoring technology records these four instances, in addition to
maximum and average speeds, and conveys them to owners through a separate
tab in the mobile app. It is important to note that these traditional measures of
3Matatus account for 11% of registered vehicles but 70.2% of passenger casualties (Macharia
et al., 2009). Buses in the US account for 1% of registered vehicles and 0.4% of casualties (BTS,
2016).
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unsafe driving need not be perfectly correlated with the damaging driving behavior
outlined above. For example, drivers often choose to bypass slow-moving traffic
by taking rough, unpaved roads that harm the vehicle but pose no safety danger.
Alternatively, driving quickly through crowded pedestrian areas may be unsafe, but
it is unlikely to cause significant damage to the vehicle.
A priori, it was not clear how the owners would use the safety information we
provided. On the one hand, owners may internalize the dangers associated with
unsafe driving because, unlike their drivers, they bear the cost if their vehicle gets
into an accident or receives a fine.4 In that case, they might use the information to
induce drivers to limit behaviors that result in these accidents and fines. On the
other hand, owners may perceive the risk of accidents to be low and disregard this
information. Alternatively, while owners care about damages to the vehicle, these
may only be weakly correlated with unsafe driving (as detailed above). If they use
the device to incentivize effort only, the number of safety violations could worsen
over the study period, producing a negative externality for Nairobi’s commuters.
Despite all the safety information we provided, the frequency of unsafe driving
events flagged by the device does not change significantly, and instances of speeding
remain the same. It follows that the gains to firms do not come at the expense of
commuters. However, these results also suggest that external intervention may be
necessary to improve safety. We tested the efficacy of one such intervention by pro-
viding small cash incentives to drivers conditional on safe driving. This treatment
was designed to mirror the actions that a regulatory body could potentially take in
this setting.5 Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of an intervention
that encouraged the employees (drivers) rather than the employers (owners) to in-
ternalize the negative externalities produced by the business. We find that the cash
incentives meaningfully reduce safety violations committed by drivers, confirming
that third-party intervention can successfully address these firm externalities. How-
ever, these effects do not persist after the removal of the cash incentives, suggesting
that further action or permanent regulation is needed to induce long-lasting change.
This paper contributes to three different literatures. First, the paper speaks to
the vast theoretical work on principal-agent relationships and contract formation,
which predominantly focuses on deriving the optimal contract subject to various
constraints (Hölmstrom, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hart and Holmstrom,
1987; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). Our paper, by contrast, empirically demon-
strates how contracts change when these constraints are alleviated via monitoring
technologies. Measuring the impact of monitoring is challenging because shirk-
ing behavior is hard to detect by design, a firm’s decision to monitor is often not
random, and data on firm operations are difficult to obtain. There are only two
other papers to our knowledge that overcome these limitations. Baker and Hubbard
4The owner may also have limited liability as they are protected by insurance. However insurance
does not always cover full repairs, and premiums will rise if the owner continues filing insurance
claims. The owner therefore always absorbs much more liability in the event of an accident, which
means that owners should prefer less accidents and fines on average than the driver.
5South Africa’s Ethekwini municipality is testing one such intervention in the coming months
(Payet, 2018).
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(2003, 2004) investigate how the introduction of onboard diagnostic computers
(OBCs) change ownership patterns in the U.S trucking industry. Baker and Hub-
bard (2004) demonstrate that shipping companies respond to the introduction of
OBCs by hiring drivers to operate their vehicles (rather than working with drivers
who already own their own trucks). Our paper differs from this existing work in
a number of ways. We generate exogenous variation in the usage of monitoring
technologies by randomizing which companies receive data from a tracking device.
We also capture high frequency data on contracts and worker behavior. This allows
us to monitor how different dimensions of the contract, and worker performance,
change over time. We can then document the impact on firm profits and worker
well-being (salary per hour, hours worked, sense of trust).
These papers are also concentrated in developed countries, and we have reason
to believe that the impacts of monitoring could be different in low-income coun-
tries. Management quality is different, and employers may not use the information
effectively (Bloom et al., 2013; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2017). Employers
also face additional frictions that may limit their ability to use the information:
law enforcement is weak and limited liability constraints bind. Contrary to Baker
and Hubbard (2004), we do not find that ownership patterns change as a result
of monitoring, precisely because of existing constraints (drivers cannot afford their
own vehicles). Nevertheless, we do find that firms use the technology to change
the terms of the contract, and to induce their employees to behave in a way that
aligns with the firms’ best interest. There is only one other paper to our knowledge
that investigates the impact of monitoring technologies within firms in a develop-
ing country: de Rochambeau (2018) studies the use of GPS devices by managers
in Liberia’s long-range trucking industry. She finds that monitoring technologies
crowd out high-performing workers’ intrinsic motivation.6 Our analysis builds on
this work by investigating how monitoring technologies alleviate other key dimen-
sions of moral hazard (including damaging driving, and lying about total revenue).
We also focus on the impact of these devices on contracts.
Second, our findings add to the literature investigating the barriers to firm
growth in low-income countries. Identifying the constraints to firm growth is a
question of great policy relevance given the large contribution these firms make
to emerging economies. Empirical research on small firm growth has identified
three key challenges facing firms: credit constraints, labor-market frictions, and
managerial deficits (Bloom et al., 2014). Our paper most closely resembles the
work on managerial deficits, which refers to the difficulties firms face managing
the day-to-day operations (including financial accounts and inventories), and incen-
tivizing and monitoring workers. Most of the work in this field studies the impact
of business training programs (Bloom et al., 2013; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen,
6Note there are additional studies that document the impacts of monitoring in low-income
countries - but they do not focus on the employer-employee relationship within the firm. Duflo,
Hanna, and Ryan (2012) find that teacher absenteeism in India decreases when their attendance is
monitored; Björkman and Svensson (2009) demonstrate that community health workers exert more
effort when their performance is scrutinized by the community; and Duflo et al. (2013) find that
incentives for third-party auditors can improve their reporting.
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2017; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2016; Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden, 2014; de
Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2014; Valvidia, 2012). These interventions provide
information about how to manage aspects of the business that do not involve em-
ployees (maintaining business records, separating finances, inventory, controlling
for quality, marketing). In contrast, our paper focuses on the role of moral hazard,
and how providing information specifically about employees’ behavior can change
firm operations. We find monitoring technologies improve firm profits and reduce
management costs, which helps the treated firms grow. As prices fall, these tech-
nologies are becoming increasingly prevalent, making their impacts important to
understand.
Finally, our results on damaging driving and traditional safety metrics contribute
to a growing empirical literature on policies that promote compliance with govern-
ment regulation - in this case with safety regulation. In recent years, international
institutions have provided funding, knowledge and technical assistance to build
systems aimed at reducing the number of traffic injuries and deaths worldwide
(World Bank, 2014).7 These efforts are difficult to evaluate because the investments
are multi-faceted and typically rolled out across an entire city. One exception is a
program that was launched in Kenya, which placed stickers inside Nairobi’s matatus
to encourage passengers to complain to their drivers about unsafe driving (Hab-
yarimana and Jack, 2015). They find that the intervention reduced accidents by
25-30%. Our intervention complements their approach by asking whether drivers,
in addition to passengers, can be incentivized to improve safe driving. We find that
owners with access to the monitoring device do not internalize the negative exter-
nalities produced by their drivers. We only document improvements in safety when
we directly incentivize drivers. This result suggests that investments in technologies
that monitor unsafe driving may be more effective when combined with external
incentives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses
Kenya’s transportation system, the prevalence of moral hazard, and the scope for
monitoring. Section 3.3 details the field experiment, and Section 1.4 reviews the
data. We present a simple theoretical framework in Section 2.4. Section 3.4 dis-
cusses each of our results. We then discuss the implications of the findings and
conclude in the final section.
1.2 Context
1.2.1 Nairobi’s Matatus
Nairobi’s transportation system was developed after Kenya’s independence in 1963
(Mutongi, 2017). Small-scale entrepreneurs responded to the growing demand for
mobility by retrofitting old vehicles and transporting passengers from the suburbs
7According to the Global Status Report on Road Safety, 1.24 million people are killed in traffic
accidents each year and 90 percent of these deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs)
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to the urban center. The buses were labelled “matatus", meaning three in Kikuyu,
in reference to the early ticket price in Kenyan Shillings (KES) of a matatu ride
(where 100 KES = 1 USD). These private businesses were legalized in 1973, but
remained largely unregulated until 2003 when the government passed the Michuki
rules, requiring that buses install speed limiters, safety belts, and ensure that all
drivers exhibit valid licenses (Michuki, 2003). To date, these regulations are rarely
enforced. In 2010, the Ministry of Transport issued a new directive to further
formalize the industry and eliminate the presence of gangs that were becoming
increasingly active in the sector. This required that all minibus owners form or
join transport Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) or transport companies
licensed to a particular route (McCormick et al., 2013). At present, industry new-
comers must first register with a SACCO or transport company before they can put
their vehicle on the road. Transport companies are rare in Nairobi and manage
buses on behalf of individual investors. SACCOs on the other hand leave the daily
management of the vehicle to the owner, but facilitate centralized organizational ac-
tivities including scheduling, resolving internal disputes between owners, ensuring
compliance with the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA) regulations,
and providing financial services to owners and drivers.
This informal network of buses constitutes the only dependable transit system in
Nairobi, and the city comes to a near standstill on days when drivers strike. Rough
estimates suggest that 15,000 to 20,000 buses currently circulate throughout the
city, swerving on and off the road to collect passengers along their designated route.
The industry remains almost entirely locally owned: private entrepreneurs purchase
14 or 33 seat minibuses, and hire a driver to operate the vehicle along their SACCO’s
designated route. The presence of severe competition within a route explains the
dangerous driving that prevails throughout the industry. According to the World
Health Organization’s Global Status Report on Road Safety, approximately 3,000-
13,000 people die annually from traffic incidents in Kenya, and at least 30% of cases
involve matatus (WHO, 2015). Conditions have not improved measurably in recent
years. However, in an effort to combat negative stereotypes, matatu owners are
increasingly investing in the comfort of their vehicle, the aesthetic (colorful interior
and exterior), the quality of the “experience" (helping passengers on and off the
bus), and the perks (TV’s) (Reed, 2018). There are no regulations placed on the
aesthetic of the vehicle. Nevertheless, the more attractive and comfortable vehicles
can charge up to twice the price of regular ones. Matatu fares vary between 0.5
and 1.5 USD for travel inside the city center, and between 1 and 5 USD for trips to
the outskirts.
This transportation industry is appealing to study for a number of reasons. First,
it is representative of many other informal transit systems worldwide, including
Tanzania’s dala dala’s, Haiti’s tap tap’s and India’s rickshaws, among others. More-
over, the sector is economically meaningful in terms of the number of individuals
it employs and the amount of income it generates. In Kenya, estimates suggest
that the industry employs over 500,000 people and contributes up to 5% of the
country’s GDP (Kenya Roads Board, 2007). Most importantly, this context allows
us to overcome major data constraints that have limited previous research in the
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space. Namely, we collect detailed information on the contract terms set by the
employer and the actions of the employee (their choice of effort and lying). We
also introduce exogenous variation into the costs of monitoring in order to observe
changes to the contract.
1.2.2 Driver and owners
In this study we work exclusively with small firms that meet three basic criteria.
First, the owners of these vehicles manage their matatu themselves, as opposed to
hiring a third party manager. Second, the owners are not the primary drivers of the
vehicle.8 These two conditions were designed to focus the research on the classical
principal-agent relationship. Finally, we only worked with owners that had a single
matatu at the time of recruitment. We chose single owner-driver pairs to remove
any dynamics that arise from one driver reporting differently from another, sending
competing signals for the owner to parse through. According to an exploratory
survey we conducted in the pre-pilot phase of the experiment, approximately 25%
of matatu owners in the general population meet these three criteria.9
In this industry, owners have settled on a fixed rent contract with limited liability
that is negotiated daily. Owners rent their vehicles to a driver every morning for
an agreed upon “target price" (henceforth referred to as the ‘target’). Unlike the
taxi systems in many high-income countries, the driver is expected to deliver this
amount at the end of the day once all the fares have been collected. This is primarily
because drivers have limited capital and cannot afford to pay the amount up front.
Drivers are the residual claimants in this contract and keep everything they earn
above the target. The owner is not allowed to revise the terms of the contract and
claim more revenue if the driver has had a good day. In the event that the driver
cannot make the target, they are supposed to provide the total revenue they earned
to the owner. In practice, drivers under-report total revenue to make sure they have
some income left over. If they fail to make the target too many times, or they are
caught under-reporting too frequently, they will be fired. In addition to choosing
the amount of revenue they declare (under-reporting), drivers decide the number
of hours they work (effort), their driving style (including driving maneuvers that
may damage the vehicle). Owners cannot directly observe these three actions by
the driver (under-reporting, effort, damaging driving), and must resort to costly
monitoring techniques. This includes phone calls, dropping by the terminus of the
route and staging someone at various stops to monitor whether the bus drives by.
This negotiation process is repeated daily over the phone (and occasionally in
person). Formal documents are not signed because legal recourse is virtually non-
existent. Typically owners and drivers have worked with each other for just over two
years. The target price is set at approximately 3000 KES (30 USD) every day, and
8Owners do not operate the vehicles themselves for two reasons. First, it allows them to pursue
side-jobs that are more lucrative than being a driver. Second, driving is a tough job that individuals
like to avoid if they have other options.
9If we allowed owners to posses two or three matatus, over 50% of matatu owners satisfied these
conditions.
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drivers make this target 44% of the time. On days when they do not report making
above the target, they under-report revenue by approximately 700 KES. Drivers
are typically on the road between 12-14 hours per day, and make approximately 10
trips to and from the city center.
This contract structure appears to be one of the only viable alternatives in this
industry. A fixed wage payment is unattractive to most owners because drivers
face incentives to undersupply effort when they cannot be monitored. The few
SACCOs that have adopted this payment scheme have hired full time managers who
supervise the drivers closely. Anecdotal evidence suggests that drivers also dislike
this remuneration scheme because it eliminates the large windfall they receive on
the best days. Next, a fixed rent contract is impossible to enforce because drivers
are poor and hence the limited liability constraint always binds. This leaves the
traditional sharecropping model or a fixed rent contract with limited liability. A
sharecropping contract in this industry would have to take the form of a profit-
sharing agreement where owners and drivers are each responsible for their share of
the costs. However, mosts of the costs that the vehicle incurs are beyond the means
of a matatu driver. A typical service fee is 2000 KES, which the driver simply cannot
pay upfront. Similarly, in the extreme case that a matatu gets into an accident,
drivers are known for running away from the scene. Moreover, a sharecropping
model with unobserved output means that drivers can consistently under-report
the amount they collect. The cost of under-reporting is low because drivers can
easily hide undisclosed revenue. These limitations may explain why owners find
this contract structure is less attractive.
A fixed rent contract with limited liability ensures that drivers face incentives to
supply effort when they earn more than the target. It also limits under-reporting
to days when the driver does not report making the target (there is no incentive to
under-report on good days because they are the residual claimant). Note that due
to the limited liability constraint, the supply of effort under this contract scheme
will be less than the first-best outcome because the driver does not supply opti-
mal effort on days when they do not expect to reach or exceed the target. This
contract structure is prevalent in many informal transportation systems worldwide.
It also characterizes relationships in agriculture where absentee landlords cannot
supervise their tenants; in the service industry where employers cannot record the
number of services provided by their employees; and in businesses where inventory
is difficult to monitor.
1.2.3 Device (Hardware and Software)
Monitoring technologies are becoming widely available in many developing coun-
tries, including Kenya. The majority of long-range bus companies that travel be-
tween the country’s main cities are equipped with tracking devices. Moreover, some
banks in Nairobi recently announced that they would only issue loans for minibuses
whose location could be tracked with a device. Despite their availability, most
medium range buses and inner-city public transportation vehicles are not yet using
them. When asked why, most vehicle owners cite the high cost of sophisticated
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tracking systems (approximately 600 dollars for the tracker and additional monthly
installments for system access), or the lack of detailed information provided by the
cheaper alternatives.
To fill this need, the research team created a new monitoring system for city
buses that is considerably cheaper, more flexible and more powerful than traditional
tracking devices. The physical tracking units were procured for 125$ from a com-
pany in the United States (CalAmp). They feature GPS, internal back-up battery
packs, 3-axis accelerometer for motion sense, tilt and impact detection. The de-
vice was designed to capture and transmit the information we required, including
the 95th percentile and average forward/backward/lateral/vertical acceleration,
as well as the 95th percentile and average forward/backward jerk. The device
was also calibrated to generate alerts for every instance of vehicle speeding, over-
acceleration, sharp braking and sharp turning. These safety alerts were calculated
by an internal algorithm built into the CalAmp device with threshold parameters
as inputs, using the full sequence of acceleration and speed data to identify un-
safe driving actions. Further processing of the CalAmp system data on the server
provided additional measures of interest including the total number of kilometers
traveled that day, the total time the matatu was running, and a safety index (from
aggregating the day’s safety alerts). Finally, an API call was generated each time
the owner used the app to request data from the server. These calls were recorded
in the database and provided a measure of owners’ usage of the app. In this way,
we could track which types of information the owner found most valuable and how
often the owner requested this information.
The data captured by the CalAmp device was transmitted to owners via a mobile
application that was specifically designed to present information simply. The app
(referred to as “SmartMatatu") provided information in three ways (Figure 1.1).
The first tab was a map of Nairobi and presented the real-time location of the
vehicle. By entering a specific date and time interval into the phone, the app would
display the exact routes traveled by the matatu over this time period. This first tab
provided owners with a more accurate measure of driver effort because they could
track where the driver was at any point in time. It also conveyed a more accurate
measure of damaging driving because they could see if the driver was operating
on bumpy routes. The second tab displayed all the safety alerts that were captured
by the device. The owner could click on the safety event to find out when and
where it had occurred on the map. It is important to remember that these safety
alerts are not necessarily correlated with damaging driving behaviors such as off-
route driving. The final tab conveyed a summary of the driver’s productivity and
safety. The productivity section of this page listed the total mileage covered, and
the duration the ignition was turned on that day. This could be used by owners to
estimate total revenue more precisely. The safety section of this page also provided
the owner with an overview of the number of safety violations that occurred that
day, as well as the driver’s daily safety rating relative to all other drivers on the road
that day (where a thumbs up appeared for scores of 60% and above, a sideways
thumb for scores between 40% and 60%, and a thumbs down for scores of 40%
and below).
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1.3 Experimental Design
1.3.1 Sample Recruitment
We conducted an extensive recruitment drive in late 2015 by contacting 61 SACCOs
that were operating along various routes across the city. We organized several
large meetings with matatu owners in each SACCO, presenting the study’s goals
and methodology. All owners were informed at the time of recruitment that a
monitoring device would be placed in their vehicle free of charge, and they would
be required to provide daily information about their business operations. We also
mentioned that a random subset of owners would be selected to receive information
from the tracker via a smartphone app for a six month time period, while others
would have to wait 6 months before gaining access to the information for a shorter
two month period. It took approximately four months to recruit enough participants
across 9 major commuter routes (Figure 1.2). Owners who expressed interest in the
study during the recruitment drive were contacted again over the phone to confirm
their willingness to participate in the experiment, and to check that they met the
three study requirements (owners had to own a single matatu, which they rented
to a driver, and manage the firm’s operations themselves).
1.3.2 Installations
The first installation took place in November 2016, and continued until April 2017.
The field team, managed by EchoMobile, was able to fit approximately 15 matatus
per week with a device (Figure 2.3). The team scheduled a time to meet each
owner individually at a location of their choosing. The owner was compensated for
the time their vehicle spent off-road to perform the installation of the device with a
one-time payment of 5000 KES (50 USD) and a new Android phone (worth approx-
imately 80 USD) to ensure they could access the SmartMatatu app. The installation
process was rather complex, requiring a team of three staff (an enumerator, a field
manager, and an engineer). While the mechanic worked on fitting the device in
the matatu, the field manager took the owner aside to re-explain the purpose of
the research project and the tracking device’s functionality. For owners in the treat-
ment group, the field manager conducted an additional training on the app. At
the same time, the enumerator administered the baseline survey to the driver in a
separate location, outside of the owner’s earshot, so that the driver felt comfortable
answering the questions honestly. Once the field manager finished the training
with the owner, and the enumerator finished administering the survey to the driver,
they switched. The field manager then took the driver aside to explain that they
would receive a daily SMS to elicit information about the day’s operations and to
emphasize that all of the data they shared would remain confidential. Meanwhile,
the enumerator conducted a 20-minute baseline survey with the owner. This whole
installation process took approximately 1 hour to complete. The field manager
shared his contact information with the owner and the driver so they could contact
him with any further questions they had.
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1.3.3 Treatment Assignment
The first treatment arm is referred to as the “information treatment". Owners in
our sample were randomly allocated to a treatment and a control group. Owners
in the treatment group were provided with free access to the data produced by the
monitoring device immediately after installation. Owners in the control group were
informed that they would receive the same access six months after the device was
installed. During the device installations our field manager spent an additional 30
minutes with treatment owners explaining the types of data that would be visible
on the SmartMatatu app. A small survey was administered to the owners at the end
of their training to make sure they knew how to find all the information contained
in the app. Despite this in-depth training, it took owners a few months to feel
comfortable navigating the different tabs in the app. We informed treatment and
control drivers that a tracker would be placed in their vehicle. We did not mention,
however, whether the information would be transferred to the owner. This meant
that any subsequent changes we observed in driver behavior could only come from
owners using the tracker data, rather than from receiving different information
from the enumerators during the installation.
Four months after the information treatment was launched, we introduced a
second treatment arm, referred to as the “safety" treatment. We selected half of the
treatment drivers and half of the control drivers and offered them cash incentives to
drive safely. This arm was designed to simulate the role of a functioning regulatory
system and monetize the tradeoff between revenue and safety that drivers face. The
cash incentive drivers were then randomly split into two groups: a one-month treat-
ment group and a two-month treatment group. This was done so we could study
whether any changes in driving behavior that might be induced by the incentives
would persist after they were removed. The specific incentive amount they received
was determined by a safety rating, calculated daily for each driver in the following
way. We analyzed two weeks of data for each driver (dropping days with less than
30km), tracking 1) the number of alerts of each type (speeding, heavy braking,
sharp turning and over-acceleration), and 2) the number of hours worked. For each
driver, day and alert type we computed the rate of violations by dividing the number
of alerts by the number of hours worked. For each driver, we then constructed a
distribution of these rates for each alert type and found the percentile into which
that day’s alert rate fell. We then calculated the weighted average percentile for
each driver-day by adding the alert rates for each type, applying weights of 1/3 for
speeding and braking, and 1/6 for over-acceleration and turning. The average we
computed each day lay between 1 and 100. We assessed the cutoff below which
they fell and disbursed their incentives accordingly (fewer safety violations resulted
in a lower percentile and a higher payout).
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1.4 Data Collection
We collected data from three different sources. The first data set is a panel of
daily responses from owners and drivers which we gathered through the app and
SMS surveys, respectively. Next the enumerators conducted 8 monthly surveys,
beginning with the baseline, followed by 6 monthly surveys and wrapping up with
the endline. Finally the GPS tracker collected a wealth of data that we use to
measure driving behavior, including safety violations.
1.4.1 Non-system application variables
The SmartMatatu app was also designed to collect information from owners. Col-
lecting accurate data can be very challenging in these settings, and this system was
created to improve the quality of the data we received. Owners in the study were
reminded daily via a notification on their phone to report on that day’s business
activities through a form located on the app. They were asked to submit data
on: the “target" amount assigned to their driver at the beginning of the day; the
amount the driver delivered to the owner; any repair costs incurred; an overall
satisfaction score for their driver’s performance (bad, neutral, good); and whether
the driver was fired/quit that day. Once the report was successfully submitted,
owners received 40 KES via M-Pesa (a mobile phone-based money transfer service).
We collected similar information from drivers through SMS surveys (because the
drivers were not provided with smartphones). At the end of every work day around
10pm, drivers would receive a text message asking whether they were ready to
respond to the survey. Once they agreed, individual text messages were sent to the
driver asking for: the total revenue the matatu collected from fares that day; the
amount they spent on fuel; and their “take home salary" (their residual income after
expenses and paying the owner). Once the driver responded to all the questions,
they were sent 40 KES via M-Pesa to incentivize consistent reporting.10
We developed a set of processes for checking and validating the daily data we
received from owners and drivers. Echo Mobile wrote code to check for anoma-
lies including outliers and entries that did not make sense and/or suggested the
owner/driver may not have understood how to answer the question. A team of enu-
merators would then follow up with owners and drivers over the phone about each
one of these entries. In cases where owners and drivers were able to justify their
responses, the enumerators would record their justifications in an excel spreadsheet.
In cases when owners and drivers revised their responses, this data was corrected
on the server.
10Note we do not see different submission rates, or differential reporting, between treatment and
control - as detailed in appendix Tables C.1 and A.2).
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1.4.2 Monthly Surveys
We conducted eight rounds of surveys. We first administered the baseline survey
during the tracker installation. The owner baseline survey collected detailed infor-
mation regarding basic demographics, employment history, features of the matatu,
and their relationship with the current driver. Similarly the driver baseline asked
about driver demographics, experience as a driver, unemployment spells, and their
relationship with the current owner. For both owners and drivers we measured
cognitive ability through Raven’s matrices. We also used games to gauge drivers’
risk aversion and driver/owner propensity to trust one another. To measure risk
we asked respondents whether they would prefer to receive 500 KES for certain
or play a lottery to win 1500 KES. The game was repeated multiple times, with
increasingly favorable lottery odds. The trust game presented owners with 500 KES
and asked them to select a certain amount to be placed back in an envelope. They
were informed that this amount would be tripled and delivered to the matatu driver
who was then going to decide how much to keep for himself and how much to
return to the owner. The amount they chose to place in the envelope was recorded
in the survey. When playing the game with drivers, we first presented them with an
envelope containing 900 KES. This amount was standardized across all drivers to
ensure they faced the same choice. The drivers were informed about the owner’s
decision and how this amount was then tripled. The drivers were asked to return
however much they wanted to the owner.
We proceeded with 5 monthly follow-up surveys. The monthly surveys were
administered with three purposes in mind. First, they provided an opportunity for
enumerators to follow up regularly with matatu owners and drivers and address any
questions they might have about the device. Second, they were used to remind both
parties to continue submitting the daily reports in the SmartMatatu app. Finally,
they were designed to collect some basic data. As owners and drivers reached the 6-
month mark, we conducted an endline survey to measure changes in key outcomes,
and to assess the impact of the information treatment and the cash incentives.
1.4.3 Tracking data
The CalAmp tracking device transmitted high frequency data on forward/backward/
lateral/vertical acceleration, jerk, location and a timestamp. We use the raw mea-
sures of acceleration to investigate changes in driver behavior. Specifically, we look
at vertical and lateral acceleration to determine whether the driver is operating on
bumpier stretches of road. Furthermore, we use the GPS data to calculate how
far each vehicle is from the route they are licensed to be on at any point in time.
This provides a measure of how far the driver is deviating from the actual route.
Figure 1.4 depicts the number of times vehicles licensed to route 126 pass through
a particular lon-lan cell. The first panel clearly shows what the route should be, and
the second panel overlays the designated route to confirm. The figure illustrates
that off-route driving is relatively common practice.
The tracker subsequently fed the raw data into an algorithm that computed
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the number of safety events that occurred in a 30 second time frame. Thresholds
were calibrated for the Kenyan roads to avoid capturing an unreasonable number
of safety violations and losing credibility among owners. These events included
instances of speeding, over-acceleration, sharp braking, and sharp turns. The data
was then further aggregated on the backend to produce daily reports on the number
of safety violations, which is what we use for our analysis.
1.5 A Principal-Agent model with unobserved output
The purpose of the model is to generate key predictions about how the monitoring
device affects the principal-agent relationship. The owner sets a target in KES that
the driver must deliver by the end of the day. The driver chooses the amount of
effort and damaging driving they engage in. Damaging (i.e risky) driving refers
to the set of behaviors that damage the company asset (which are not necessarily
correlated with the unsafe driving metrics we will discuss in the results section).
The driver also decides when they will under-report revenue, and by how much -
because revenue is unobserved to the owner. This results in five key parameters,
and we derive comparative statics for each one. For simplicity we assume that both
owners and drivers are risk-neutral.
Given that all of the contracts in this transportation sector follow this fixed form,
and they do not change over time, we restrict our attention to contracts of this type
(detailed in more depth right below). We then derive comparative statics resulting
from the introduction of the monitoring technology, which affects the parameters
of the contract (not the type of contract), and driver behavior. There are three
additional departures from the classical setting: 1) the driver selects both effort
and risk levels, 2) production is unobservable to the principle (allowing the driver
to misrepresent production), and 3) the principle observes a signal of production.
1.5.1 Status Quo
The model is comprised of four steps that correspond to the owner-driver daily
interaction.
1. First, the owner sets the target (T ), and asks the driver to deliver it by the end
of the day.
2. Second, the driver chooses how much effort (e) and damaging driving (r) to
engage in. The days’ random events unfold (ε), and total revenue is generated.
We define total revenue q as:
q = e + rε
where r ≥ 1 (it is impossible for drivers to avoid risky driving entirely). This
production function says that an increase in effort shifts the distribution of
output to the right, while an increase in risk reduces the variance of rev-
enue while keeping the mean constant (this is similar to (Ghatak and Pandey,
2000)). We assume drivers choose the amount of effort and risk before ε is
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realized. A driver that chooses to behave in a really risky manner will expe-
rience more extreme outcomes depending on the days events. For example,
if he chooses to drive off-route a lot (higher risk), he may be caught by the
police and impounded (earning very low revenue that day) or he may get
away with it and earn high revenue. While q = q(e, r, ε), I will suppress the
arguments for notational convenience throughout the rest of the paper. Note:
q is observed to the driver, because they collected passenger fares throughout
the day, but it is not unobservable to the owner.
3. Third, the driver chooses how much revenue to report to the owner (q˜).
4. Finally the owner decides whether or not to punish based on 1) whether
he detects any damages to the vehicle, and 2) whether he can be sure the
driver is under-reporting revenue. Note these punishments are non-monetary
(firing, reprimands) because the driver’s limited liability constraint binds -
they cannot be expected to pay monetary costs.
We solve the model in 4 steps, via backward induction.
Step 1: Owner’s punishment
The owner punishes the driver for two types of behaviors. First, they will punish
the driver if they detect any damages to the vehicle. The expected punishment is
expressed as βr, where β is the probability the owner detects risky driving that dam-
ages the vehicle, and r are the damages incurred. Note that without a monitoring
technology β is close to zero because the owner has a hard time detecting behavior
that damages the vehicle.
Second, the owner will punish based on the driver’s reported revenue (q˜). We
know the owner (principal) sets a target amount (T) at the beginning of the day,
which they want the driver (agent) to deliver by the end of the day. The driver
earns revenue (q) from passenger fares, and decides how much to report to the
owner (q˜). Owners do not observe actual revenues that are collected by drivers
from passenger fares throughout the day (q), but they receive a signal (qˆ) about
what true revenue (q) should be. This signal comes from the information owners
gather about driving conditions and driver behavior throughout the day. Absent a
monitoring technology, the owners signal will be informed by listening the news,
visiting the designated route, or talking to their friends. We assume the owner’s
signal is noisy but unbiased, so that qˆ is defined as follows:
qˆ = q − σ
σ ∼ F
(
0,
1
α
)
where α is the precision of the owners’ signal about true revenue. Any monitoring
technology we introduce will provide more information to the owner about driver
behavior. This will increase the precision of the owner’s signal about what revenue
should be, which gives the driver less leeway to significantly under-report revenue
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on a particular day. In the case of our monitoring technology specifically, the owner
can observe the number of kilometers driven, and where the driver was operating
at any point in time. Owners can use this information to estimate the number of
trips to and from the city center, which provides a more accurate measure of total
daily revenue.
In principle the owner’s decision to punish the driver could depend on 1) the
level of reported revenue (q˜), and 2) the signal of actual revenue (qˆ). In theory,
punishing based on the level of q˜ is rational because owners may be able to infer that
their driver invested low effort or took too much risk from a very low q˜. Alternatively,
owners could punish based on (qˆ − q˜) because this difference reflects how much
the owner thinks the driver is lying. In practice, the most effective punishment
will depend on owners ability to infer e and r from reported q˜, which will depend
on the variance of ε. If the variance of ε is high, then the owner cannot infer e
and r from a low q˜. Anecdotally, it appears the variance of epsilon is large, which
means the owner will place more weight on (qˆ − q˜) (which owners in our sample
confirmed). For ease of exposition we assume that the punishment is quadratic
in the difference between the owners signal qˆ and the driver’s offer q˜ - where the
distributional assumptions that rationalize this are presented in the Appendix. Note
that because qˆ is an unbiased signal of q, and σ is independent of q˜, the punishment
can also be expressed as an increasing function of the gap between the true revenue
(q) and the offer (q˜) (or in this case, a quadratic of the difference). All comparative
statics go through as long as this punishment remains an increasing function of the
in gap between q − q˜. The punishment is expressed as:
E[punishment] =
α
4
(q − q˜)2
Step 2: Solve the agent’s optimal reporting schedule
The driver needs to choose how much revenue to report to the owner (q˜). Broadly,
the driver can choose to report truthfully, or to under-report, and there will be some
threshold of revenue beyond which they will choose to truthfully report.
Case 1: The driver chooses to reports above the target (q˜ > T)
When the agent chooses to report above the target, they do not face any incentive to
lie because they keep everything they earn above the target and the owner cannot
renegotiate the terms of the contract. Therefore they report truthfully q˜ = q and
their utility is
UD =
salary︷︸︸︷
q − T −
damages︷︸︸︷
βr
Case 2: The driver chooses to report below the target (q˜ < T)
When the agent chooses to report below the target, they face an incentive to lie in
order to increase their take-home pay. Indeed, on days when the driver truly fails
to make the target q < T , under-reporting revenue means they get to walk away
with some money rather than handing it all over to the owner as stipulated by the
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contract. Even when the amount of revenue is slightly above the target q > T , the
driver faces some incentive to lie in order to walk away with slightly more income
than what they would if they reported truthfully and had to hand over the entire
target amount. On the days that the driver decides to report below the target, they
know they can be punished by the owner. The driver then needs to choose the
amount of revenue to report (q˜) to maximize their utility:
max
q˜
UD =
salary︷ ︸︸ ︷
(q − q˜)− α
4
(q − q˜)2︸     ︷︷     ︸
punishment
−
damages︷︸︸︷
βr
Solving for q˜ yields:
q˜ = q − 2
α
where
∂q˜
∂α
=
2
α2
> 0
This says that the optimal amount for the driver to under-report is a function of
the owner’s signal. More specifically, it is optimal for the driver to under-report
by a constant amount
(
2
α
)
. Figure 1.5 shows that the data confirms this behavior.
The graph summarizes values of under-reported revenue at unique/binned values
of net revenue above the target.11 We see that drivers continuously under-report
approximately 700 KES (7 USD) until the net revenue they generate exceeds the
target by approximately 500-1000 KES. This graph confirms that our model does a
good job of predicting the behavior we observe in the data.
Switch point: Next we need to determine the point at which the driver is indifferent
between reporting above the target (and telling the truth) and reporting below the
target (and under-reporting). When the driver tells the truth i.e q˜ = q , they get
utility:
(q − T − βr)
When they lie “optimally" i.e q˜ = q − 2
α
, they get utility:
(q − q˜) − α
4
(q − q˜)2 − βr = 1
α
− βr
11On the y-axis we have under-reported revenue, which we compute from driver and owner’s
daily surveys. When the driver does not make the target (owner’s income is less than the target), any
salary the driver reports to us is under-reported revenue because they should have handed this over
to the owner. When the driver makes the target (the owner’s reported income equals the target),
there is no under-reporting and this variable is set to zero. On the x-axis we plot net revenue above
target, defined as owner income + driver salary − target. Indeed, to get an accurate measure of
under-reporting we want to know the share of joint revenue that the driver withholds. In other
words, we need to know the income that the owner took home and and the salary of the driver.
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Setting the two utilities equal and solving:
q − T − βr = 1
α
− βr
q∗ = T +
1
α
Where
∂q∗
∂α
= − 1
α2
< 0
∂q∗
∂T
= 1 > 0
This says that the revenue required to truthfully report, (q∗), is a function of the
owner’s signal and the target. It is perhaps useful to relate this result that q∗ = T + 1
α
to the optimal reporting behavior q˜. In particular, if the driver observes q at the
upper bound of [T,T + 1
α
], he will report q˜ = q− 2
α
= T − 1
α
, which is indeed less than
the target.
Step 4: Driver’s optimal choice of effort
The driver chooses two actions, effort (e) and risk (r), which affect the probability
distribution of revenue. Following (Ghatak and Pandey, 2000) we define q as:
q = e + r · ε
where ε is a random variable that reflects the idiosyncratic events of the day
(weather and traffic). The driver chooses effort and risk to maximize his utility
max
e,r
E
[
(q − T − βr) | q ≥ q∗] · Pr(q ≥ q∗)︸                                           ︷︷                                           ︸
Truth
+ E
[
(q − q˜) − α
4
(q − q˜)2 − βr | q < q∗
]
· Pr(q < q∗)︸                                                           ︷︷                                                           ︸
Under−report
− h(e, r)︸︷︷︸
Cost
Where h(e,r) is the driver’s private cost for his actions, and we assume that this
function is twice continuously differentiable, monotonically increasing and convex
in e and r. The optimization problem yields the following F.O.C with respect to e
and r, respectively (all the derivations in the paper can be found in the Appendix):
1 − Fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
− h′e = 0∫ ∞
q∗−e
r
ε fε(ε)dε − h′r − 2β = 0
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Where
∂r
∂α
< 0 &
∂e
∂α
> 0
∂r
∂T
> 0 &
∂e
∂T
< 0
∂r
∂β
< 0 &
∂e
∂β
> 0
This means that the driver’s choice of effort and risk is a function of the owner’s
signal, the target, and the probability the owner detects damaging driving. Intuition
for the sign of these partial derivatives will be provided in the next section when
we introduce the monitoring technology.
Step 5: Owner’s choice of the target
Constrained case
The owner chooses T to maximize his utility:
max
T
T · Pr(q ≥ q∗) + E[q˜ | q < q∗] · Pr(q < q∗) − γ(r) s.t
E
[
(q − T − βr)|q ≥ q∗] · Pr(q ≥ q∗) + E [(q − q˜) − α
4
(q − q˜)2 − βr | q < q∗
]
· Pr(q < q∗) − h(e∗, r∗) > 0
Where γ(r) are the costs owners incur for any damages to the vehicle they detect
that need repairs. The constraint is the driver’s participation constraint, where we
assume for simplicity that they have a reservation wage of zero. This optimization
problem yields the following F.O.C with respect to T and λ, respectively:
∂
∂T
= 1 − Fε(·) + ∂e
∂T
Fε(·) + ∂r
∂T
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
ε fε(ε)dε − ∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
) (
1
α
)
fε(·) − γ′(r) ∂r
∂T
+
λ
−(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂e
∂T
(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂r
∂T
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
ε fε(ε)dε +
∂r
∂T
(−β) − h′
(
∂e
∂T
+
∂r
∂T
) = 0
∂
∂λ
=
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
(e∗ + r∗ε − T − βr∗) fε(ε)dε +
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
(
1
α
− βr
)
fε(ε)dε − h(e∗, r∗) = 0
Unconstrained case
The owner chooses T to maximize his utility:
max
T
T · Pr(q ≥ q∗) + E[q˜ | q < q∗] · Pr(q < q∗) − γ(r)
21
Which yields the following F.O.C with respect to T
(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂e
∂T
Fε(·) + ∂r
∂T
∫ q
∗−e∗
r∗
0
ε fε(ε)dε
 − 1α fε(·) ∂∂T
(
q∗ − e
r
)
− γ′(r) ∂r
∂T
1.5.2 Monitoring Technology
Introducing the monitoring technology increases α and β. In other words, the
precision of the owner’s signal about output (α), and the probability of detect-
ing damaging driving (β), increase. In what follows we consider how the owner
changes the terms of the contract, and how this subsequently affects the driver’s
choices of effort, risk and under-reporting. We assume throughout that the driver’s
participation constraint binds.12 As α and β increase:
Proposition 1. (Target)
∂T
∂α
< 0 and
∂T
∂β
< 0
This says that as the precision of the owner’s signal (α) increases, the owner
will reduce the target. We know that the driver’s utility will fall as α increases.
Because the constraint binds, the owner needs to reduce the target to ensure the
driver makes their reservation wage. The same reasoning explains why the owner
reduces the target as the probability of detecting damaging driving (β) increases.
Proposition 2. (Damaging (Risky) Driving)
dr
dα
=
−︷︸︸︷
∂r
∂α
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂r
∂T
−︷︸︸︷
∂T
∂α
< 0
dr
dβ
=
∂r
∂β︸︷︷︸
−
+
∂r
∂T︸︷︷︸
+
∂T
∂β︸︷︷︸
−
< 0
This says that risk will unambiguously decrease when α increases. There are two
effects at work. As α increases, the driver is going to have to truthfully report more
often (q∗ falls), which increases the probability they are the residual claimant and
must bear the cost of a bad revenue day. Being exposed to greater downside risk
makes damaging behavior less attractive, ∂r
∂α
< 0. Similarly, as the owner reduces
the target in response to a higher α, (q∗ falls), and the driver will take on less
risk, ∂r
∂T > 0. Next, the driver’s immediate response to an increase in probability of
detection (β) is to reduce risk, ∂r
∂β
< 0. Moreover as the owner reduces the target in
response to higher β, the driver will further reduce the amount of risk they take.
12Anecdotally we know that there are a lot of drivers on the market and we think it reasonable
to assume that they would have been bargained down to their constraint. Switching costs are not
trivial and the owner would prefer less turnover all else equal.
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Proposition 3. (Effort)
de
dα
=
+︷︸︸︷
∂e
∂α
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂e
∂T
−︷︸︸︷
∂T
∂α
> 0
de
dβ
=
∂e
∂β︸︷︷︸
+
+
∂e
∂T︸︷︷︸
−
∂T
∂β︸︷︷︸
−
> 0
This says that effort will unambiguously increase when α increases. Yet again,
there are both direct and indirect effects driving this result. As the precision of the
owner’s signal, α, increases, the driver will supply more effort, ∂e
∂α
> 0. Indeed, for
every level of output below q∗, the driver can no longer under-report as much as
they used to because the owner has a more precise signal of what output should
be. Holding all else constant, their revenue will decrease if they do not respond
by increasing effort and generating more revenue. Next, we know that the owner
responds to an increase in α by lowering the target. As the target decreases the
driver is more likely to meet it, which increases the returns to effort and incentivizes
the driver to work more, ∂e
∂T > 0. Turning next to the effects of better detection of
risky driving (β), we know from above that the driver will have to reduce the
amount of risk they take, which reduces the probability of large windfall days. The
driver has to compensate by investing more effort, ∂e
∂β
> 0.
Proposition 4. (Switch Point)
dq∗
dα
=
−︷︸︸︷
∂q∗
∂α
+
+︷︸︸︷
∂q∗
∂T
−︷︸︸︷
∂T
∂α
< 0
As the owner’s signal becomes more precise, the revenue required to truth-
fully report and make the target q∗ will decrease, ∂q
∗
∂α
< 0. Similarly, as the target
decreases, the revenue required to truthfully report and make the target q∗ will
decrease, ∂q
∗
∂T > 0. Together these two factors drive the reduction in q
∗ we anticipate
with the introduction of the monitoring technology.
Proposition 5. (Under-reporting)
dq˜
dα
=
2
α2
> 0
This says that the optimal amount for the driver to report (q˜) increases with the
precision of the owner’s signal (α). It follows mechanically that the amount they
under-report will fall.
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1.6 Results
We test each one of these predictions in our data. We first investigate how the
technology affects the target contract. We then examine drivers response along the
key dimensions detailed above, including 1) effort, 2) damaging driving, and 3)
reporting behavior (probability of making the target, and under-reporting revenue).
Before reviewing whether these behaviors change in the way we would expect from
the model, we briefly provide some summary statistics and evidence that owners
were interacting with the device. Finally, we conclude this section with an overview
of the device’s impact on safe driving (which is not highly correlated with the our
measure of damaging driving).
1.6.1 Baseline Characteristics
We work exclusively with matatu owners with one vehicle, which they do not
operate themselves. They are approximately 40 years of age, and have completed
11 years of education. These small-scale entrepreneurs have spent an average of
8 years in the matatu industry, owning a vehicle for the past 4 years. While it is
possible to have a salaried job and manage a matatu at the same time, only 20%
of our sample juggle these two responsibilities. Typically owners have worked with
their current driver for the past 2 years. Drivers have very similar profiles - which
we expect - because many owners were previously driving matatus themselves.
They are a few years younger (35 years old on average), with slightly lower levels
of education (8 years on average). They have worked in the industry for over a
decade, driving a vehicle for the past 7-8 years. They have worked with 5 different
owners, averaging 1.5 years with each one. Both driver and owner characteristics
are balanced across treatment and control groups (Table 1.1 and Table 1.2).
1.6.2 Information Treatment Arm
To study the treatment effect of information on contracts, productivity (which in-
cludes effort, damaging driving, under-reported revenue, and profits) and safety,
over the 6 month time frame we run the following regression model:
yird =
6∑
m=1
Dimβm + αd + τr + Xiγ + εird
where yird is a daily contract/productivity/safety outcome for owner i on route r,
on day since installation d; Dim is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if the owner is
in the information group in month m (which allows us to examine the treatment
effect as it evolves over the six months of the study); αd is a day fixed effect; τr
is an assigned route fixed effect; Xi is a set of firm-level baseline specific controls
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included for precision, and εirmd is an error term.13 We cluster our standard errors
at the firm level. Note that the study offered the information to control owners in
months 7 and 8 (as compensation for participating in the study). As a result all the
regressions only include data before month 7.14
We also have an endline survey that asked owners about their use of the device,
perceptions of drivers’ performance, their monitoring strategies, and their firm’s
size. To study the impact of our device on these outcomes we run the following
regression model:
yir = αd + τr + Diβ + Xiγ + εir
where yir is an endline outcome for owner i on route r; τr is an assigned route
fixed effect; Di is a treatment indicator equal to 1 if the owner is in the information
group; Xi is a set of firm-level baseline controls included for precision, and εir is an
error term.
1.6.3 Usage
First, we monitor owners’ usage of the device. We do so by tracking the API calls that
are generated every time the owner logs into the app and requests different pieces
of information (including historical location, up-to-date summary information, and
where the safety violations occurred on the map). Figure 1.6 calculates the share of
owners that made at least one API call during the week. We find high rates of take-
up. In the early months of the study approximately 80% of owners are checking
the app at least once a week. This share decreases but stabilizes at about 70% as
the study progresses. A large share of owners are also using the app daily. In the
first few months, 60% of owners check the app once a day, and 40% continue their
daily usage after 6 months. This suggests that owners are actively engaging with
the device throughout the study.
We also check whether owners are internalizing the information we provided.
At endline we asked owners to state the revenue earned, the number of kilometers
driven, the fuel costs, and the extent of off-road driving on the most recent day
their vehicle was active. Owners had the option of answering “don’t know". We
find that owners in the treatment group are 27 percentage points more likely to
know about the number of kilometers driven and 45 percentage points more likely
to know about the the instances of off-route driving (Table 1.3 Columns 1 and 2).
We do not find any differences between the treatment and control groups regarding
knowledge of exact revenue (Column 3). This last result is not altogether surprising.
While the device provides a better estimate of revenue by revealing the number of
kilometers the vehicle has covered, and the location of the vehicle throughout
the day, it does not reveal the exact revenue because the number of passengers
13Controls include the matatu’s age and number of features, as well as owner’s age, education,
gender, tenure in the industry, their raven score and the number of other jobs they have.
14All of the results from these regressions are presented through figures because it is easier to see
the how owners’ and drivers’ behavior changes over time. Please see the appendix for the specific
point estimates from these regressions, and alternate regression specifications (Appendix Tables A.3
though A.11).
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is uncertain. As a final test, we also ask owners to rate how challenging it is to
monitor their employees on a scale from 1 (not hard) to 5 (very hard). Having
access to the information reduces the reported difficulty level by just over 2 points.
In other words, control owners maintain that monitoring is hard while treatment
owners reveal that it is easy (Table 1.4).15 We do not, however, find any significant
changes in traditional monitoring behaviors (checking-in with the driver over the
phone, at the terminal (locally referred to as “stage"), or through a third party).
Finally, we investigate whether there are any changes in how the owners and
drivers interact. We asked drivers to report the frequency with which they were
contacted and criticized by the owner that month. Formal reprimands are not
frequent but they are used by owners to signal their displeasure with the driver’s
behavior. Figure 1.7 suggests that the number of reprimands is marginally higher in
the treatment group at the beginning of the study period. This is consistent with the
idea that owners use the information to correct behavior early on. The frequency
increases by approximately 20-30 % (off of a control mean of 0.5) in months 1-4
before decreasing significantly in month 6. We also investigate whether owners
take more extreme actions and fire their drivers more frequently. While the trend in
Figure 1.7 suggests that the number of firings increased in the second month of the
study and decreased thereafter, this result should be interpreted carefully because
there are so few firings in our data (17 in total).
Contracts
We first investigate whether access to the tracking information changes the terms of
the contract. While the intervention could also have changed the type of contract
they offered their drivers (fixed wage or sharecropping), extensive interviews with
owners suggested this was unlikely to occur. The fixed wage contract is unpopular
among owners and drivers, and the sharecropping model is difficult to implement
when limited liability constraints bind, and revenue is unobserved/can be easily
withheld by the drivers. Moreover, social norms are engrained in this industry, and
a change of this magnitude would be unexpected in a 6 month time frame. We
further confirmed in our endline survey that every owner maintained the same type
of contract.
As detailed in the model, owners can use the information from the device to
change the target they set for drivers (Proposition 1). Absent the technology, the
target for 14 seater buses is usually set at 3000 KES. Discussions with owners con-
firm this is an industry standard that only fluctuates with good reason (they know
that demand will be high or low that day because the weather or road conditions
have changed). Charging much more would alienate drivers, and charging any less
would cut into firm revenues. Figure 1.8 depicts the estimated treatment effect on
the owners’ daily target across the 6 months of the study. There are no significant
changes in the first month, likely because owners were still learning how to use the
15Column 2 of Table 1.4 also shows that control owners report no change in the time they spend
monitoring during the study period, while 70% of treatment owners reveal they spend less time
monitoring.
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app and experiment with ways to improve their business operations. In subsequent
months, however, we see the target steadily declining. By month 6, the daily tar-
get amount is 135 KES (1.35 USD) below the control group, representing a 4.1%
decrease (0.2 standard deviation). While the result is not statistically significant
(likely because we are underpowered), the downward trend is clear. This steady
reduction suggests that the information allows managers to re-optimize the terms
of their employees’ contracts. Taking this result back to the model, it suggests that
the drivers are operating at their participation constraint. When the constraint
binds, the owner needs to decrease the target in order to compensate the driver
for their lost information rents. Lowering the target also reduces owners’ revenue
on days where the driver makes the target. As a result it is only profitable for the
owner to reduce the target if the owner is compensated in other ways, namely with
a higher share of revenue on days when the driver does not make the target, fewer
damages to the vehicle, or an increase in the frequency with which drivers make
the target. We turn to these results next.
Productivity
We consider three measures of productivity, which correspond to the choices that
drivers make throughout the day. This includes how damaging (risky) they will
drive, how much effort to supply, and the amount of revenue they disclose to the
owner (which is either the target amount, or some amount below).
1. Damaging (risky) driving: We hypothesize that owners prefer less damaging
driving than what the drivers would optimally choose. With the technology, owners
can observe driving behavior more accurately, and the probability they detect dam-
aging driving increases. This reduces drivers’ incentive to drive in ways that damage
the vehicle. Similarly, as the precision of the owner’s signal about revenue improves,
and they decrease the target, the driver will be exposed to greater downside risk
on bad revenue days.16 This should further reduce their incentive to drive in ways
that damage the vehicle (Proposition 2). Figure 1.9 confirms this hypothesis in the
data. We see damages substantially decrease throughout the entire 6 month period.
In month 3, daily repair costs for treatment owners are reduced by 125 KES (1.25
USD), and continue falling until month 6, where they are 226 KES (2.26 USD) less
than what control owners incur on average (this represents a 46% decrease in daily
repair costs). These repair costs represent a major business expense for owners,
which makes the impact of the monitoring technology significant.
We want to confirm that this result stems from less damaging driving behavior.
One of the greatest sources of damaging driving is off-route driving. Drivers often
take shortcuts on bumpy roads that are notoriously damaging to matatus. These
shortcuts are appealing to the driver because they help them travel to the city center
16As detailed in the model, the switch point q∗ shifts down. This means that there are days when
the driver used to under-report, and they now truthfully report. As the residual claimant on these
days, they bear the cost of a bad revenue day (which is higher when they make more damaging
maneuvers on the road).
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more quickly, and avoid traffic jams where they sit idly without picking up any
passengers. Typically owners cannot observe off-route driving and drivers cannot be
expected to pay for vehicle repairs. This means that damaging driving along these
alternate routes is costless to drivers but offers the opportunity for large windfall
days. When owners have access to the monitoring technology, however, they can
inform drivers about how to take better care of the vehicle, and mandate that they
stay on their designated routes. To investigate this hypothesis, we compute the
distance between each GPS point recorded by the device, and the vehicle’s licensed
route. Figure 1.10 demonstrates that treatment drivers are on average 400 meters
closer to the designated route than control drivers throughout the study period. To
confirm that the reduction in off-route driving is responsible for fewer damages,
we investigate whether the distributions of lateral and vertical acceleration differ
across treatment and control groups. Taking fewer bumpy roads that jostle the
vehicle should be visible in the acceleration data. Lateral acceleration measures
tilting from side to side, while vertical acceleration captures movement upwards
and downwards. We find suggestive evidence that driving behavior has changed.
The distribution of lateral acceleration in the treatment group tightens around 0
(less tilting - Figure 1.11). Similarly, the distribution of vertical acceleration has
more mass around gravity (normal driving) for the treatment group. We can reject
equality of these distributions across treatment and control by applying a K-S test,
which returns a p-value of 0.000 for both measures of acceleration.
It is also important to rule out any alternative explanations for these effects on
repair costs. Specifically, it could be the case that drivers tend to inflate repair costs,
and the device reduces their incentive to do so because they are more likely to be
caught in the lie.17 This cannot be the case for larger repairs, however, because they
are incurred by the owner directly and/or will be validated with the mechanic. We
therefore create an indicator for whether the repair costs exceed 1000 KES (80th
percentile). The second panel in Figure 1.9 demonstrates that the probability of
incurring a large repair cost decreases significantly (7-8 percentage points). This
implies that the decrease in the repair costs that we observe cannot be entirely
driven by drivers inflating the repair costs. Drivers are also changing how they drive
as the result of the technology.
2. Effort: Next, we proxy driver effort by the number of hours the tracking device is
on (the device powers on and off with the matatu). When the device is installed in
the matatu, drivers know that owners have a more precise signal of output, which
means they are more likely to get caught if they under-report heavily. This encour-
ages drivers to under-report less, which reduces their take-home pay. As the model
demonstrates, this creates an incentive for drivers to invest more effort throughout
the day so they can increase total revenue and ensure they maintain similar com-
pensation. In parallel, owners have lowered the target, which means that it is more
17Note that drivers pay for some of the smaller repair costs out-of-pocket, if they can be handled
quickly by a mechanic during the day. They subsequently report the amount they spent to the owner,
which we would then capture in the owner survey.
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likely that the driver will become the residual claimant. Finally, the model predicts
that drivers will compensate for the reduction in damaging driving by investing
more effort. For all of these reasons we expect effort levels to rise (Proposition
3). This prediction is borne out in our data: Figure 1.12 demonstrates the upward
trend in effort that we anticipated. The number of hours the tracking device is
on increases by 0.98 hours per day on average in month 3 and rises steadily until
the end of the study. By month 6, effort levels increase by 1.47 hours per day on
average in the treatment group. This represents a 9.9% increase in drivers’ labor
supply. This is substantial in an environment where drivers are already working
14 hour days. With more hours on the road, we also see the number of kilometers
increase by 12 kilometers per day on average, which corresponds to an extra trip
to/from the city center (Figure 1.12).
3. Reporting Behavior: Once the driver chooses how much effort and risk to invest,
they need to decide whether or not to truthfully report. The model predicts that the
optimal switch point for truthfully reporting (q∗) shifts down because 1) the owner’s
signal of true revenue becomes more precise, and 2) the owner has lowered the
target (Proposition 4). Testing this proposition is difficult because we do not have a
direct measure of q∗; we only observe whether or not drivers make the target (when
owner reported income is equal to the target). However, a lower q∗ implies that
drivers should make the target more often, primarily on days when revenue is close
to q∗ to begin with. To investigate this prediction in the data, we first apply our
standard regression specification to determine whether we see a significant change
in the probability of making the target.18 Figure 1.13 suggests that from month 3
onwards, the rate at which drivers make the daily target increases by 11 percentage
points from a base of 44 percent (significant in month 3 only). It is not altogether
surprising that this result is slightly weaker because the analysis considers the full
range of revenue rather than focusing on days when drivers are close to q∗ to begin
with (i.e. close to making the target). This is where the model predicts we should
see these effects. To investigate this further we calculate the average revenue above
target on a route-month in the control group to get a sense of the usual revenue
above target generated for a day.19 We then compute drivers’ daily reported revenue
above target and subtract the average expected amount. This is akin to including
route fixed effects - because we know that a certain level of revenue above target
will be acceptable on certain routes but not on others. We are left with a measure
of daily deviation from expected revenue above target, which we plot in the second
panel of Figure 1.13. The revenue above target measure has an approximate mean
of 4,000 KES. As such, -2000 KES on the graph implies that drivers only have
2,000 KES in revenue to cover their salary and their costs for that day. This results
in a take-home pay of 500 to 1000 schillings, which is right where we expect q∗
18The driver has “made the target" if the owner’s reported income is equal to the target. When
the owner’s reported income is below the target, the driver has not made the target.
19We use gross revenue below average for this outcome instead of net revenue as we did for the
shading amount because it only depends on drivers reporting, which means we have more data to
work with.
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to be (from plotting the amount drivers under-report in Figure 1.5). Figure 1.13
demonstrates that the probability of making the target increases significantly at
this point, which is exactly what we would expect. This represents a meaningful
increase in “compliance" with the terms of the contract.
Finally, we anticipate that drivers’ reporting behavior (q˜) will change as the
monitoring devices are introduced. According to the model, we should see drivers
under-reporting below some optimum q∗, at which point they will start truthfully
reporting and providing the owner with the target amount. Below this optimum,
the model predicts that drivers will under-report by a constant amount. This is
consistent with the idea that drivers have some reservation wage they do not want
to fall below. We predict that the monitoring technology will decrease the amount
of under-reporting we see in the data. Owners can use the device to estimate actual
revenue more accurately, and they are more likely to detect when the driver is
under-reporting. Drivers should respond by lying less everywhere below the thresh-
old. Figure 1.14 depicts under-reporting across treatment and control groups, to
which we apply a non-parametric smoothing function. We observe constant under-
reporting below some threshold value q∗ in both groups (which falls somewhere
between 500-1000 KES). Moreover, we observe that the treatment group under-
reports less than the control group. To obtain a more precise estimate for the
reduction in under-reporting, we regress the amount drivers under-report on treat-
ment status for different possible q∗ (between 500-1000). The regression only
considers data below q∗ because this is where the model predicts shading will oc-
cur.20 The results in Table 1.5 confirm that the amount drivers under-report falls by
approximately 70-100 KES (≈ 1 USD) per day depending on the exact location of q∗.
As a final check, taking 900 KES as a benchmark value for q∗ and keeping all data
below this point, Figure 1.15 applies our standard regression specification over
study months. We see that the amount drivers under-report falls by approximately
100 KES throughout the study (except for month 1).
Without knowing q∗ exactly, our estimate of 70-100 KES technically includes
both a reduction in q˜ and a drop in q∗. We want to confirm that both of these
behaviors are indeed happening in reality. We do so by imposing a step function
in a regression of under-reported amount on treatment. In other words, we allow
under-reporting below q∗ and impose zero shading above. We run this regression
for every reasonable value of q∗ for treatment and control groups. We then plot
two outcomes in the second panel of Figure 1.14. The dots represent the estimated
under-reported amount in the treatment (in red) and control (in black) groups
across different choices of q∗. We can see that the treatment groups under-report
by approximately 50-70 schillings less than the control group regardless of the q∗
we impose on the model. Next, we plot the Mean Squared Error (MSE) of our
regressions (dotted lines) to isolate the q∗ that minimizes the MSE for the treatment
and control groups respectively. The vertical lines represent the optimal q∗ using
20The regression includes the standard controls and fixed effects. The regression also excludes
data from month 1 because we know that owners were unfamiliar with the device in that first month.
The magnitude of the results stay the same when we include month 1 but we lose some precision
from the noise this month introduces.
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this metric. This demonstrates that our best guess of q∗ in the treatment group is
150 schillings below our best guess of q∗ in the control group. This confirms that
both factors explain the overall reduction in under-reporting that we observed in
the more flexible regression specification above.
Company Performance and Employee Well-being
We now turn to investigating the impact of the monitoring device on firm perfor-
mance. Specifically, we are interested in determining whether the information we
supplied allows companies to generate higher profits and ultimately expand their
operations by adding more vehicles to their fleet. Company profits are measured by
subtracting costs (repairs and driver salary) from total revenue. We documented
substantial reductions in repair costs and, assuming drivers are at their reservation
wage, we expect their salary to stay the same (Figure 1.17 confirms this is true).
The model predicts that the impact on revenue, however, is ambiguous. Improved
monitoring increases driver effort, and reduces under-reporting. However, it also
reduces the amount of damaging driving they engage in (which we confirmed in our
data). Depending on which of these effects dominates revenue could increase or de-
crease. Panel 1 of Figure 1.16 illustrates that revenue does not change substantially
throughout the study. Taken together, decreasing costs and stable revenues suggest
that firm profits will increase. Panel 2 in Figure 1.16 demonstrates a similar trend
to what we’ve observed to date: profits increase continuously starting in month
3, and peak at month 5. Specifically, treatment owners see their daily profits rise
by approximately 12% in month 4 and 5 (440 KES per day = 4.40 USD per day).
Taking the average gains over the study period and extrapolating to the full year
(assuming matatus operate 25 days a month), we can expect a 120,000 KES (1200
USD) increase in annual firm profits. It is worth mentioning that this profit measure
does not capture any additional gains from having to spend less time and effort
monitoring the driver. The device cost 125 USD (including shipping to Kenya),
which means that it would take less than 3 months for the investment to become
cost-effective for the owner. This return on investment (ROI) suggests that these de-
vices are likely to be welfare improving for owners in the short and long run. One of
the reasons we do not see more matatu owners adopting them, however, is because
they currently do not exist in this form on the market. The options are either much
more expensive (approximately 600 USD and monthly installments), or have more
limited capacity. Without having tested their efficacy, owners are hesitant to make
the investment. It is perhaps worth mentioning that our profit gains are in line with
some of the more successful business training programs documented in the litera-
ture. The cost of these trainings range from 20 to 740 dollars and last a few weeks
at most (Bloom et al., 2013; Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2017; McKenzie and
Woodruff, 2016; Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden, 2014; de Mel, McKenzie, and
Woodruff, 2014; Valvidia, 2012). Our technology has the added benefit of requiring
a single up-front payment for continued use. Moreover it requires relatively little
coordination and training.
Are treatment firms also more likely to grow their business than control firms?
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We measure firm growth by the number of vehicles that owners have in their fleet
at endline. A simple regression of this outcome on treatment with the standard
controls reveals that treatment owners have 0.145 more vehicles in their fleet on
average than control owners (Table 1.7, Column 1). This represents an 11 percent
increase in fleet size. While treatment owners were also more likely to make
changes to their matatu’s interior, this result is not statistically significant (Table 1.7,
Column 2). There are a number of reasons why the monitoring device could have
encouraged treatment owners to grow their businesses more actively. First, profits
have increased and under-reporting has decreased. Second, our results suggest
that owners started trusting their drivers more. Table 1.6 presents four different
measures of owners’ perceptions of their drivers at endline. We see owners sending
an additional 30 KES to drivers in the trust game the enumerators administered
(Column 1) - a 30% increase. Moreover, treatment owners’ assessment of whether
their drivers’ skills have improved increases by 0.6 points (where they could be
assigned a -1 for worse driving, 0 for no change, and 1 for better driving). Finally,
treatment owners are more likely to report that their drivers have become more
honest (Column 3). We suspect that greater trust in their drivers’ abilities/honesty,
combined with a reduction in the amount the drivers under-report, makes the
process of managing the company easier. Together with higher profits, treatment
owners may have seen an opportunity to expand that did not exist before.
Finally, it is important to investigate whether these gains to the company come
at the expense of their employees. While it is difficult to measure welfare, we
consider three main outcomes that could impact drivers’ well-being: the amount of
effort they supply, their salary and their relationship with the owner. We know the
amount of effort they supply increases (Figure 1.12), and the amount they under-
report decreases (Figure 1.14). While their salary per hour remains unchanged
(Figure 1.17), they are potentially worse off from working more hours. However,
throughout the course of the study we did not receive any complaints from drivers,
despite contacting them regularly to conduct our surveys. To investigate this further,
we administered a small survey to drivers via SMS 6 months after the original
study concluded (at this point we had given control owners 2 months with the
information as well, and no distinction can be drawn between treatment and control
drivers). Sixty percent of drivers responded (distributed evenly across treatment
and control) with very positive experiences about the device: 27% said it improved
their relationship with the owner (70% said nothing changed), 65% said it made
their job easier (26 % said nothing changed), 96% said they preferred driving
with the tracker, and 65% said it changed the way they drove. While we do not
want to lean too much on this qualitative evidence, it does suggest that the drivers
benefitted from the device as well. Some of the open ended questions reveal that
drivers felt a greater sense of security with the device in their car. They also felt
that it increased owners’ trust in their work, which reduced their stress levels. In an
environment where drivers are constantly being second guessed by their employers,
this could represent a meaningful improvement in working conditions.
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Externalities
The device conveyed information to owners about productivity and safety. A priori,
we thought that owners might care more about safe driving than drivers for two
reasons. First, owners are the ones to pay for repairs when the vehicle is damaged,
and for fines when the car is ticketed or impounded by the police. Second, drivers
can increase their take-home pay if they generate higher revenue in fares by break-
ing safety regulations to pick up more passengers. It follows that the information
we provided should have an effect if unsafe driving is correlated with damages, and
the owners want to avoid high repair costs. Alternatively, owners should use the
information to reform driving behavior if unsafe driving results in more fines than
the owner would optimally choose to incur. The Kenyan government also assumed
that owners would reform driving behavior when they mandated that long-range
buses be equipped with GPS tracking devices in 2016. However, this measure was
only marginally successful, and before rolling out the experiment we were con-
scious that the safety information we provided may not have the intended effects.
This may be because owners down-weight the probability of getting into severe
accidents, or fined for unsafe driving. Alternatively, the benefits to unsafe driving
in terms of increased revenue may be high for the owners as well. If owners care
only about profits, and increased effort comes at the expenses of safety, we might
expect instances of unsafe driving to increase. Finally, while owners definitely care
about damages to their vehicle, these damages may only be weakly correlated with
unsafe driving. If this is the case, then the information we provided may not change
safe driving practices.
The device collected six pieces of information that correlate with safe driving:
maximum speed, average speed, speeding over 80km, over-acceleration, sharp
braking and sharp turning. We do not see any meaningful increases in maximum
or average speeds as the study progresses. Similarly, instances of over-acceleration
and speeding above 80km do not change significantly (Figure 1.19). We see no
effect on sharp turns or sharp braking (Figure 1.20). Finally we tracked the number
of accidents throughout the project. There are 41 accidents in total throughout
the 6 month period, of varying degrees of severity. While the number of accidents
trends upwards in months 4 and 5, it is difficult to conclude that accidents increase
significantly (Figure 1.21). Overall the evidence points towards safety standards
staying the same, despite the emphasis we placed on safety across all tabs in the app.
While this highlights that owners can incentivize optimal levels of effort without
further compromising passenger safety, we cannot necessarily expect owners to
curb unsafe driving with these technologies. This is especially important for local
governments in Kenya and South Africa to know, as they continue to take steps to
curb unsafe driving by introducing monitoring technologies.
1.6.4 Cash Treatment Arm
Bearing in mind that owners may not act on the safety information we provided,
we tested the impact of an intervention that incentivizes drivers to take safety into
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account. Drivers were offered 600 KES at the beginning of the day, and incurred
a penalty for each safety violation they incurred. The experiment was designed to
mimic an intervention that a regulatory body could feasibly implement. We find that
the cash treatment has no discernible effect on average speed, over-acceleration,
and sharp turning. However, we detect large decreases in the instances of speeding
and sharp braking. The number of sharp braking alerts deceases by 0.13 events per
day, a 17% decrease relative to the control group. Likewise, the number of sharp
braking events decreases by 0.24 per day, representing a 35% decrease. These
results suggest that drivers can be incentivized to take safety into account. However,
the incentives must come from a third party, as owners are unlikely to induce similar
changes in driving behavior.
In Table 1.9 we examine driving behavior among the group of drivers whose
cash incentives were removed after the first month. The goal of this exercise is to
examine whether the behavioral changes induced by the cash treatment persist after
the incentives are removed. The variable “One-month post treat" compares drivers
who never received cash incentives, to the drivers whose incentives have been
removed. We see that the number of speeding events rebounds almost completely
to pre-treatment levels, while the number of sharp braking events remains lower
but is statistically insignificant. Overall, it appears that the behavioral effects of the
cash treatment arm wear off after the removal of the incentives. This suggests that
inducing better driving habits for a short time period may not be sufficient to see
longer run improvement in safety outcomes.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we design a monitoring technology tailored to the minibus industry
in Nairobi. The device provides real time information to the owner of the minibus
about the productivity and safety of the driver. We find that the monitoring tech-
nology eases labor contracting frictions by improving the contract that owners offer
their drivers. The drivers respond by supplying more effort, driving in ways that
are less damaging to the vehicle, under-reporting revenue by less and meeting the
target more often. This results in higher profits for the firm. Treatment owners
also report greater trust in their drivers, and find it less difficult to monitor them,
which may explain why their businesses grow faster during the study. Despite the
breadth of information we supplied on safety, we do not see drivers improving their
performance along this margin unless they are explicitly incentivized to do so with
small cash grants. While this suggests that gains to the company do not come at the
expense of the quality of service they provide, it also highlights that the technology
does not remedy the negative safety externalities of the industry.
These results are important for a number of key stakeholders, including small
firms operating in the transportation industry, and policy makers working to im-
prove road safety conditions in urban hubs. We know firms struggle to grow in
developing countries for a number of reasons, and this paper identifies another
important barrier that is relatively understudied empirically: moral hazard in labor
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contracting. One solution that can potentially ease this friction is improved moni-
toring. Monitoring is typically difficult in small firms, however, because they cannot
hire dedicated staff to oversee employee performance, and it takes time away from
regular business operations. In our paper, we demonstrate that introducing cost-
effective monitoring technologies can be a worthwhile investment for companies
looking to increase their profits and grow their asset base.
We do not find that safety standards improve when information from the device
is conveyed to owners. However, when the drivers are incentivized to drive more
safely we see instances of speeding and sharp braking fall. This suggests that simply
introducing monitoring technologies, without further regulation, might not achieve
the desired effects for governments trying to improve road safety. Local transport
authorities in Nairobi and South Africa have already started to discuss ways of
introducing remote tracking solutions throughout the transportation industry to
help monitor and record the behavior of the drivers on the road. Our research
suggests that while this will improve firm operations, more targeted interventions
requiring regulatory oversight will be necessary if these devices are to induce safer
driving.
This analysis highlights the need for further research estimating the longer term
impacts, and general equilibrium effects, of these technologies on firm operations,
and worker outcomes. Our study included 255 matatus and lasted 6 months, but we
hypothesize that we would have seen greater changes in the terms of the contract,
and in the type of contract being offered had we continued for an additional year
and offered more GPS trackers to owners on the various routes. Similarly, the
impacts on driver well-being may have changed if all the matatus on the route were
fitted with GPS tracking devices. While our results suggest that benefits accrue to
both workers and firms in this context, thinking about who gains and who loses as
these technologies become more pervasive is an important area for future work.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Balance across information treatment (owners)
Variable Control Treatment Difference
Install date (days since July 1, 2016) 211.9 212.9 -1.03
(5.09)
Owner age 36.3 37.3 -0.99
(0.99)
Owner gender 0.18 0.18 -0.0056
(0.048)
Owner highest level of education 2.94 2.97 -0.030
(0.11)
Owner is employed in salaried job 0.21 0.24 -0.030
(0.052)
Years the owner is in matatu industry 7.71 7.71 -0.0066
(0.79)
Years owner has owned matatus 4.65 4.47 0.18
(0.52)
Number of drivers hired for this matatu 1.26 1.37 -0.12
(0.13)
Number of other drivers hired in the past 1.77 1.94 -0.17
(0.22)
Amount given in trust game 117.7 126.2 -8.50
(12.4)
Owner Raven’s score 4.51 4.65 -0.14
(0.19)
Driver rating: owner’s fairness 8.11 8.33 -0.23
(0.18)
The summary statistics are calculated using the owners baseline data. The first column shows the
mean in the control group, while the second column show the mean in the treatment group. The
final column shows the difference between treatment and control. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
36
Table 1.2: Balance across cash treatment (drivers)
Variable Control Treatment Difference
Driver age 34.4 37 -2.64
(0.88)∗∗∗
Driver highest level of education 2.45 2.48 -0.030
(0.087)
Driver experience 6.95 8.24 -1.29
(0.72)∗
Weeks unemployed before current job 2.96 2.28 0.68
(0.77)
Number of vehicles driven for before current 6.05 4.97 1.08
(0.57)∗
Number of past accidents 0.90 0.87 0.035
(0.13)
Number of months the driver has been employed 15.2 14.3 0.91
(2.49)
Owner rating: driver’s honesty 7.78 7.60 0.18
(0.18)
Owner rating: how hard driver works 8.29 8.07 0.22
(0.18)
Owner rating: driver’s safety 8.32 8.21 0.11
(0.18)
Owner rating: driver’s performance overall 8.09 8 0.092
(0.17)
Driver days working for owner 411.7 500.8 -89.2
(61.2)
Driver Raven’s score 4.26 4.28 -0.016
(0.18)
Revenue at baseline 7744.8 7732.3 12.5
(207.6)
Baseline target 3113.1 3147.6 -34.5
(56.6)
The summary statistics are calculated using the driver baseline data. The first column shows the
mean in the control group, while the second column show the mean in the treatment group. The
final column shows the difference between treatment and control. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 1.3: Knowledge gathered through the device
(1) (2) (3)
Know Km Know Off-route Know Revenue
Info Treatment 0.268∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.068) (0.065) (0.072)
Control Mean of DV 0.47 0.40 0.61
Controls X X X
Route FE X X X
Matatu N 187 187 187
The data are from the owner endline surveys (where 3% of the sample - 9 owners - were
unreachable, balanced between treatment and control). Note that the variables in this table were
added to the endline survey after the first wave of endlines had already been completed, which is
why we only have 187 observations (balanced across treatment and control). Each of the variables
is a binary indicator for whether the owner said he knew the exact number of kilometers, instances
of off-route driving and revenue generated by the vehicle on the most recent day the vehicle was on
road. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard
errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table 1.6: Perceptions of trust
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust Amount Better Driving More Honest Performance Rating
Info Treatment 33.796∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.112
(15.123) (0.057) (0.052) (0.174)
Control Mean of DV 151.61 0.04 0.04 7.21
Controls X X X X
Route FE X X X X
Matatu N 244 190 190 246
The data are from the owner endline surveys (where 3% of the sample - 9 owners - were
unreachable, balanced between treatment and control). The first column represents the amount of
KES that was transferred from the owner to the driver in a game of trust. The owner was given an
envelope with 900 KES and told that anything they placed back in the envelop would be tripled and
sent to the driver. The driver would then choose how much to send back to the owner. The
following two columns ask owners whether their drivers’ driving has improved, and whether they
have become more honest (= +1), or less honest (= −1) in the last 6 months. Note that the
variables in Column 2 and 3 were added to the endline survey after the first wave of endlines had
already been completed, which is why we only have 190 observations (balanced across treatment
and control). The final column reflects owners rating of drivers on a scale from 1 to 10 (where 10
is the highest score). Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
Table 1.7: Business decisions
(1) (2)
Number Vehicles New Interior
Info Treatment 0.145∗ 0.074
(0.078) (0.057)
Control Mean of DV 1.22 0.21
Controls X X
Route FE X X
Matatu N 246 240
The data are from the owner endline surveys (where 3% of the sample - 9 owners- were
unreachable, balanced between treatment and control). The first column represents the number of
vehicles the owner possesses, while the second column is an indicator = 1 if the owner refurbished
the interior of his vehicle. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗
levels. Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table 1.8: Effect of cash (immediate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average speed Maximum speed Speeding Sharp braking Overacceleration Sharp turning
Cash Treatment -0.099 -0.214 -0.239∗∗ -0.131∗ -0.009 0.041
(0.247) (0.874) (0.108) (0.074) (0.015) (0.035)
Mileage in km 0.007 0.022 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Control Mean of DV 15.89 52.64 0.69 0.77 0.08 0.40
Controls X X X X X X
Matatu FE X X X X X X
Day FE X X X X X X
Route FE X X X X X X
Matatu-Day N 39,072 39,072 39,072 39,072 39,072 39,072
The data are from the tracking device throughout the study period. Column (1) and (2) capture
average and maximum speeds throughout the day, respectively. Column (3)-(6) capture daily alerts
for speeding over 80 km/hour, sharp breaking, over-acceleration, and sharp turning, respectively.
We control for the number of miles the vehicle was on the road. Cash Treatment = 1 if the driver
received cash transfers (whether it be for one month or two). Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
Table 1.9: Effect of no cash (ongoing)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average speed Maximum speed Speeding Sharp braking Overacceleration Sharp turning
Cash Treatment -0.120 -0.409 -0.220∗∗ -0.140∗∗ -0.014 -0.000
(0.220) (0.756) (0.096) (0.058) (0.013) (0.031)
One Month Post Treat -0.039 0.072 -0.058 -0.115 -0.003 -0.017
(0.260) (0.971) (0.135) (0.089) (0.012) (0.031)
Mileage in km 0.008 0.024 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Control Mean of DV 15.89 52.64 0.69 0.77 0.08 0.40
Controls X X X X X X
Matatu FE X X X X X X
Day FE X X X X X X
Route FE X X X X X X
Matatu-Day N 42,405 42,405 42,405 42,405 42,405 42,405
The data are from the tracking device throughout the study period. Column (1) and (2) capture
average and maximum speeds throughout the day, respectively. Column (3)-(6) capture daily alerts
for speeding over 80 km/hour, sharp breaking, over-acceleration, and sharp turning, respectively.
We control for the number of miles the vehicle was on the road. Cash Treatment = 1 if the driver
received cash transfers (whether it be one month or two). One Month Post Cash = 1 for drivers in
the 1 month cash treatment group, in the month after their cash incentives were stopped. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard errors are clustered
at the matatu level.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Mobile app “SmartMatatu"
(a) Map Viewer (b) Historical Map Viewer (c) Safety Feed
(d) Productivity Summary (e) Report Submit (f) Report Complete
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Figure 1.2: Device Location
(a) Designated bus routes in Nairobi (black)
(b) Designated bus routes in Nairobi (black) and routes in our sample (colored)
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Figure 1.3: Study Timeline
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Notes: The figure depicts the number of matatus that were fitted with GPS trackers (and hence
were added to the study) per week. The first installation took place in November 2016, and
continued until April 2017. On average, the field team was able to fit GPS trackers to 15 matatus
per week. As a result it took approximately 5 months to finish installations.
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Figure 1.4: Device Location
Notes: These maps use data from the trackers that were installed in vehicles licensed to
operate on Route 126 (Ongata-Rongai line). Specifically, we count the number of times that
vehicles passed through particular longitudinal and latitudinal cells on the map. A deeper
shade of blue demonstrates that more vehicles passed through that particular cell. The second
panel overlays the designated route that vehicles are supposed to be on (red). Any colored
cells outside of the designated route are instances of off-route driving. Some of these are
sanctioned by the owner, while others are not.
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Figure 1.5: Model Validation (Constant Shading)
Notes: This figure depicts the amount of under-reporting on the y-axis, and the amount of revenue
relative to the target on the x-axis. The data are from the control group. Under-reporting is the
amount of revenue the driver withholds from the owner. According to the contract, the driver must
deliver the target to the owner by the end of the day. On days where the driver does not make the
target (owner’s reported income is below the target), they should deliver everything they earned in
fares to the owner. On these days, any take-home pay the driver reports to us via the SMS survey, is
the amount they under-report to the owner. On days when the driver makes the target (owner’s
reported income is equal to the target), under-reporting is set to zero because they made the target.
Note, to get an accurate measure of under-reporting we want to know the share of joint revenue
that the driver withholds. In other words we need to know the income that the owner took home
and and the salary of the driver. We therefore use net revenue above target on the x-axis, defined as
owner income + driver salary − target.
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Figure 1.6: Device Usage (API Calls)
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Notes: To measure device usage, we capture whether any API
calls were made in a day. An API call is generated each time the
owner logs into the app throughout the study period. The first
panel looks at usage by week, whereas the bottom panel looks at
usage per day.
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Figure 1.7: Reprimands and Firing
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Notes: Each point on the graphs is the average difference between treatment
and control in a particular month for a particular outcome. Note that because
installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first
month (through the sixth month) since installation. The outcome in the first
panel is number of instances the owner criticized the driver (driver-reported).
This data was collected in the monthly driver surveys. The outcome in the
second panel is the number of drivers fired. This data was captured by the daily
owner/driver surveys, and then validated by an enumerator who called the
owner directly to confirm.
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Figure 1.8: Prediction 1→ Target
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Notes: Each point on the graph is the difference between the average daily target reported by
treatment and control owners in a particular month. The data was collected through the owner
daily surveys. Note that because installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6)
represent the first month (through the sixth month) since installation.
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Figure 1.9: Prediction 2→ Damaging (Risky) Driving
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Notes: Each point on the graphs is the average difference between treatment
and control in a particular month for a particular outcome. Note that because
installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first
month (through the sixth month) since installation. The outcome in the first
panel is the daily repair cost reported by the owner (daily survey). The
outcome in the second panel is a binary indicator = 1 if the owner’s reported
repair was “large" (i.e. in the 80th percentile or above).
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Figure 1.10: Prediction 2→ Damaging (Risky) Driving
Notes: Each point on the graph is the difference between the average distance to designated route
calculated for treatment and control owners in a particular month. “Distance to designated route" is
the shortest distance between the GPS tracker data point and the line corresponding to the route
the vehicle is supposed to be on. A negative coefficient means the vehicles in the treatment group
are closer to the designated route than the vehicles in the control group. Note that because
installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first month (through the
sixth month) since installation.
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Figure 1.11: Prediction 2→ Damaging (Risky) Driving
K-S test: p-value = 0.000
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Notes: We plot the distributions of vertical and lateral accelerations for
treatment and control vehicles from month 2 onwards (for consistency with the
other pooled regressions, but the results are the same if month 1 is included).
These acceleration measures are taken from the device directly. The
distributions for vertical and lateral acceleration are centered at -200 and 100,
respectively, rather than 0 because of some combination of a non exact
calibration and the asymmetry of suspension resulting in asymmetrical
acceleration.
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Figure 1.12: Prediction 3→ Effort
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Notes: Each point on the graphs is the average difference between treatment
and control in a particular month for a particular outcome. Note that because
installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first
month (through the sixth month) since installation. The outcome in the first
panel is number of hours the device was on. The device powers on and off with
the vehicle, and thus provides a measure of effort. The outcome in the second
panel is the number of kilometers driven. These data points were captured
daily by the device.
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Figure 1.13: Prediction 5→ Achieving Target
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Notes: The outcome in these figures is whether or not the driver
made the target (owner income = target). The data is collected from
owner daily surveys. In the first panel, each point on the graph is the
average difference in the probability of making the target between
treatment and control in a particular month. Note that because
installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6)
represent the first month (through the sixth month) since installation.
In the second panel we pool the data from months 2 onwards and
look at whether the probability of making the target differs between
treatment and control for a particular amount of revenue. The x-axis
here depicts revenue relative to an average revenue day on that route
(normalized by the target). Note we use gross revenue for this
outcome instead of net revenue like we did for the under-reporting
amount.
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Figure 1.14: Prediction 4→ Less Under-reporting
Notes: The outcome in these figures is the amount of revenue drivers
under-report. The first panel reproduces Figure 1.5, but separates treatment
drivers from control drivers. We also overlay a non-parametric smoothing
function. The second panel imposes the model’s step function and computes
the average under-reported amount for different levels of q∗ for treatment (red
dots) and control (black dots). The dotted lines on the bottom represent the
MSE from each regression.
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Figure 1.15: Under-report
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Notes: Each point on the graph is the difference between the average amount of revenue treatment
and control drivers under-report in a particular month. The data was collected from owner and
driver surveys - see Figure 1.5 for a description of how under-reported revenue was computed.
Note that because installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first
month (through the sixth month) since installation.
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Figure 1.16: Company Outcomes
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Notes: Each point on the graphs is the average difference between treatment
and control in a particular month for a particular outcome. Note that because
installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first
month (through the sixth month) since installation. The outcome in the first
panel is the amount of revenue collected by the driver (captured through daily
driver surveys). The outcome in the second panel is amount of profits the
business generates, where pro f its = revenue − costs − driversalary - which are
captured from owner and driver daily reports.
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Figure 1.17: Salary per hour
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Notes: Each point on the graph is the difference in driver salary per hour between treatment and
control drivers. The data was collected from daily driver surveys. Note that because installations
were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first month (through the sixth month)
since installation.
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Figure 1.18: Speeding
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Notes: Each point on the graphs is the average difference between treatment
and control in a particular month for a particular outcome. Note that because
installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first
month (through the sixth month) since installation. The outcome in the first
panel is maxspeed, while the outcome in the second panel is average speed.
Both are measured directly by the tracker.
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Figure 1.19: Over-acceleration and Over-speeding
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Notes: Each point on the graphs is the average difference between treatment
and control in a particular month for a particular outcome. Note that because
installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first
month (through the sixth month) since installation. The outcome in the first
panel is over-acceleration alerts, while the outcome in the second panel is
over-speeding alerts. Both are measured directly by the tracker
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Figure 1.20: Sharp-turning and Sharp-braking
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Notes: Each point on the graphs is the average difference between treatment
and control in a particular month for a particular outcome. Note that because
installations were rolled out over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first
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Figure 1.21: Accidents
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drivers get into. The data was collected from daily owner/driver daily surveys, and then validated
by an enumerator who called the owner directly. Note that because installations were rolled out
over time, Month 1 (through 6) represent the first month (through the sixth month) since
installation.
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2 | Endogenous Information Sharing
and the Gains from Using Net-
work Information to Maximize
Technology Adoption
Chapter abstract: Can agents in a social network be induced to obtain in-
formation from outside their peer groups? Using a field experiment in rural
Bangladesh, we show that demonstration plots in agriculture — a technique
where the first users of a new variety cultivate it in a side-by-side comparison
with an existing variety — facilitate social learning by inducing conversations
and information sharing outside of existing social networks. We compare these
improvements in learning with those from seeding new technology with more
central farmers in village social networks. The demonstration plots — when
cultivated by randomly selected farmers — improve knowledge by just as much
as seeding with more central farmers. Moreover, the demonstration plots only
induce conversations and facilitate learning for farmers that were unconnected
to entry points at baseline. Finally, we combine this diffusion experiment with
an impact experiment to show that both demonstration plots and improved
seeding transmit information to farmers that are less likely to benefit from the
new innovation.
2.1 Introduction
People commonly rely on their peers for information. Research has established the
existence of such peer effects across a variety of domains, ranging from learning in
school to adoption of new innovations in poor countries.1 Building on the impor-
tance of networks for transmitting knowledge, recent work has sought to answer
1A non-exhaustive subset of research in this area includes peer effects on academic performance
(Sacerdote, 2001), purchases of financial assets (Bursztyn et al., 2014), adoption of improved sani-
tation in developing countries (Guiteras, Levinsohn, and Mobarak, 2015), the decision of whether
to purchase crop insurance (Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet, 2015), and the adoption of agricultural
technology (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Munshi, 2004; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and
Udry, 2010).
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the question as to who should be chosen as the initial recipients of information in or-
der to make that information proliferate more extensively throughout the network?
The proven methods for selecting these optimal entry points or “seeds" include
collecting information on the full network in a community (Beaman et al., 2015)
or asking a smaller number of individuals for the right people to seed information
(Banerjee et al., 2018b). These approaches rely on the structure of the social net-
work being roughly fixed and stable over time. Typically, agents pass information
only amongst their connected peers.
Another strategy — and one that has received less attention in the literature
— is to consider the exchange of information between individuals without existing
social ties, and ask what can be done to encourage individuals to seek out informa-
tion from outside their networks? Is it possible for the policymaker to intervene in a
way that encourages people to seek information from off-network sources? Or, are
information-sharing relationships sufficiently rigid to only respond to the selection
of optimal seeds within the network? In this paper we focus on the efficacy of a
commonly used technique in agricultural extension, namely the use of demonstra-
tion plots that showcase the features of a new seed variety relative to traditional
varieties. We find evidence suggesting that this low-cost approach to encouraging
learning can effectively substitute for the typically difficult task of finding optimal
entry points in social networks.
We arrive at this conclusion using two related experiments spread across 256
villages in rural Bangladesh. The first experiment contrasts the two approaches
detailed above to spreading information about a new rice variety called BRRI Dhan
56 (or BD56 for short).2 We introduced the new variety to five farmers, referred
to as “entry points" throughout the remainder of the paper, in a random subset of
192 villages. We then cross randomized villages across two treatments: (1) the
selection criteria for entry-point farmers and (2) the demonstration method, aimed
at encouraging other farmers from the village to seek information. The different
treatment cells are described visually in Figure 2.1.
In terms of selection of entry points, we randomized villages across three differ-
ent selection methods. In the first 64 villages we randomly selected farmers (as a
benchmark). In the next 64 villages we relied on the local knowledge of agricultural
extension officers (known as “sub-agricultural officers" or SAO’s) to identify farmers
who would be most effective at demonstrating the features of a new rice variety. In
the remaining 64 villages, we ranked farmers according to farm size and selected
the five largest farmers.3 We opted for these selection mechanisms because they can
2Effective use of BD56 necessitates a large change in the production process. In short, the variety
is ready for harvest a full month before the common variety being grown in the rainy season. As a
result, the technology provides enough time for a third crop to be grown in between the rainy and
dry-season rice crops. This large change in the cropping system — going from producing two rice
crops to producing a third crop in between — enhances the potential for social learning about BD56
and its attributes.
3We found during piloting that large landholders often act as opinion leaders during focus group
discussions about agriculture. Moreover, other farmers seemed to look at large farmers to learn
about new technology. These casual observations led to the inclusion of the arm where farm size
was used to select entry points.
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be implemented at relatively low cost, which is attractive from a policy perspective.
Indeed, neither approach requires an expensive survey nor detailed data collection
efforts to characterize social networks.
In the second treatment, we randomized whether farmers were asked to set up
demonstration plots or not. This treatment was cross-randomized with the selection
of entry points detailed above. This means that 32 villages out of the 64 assigned
to a particular “entry-point" selection arm were also assigned to demonstration
plots. There the team assisted farmers in setting up “head-to-head demonstration
plots", which involved cultivating BD56 alongside a counterfactual seed variety of
the farmer’s choosing. We provided two markers to make comparison across the
two varieties more visible — one reading “BD56" and the other listing the name
of the chosen alternative variety — to be placed in the two fields (see Figure 2.2
for an example).4 We refer to this treatment as “demonstration plots" throughout
the remainder of the paper. The demonstration plots indicate to other farmers
that the entry point is comparing the attributes of the new variety to a known one.
This serves as a mechanism to focus attention of other farmers on existence of a
new learning opportunity.5 In the remaining 32 villages that were not assigned to
demonstration plots, the entry points used BD56 on one of their plots and were
provided with a single “BD56" marker. It follows that the demonstration plots must
do more than broadcast information about the existence of BD56 because farmers
in these comparison villages also labelled their field with a marker.
These two approaches to increasing knowledge transmission rely on very dif-
ferent assumptions about how information diffuses in networks. The improved
selection of entry points, using either large farmers or those hand picked by SAO’s,
seeks to test scalable approaches to finding the right influential farmers in the net-
work. Importantly, the notion of optimal seeds is designed to exploit the network as
it exists at baseline, and does not consider that the intervention itself may change
the network. In contrast, the demonstration plots are meant to spark interest and
potentially induce communication beyond existing network links. The demonstra-
tion plots can do so by either 1) capturing attention and thus increasing the demand
for information or 2) providing a more precise signal to entry points and therefore
increasing their supply of information to others.
This experiment delivers four main results. First, and using only baseline infor-
mation, we verify that the large and SAO-selected entry points are far more central
in the village networks than random seeding, and are thus well positioned to spread
information to a larger number of farmers. At baseline our survey teams visited all
farming households in each village — making a total of almost 22,000 visits — and
posed the question “which farmers in this village do you regularly speak to about
rice farming?"6 Using these data, we observe that the average entry point in the
4This method of demonstration plots is commonly used, especially by private sector seed compa-
nies seeking to promote and demonstrate the attributes of their new seed varieties.
5We didn’t provide any further assistance (such as inputs or advice) with the actual cultivation
of the two plots. This was purposeful to lessen the cost of the demonstration plots treatment, and
make the approach easily scalable.
6Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2016) show that measures of network centrality are misleading when
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random villages is connected to 4.6 other farmers. This increases sharply to 8.2 and
9.1 connections for entry points in SAO and large farmer villages, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, the eigenvector centrality of entry points increases by 47 percent under SAO
selection and 80 percent with large-farmer selection. Based solely on the network
measured at baseline, both treatments would therefore be expected to increase the
spread of knowledge.
Despite these noticeable differences in network centrality, our second result
is that demonstration plots with random farmers create just as much additional
knowledge as entering with large and SAO-selected farmers. After the harvest of
BD56 — and sowing of the next crop — we conducted a survey with 10 random
farmers in each village. In addition to awareness about existence of BD56 and
its basic attributes, we also collected information on reported conversations about
BD56. Using large farmers as entry points increases awareness by 7.4 percentage
points or 12.3 percent in villages without demonstrations. Similarly, entry points
selected by extension agents increase awareness by 6.7 percentage points (11.2
percent) in villages without demonstrations. However, providing seeds to more
central farmers provides no additional benefits for knowledge diffusion when we
introduce demonstration plots.
At the same time, setting up demonstration plots increases awareness by 7.2
percentage points (12 percent) with random entry points. Noticeably, the impact
of demonstration plots under random selection is of the same magnitude as the
impacts of improved entry-point selection in the absence of demonstration plots.
The results remain similar when looking at the number of reported conversations
about BD56: demonstration plots with random farmers induce conversation by
about the same amount as introducing seeds with more central farmers. Given
the ease of setting up demonstrations, i.e. simply placing two signs in adjacent
fields, our experiment offers insight into how interventions that attract attention to
the fact that there is something to be learned can substitute for seeding with more
central entry points in networks.
Third, we then move on to investigate why demonstration plots are effective.
The results are consistent with the idea that demonstration plots cause farmers to
learn from people outside their network. Focusing on the 64 villages with random
entry-point selection, we observe strong peer effects on knowledge. Farmers that
were randomly connected to an additional entry point are 7.7 percentage points
more likely to know about BD56. This average effect differs meaningfully between
villages with and without demonstration plots: an additional connection with an
entry point has no effect in demonstration villages, but it increases awareness by
13.5 percentage points (22 percent) in non-demonstration villages. In other words,
demonstration plots lead to information exchange outside of baseline networks
and therefore greater transmission of knowledge. In doing so, demonstration plots
entirely eliminate peer effects. The same pattern of results again appears when
considering conversations about the technology.
estimated using only a sample of nodes within the network. Our approach of fully characterizing
the network by sampling each household in the village alleviates this concern.
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Also consistent with this network interpretation, we find that demonstration
plots were most effective for farmers that are least connected in the baseline in-
formation network — where connectivity is measured by eigenvector centrality. A
plausible explanation of this result is that the demonstration plots induced these
less connected farmers to endogenously seek information about BD56.
Finally, we show that their network centralities at least partly explain why large
and SAO-selected entry points lead to better information diffusion. The effects of
large and SAO selection on knowledge decrease by 43 and 31 percent, respectively,
when conditioning on the average degree of entry points. In addition, average
degree centrality of entry points is itself positively correlated with BD56 awareness.
Conditioning on average degree is not a perfect test — since the particular network
measure that should “knock out" the treatment effects depends on the specific model
of diffusion.7 Nonetheless, the result is consistent with the idea that diffusion via
network links partly explains why the entry-point treatments were successful.
While we mainly consider effects on knowledge transmission, we also observe
uptake when BD56 was made available for sale at subsidized prices. The results
on seed adoption are noisier, but qualitatively consistent with our observations on
knowledge.
Our second experiment allows us to further test whether demonstration plots
(or alternative seeding strategies) are more likely to deliver information to the
farmers most likely to benefit from the new technology. Returning to Figure 2.1, we
also randomly selected 64 control villages where we provided a new long-duration
rice seed to a set of farmers identified using the same criteria as in the 192 BD56
villages. This experiment allows us to characterize the impact of short-duration rice
on agricultural practice and profits. The main benefit of the short-duration seed
is the ability to grow a third crop in between the rainy and dry-season rice crops.
Using the machine learning methods developed in Chernozhukov et al. (2018), we
estimate a mapping between baseline covariates and the treatment effect of BD56
on the number of crops grown. This heterogeneity index serves as a prediction of
which farmers are most likely to benefit from BD56 by increasing cropping intensity.
Using this heterogeneity index with the 192 villages in our first diffusion experi-
ment, we find suggestive evidence that both demonstration plots and our selection
treatments increase knowledge and conversations only for farmers that have below-
median expected treatment effects of BD56 on the number of crops grown. In other
words, intervening to increase knowledge diffusion in networks may only be effec-
tive for farmers with lower expected benefits from adopting an innovation.8 These
findings point to an important consideration for research that studies alternative
mechanisms for increasing diffusion of products that have heterogeneous benefits.
7Degree is a suitable measure if we think of diffusion models with few periods, the probability
of passing information to connected friends is high, and the farmers with the largest degrees are
sufficiently spread out in the network.
8An alternative explanation is that the diffusion treatments succeeded in informing farmers that
were the least likely to benefit from BD56, and therefore prevented their adoption. This explanation
is less consistent with the positive (but noisy) point estimates we observe when estimating the effects
of the diffusion treatments on seed adoption.
68
Combining diffusion experiments with standard impact evaluations allows the re-
searcher to estimate treatment effect heterogeneity and use that to measure which
diffusion strategies reach the people most likely to benefit from an innovation, even
without a strong prior on which observables drive the heterogeneity.9
We then go on to show how a simple diffusion model, when amended to allow
for formation of new links with entry points, explains our pattern of results. In
the model, farmers can either become informed by receiving information flowing
through the structure of existing links, or by actively communicating with entry
points. Farmers in the worst position to learn from the network, i.e. those that are
the least connected to entry points, benefit from having the opportunity to engage
directly with entry points. The demonstration plots treatment appears to deliver
these benefits by inducing unconnected and more isolated farmers to learn directly
from entry points.
Turning to literature, theoretical work has considered information transmission
when network communication is endogenous (Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar,
2014; Calvó-Armengol, Martí, and Prat, 2015), but empirical work in this area is
scarce. Mobius, Phan, and Szeidl (2015) show that having conversations is corre-
lated with possessing the correct information in a field experiment amongst college
students, but that frictions still exist in the diffusion of information. Chandrasekhar,
Golub, and Yang (2016) make an important contribution by considering one par-
ticular friction arising with endogenous social learning: the need for information
can reveal low skill, therefore creating a stigma effect that represents part of the
costs of information seeking. Banerjee et al. (2018a) show evidence consistent
with this same idea during India’s recent demonetization. In particular, villagers
were less willing to seek information about demonetization rules when everybody
knew that information was provided widely and thus seeking information signals
an inability to process one’s own information. Our experiment delivers insights
on the potential to intervene to induce communication, overcome some of these
frictions, and therefore facilitate social learning.
Looking for ways to induce communication and learning builds on an active
literature that treats networks as fixed and asks how to find the optimal entry
points within these networks. These studies include demonstration of agricultural
inputs (Beaman et al., 2015; Beaman and Dillon, 2017), diffusion of information
about microfinance (Banerjee et al., 2013), diffusion of health products (Kim et al.,
2015), and information on how to capitalize on a financial opportunity or the uptake
of vaccines (Banerjee et al., 2018b).10 There are a couple of limitations with this
approach. First, it can be difficult to identify the most central entry points in a social
9Rigol, Hussam, and Roth (2017) is the closest example where the authors use machine learning
methods to estimate treatment effect heterogeneity for microfinance in India. They then show that
using community information on the returns to microfinance is more effective than the machine
learning algorithm when applied to the set of observables in their baseline data.
10In addition to selection, other work has looked at different ways of making entry points com-
municate more, including compensation (BenYishay and Mobarak, 2015) and training (Kondylis,
Mueller, and Zhu, 2017).
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network without fully characterizing the network, which may be cost prohibitive.11
Second, the efficacy of finding better entry points for seeding information likely
depends on the underlying structure of the social network or the specific model of
diffusion (Centola, 2010; Valente, 2012; Golub and Jackson, 2012). Akbarpour,
Malladi, and Saberi (2018) show that in many network structures the benefits from
seeding information with a slightly larger number of agents outweigh the benefits of
identifying the most central individuals. Our experiment considers scalable methods
of entry-point selection as a benchmark and shows that their benefits can also be
obtained by interventions that trigger social learning.
Focusing on agricultural development and policy, learning frictions is one of
the frequently proposed reason why farmers do not adopt new technology.12 Agri-
cultural extension is expected to serve as the policy tool to improve learning. In
practice, the standard method of agricultural extension attempts to leverage social
learning by seeding information with contact farmers (entry points) and relying on
information diffusion through social networks (Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder,
1991; Anderson and Feder, 2007; Kondylis, Mueller, and Zhu, 2017). Our exper-
iment provides evidence on how demonstration plots can offer a substitute for
the policymaker when improved selection of these contact farmers is difficult to
implement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.3 discusses the
design and implementation of the experiment, data collection, and basic character-
istics of the sample. Section 3.4 presents each of our individual results, focusing on
how selection and demonstration plots influence learning, and on understanding
what drives the effectiveness of the two approaches. Section 2.4 outlines a sim-
ple theoretical framework that is consistent with our results. We then provide an
overview and discuss implications of the findings in the final section.
2.2 Overview of the Experiment
In this section we review the details of the randomized control trial: the sampling
strategy, the experimental design, and the data collection activities. We conducted
the study in 11 sub-districts (upazilas) scattered across 3 districts of Rajshahi divi-
sion, consulting with the Department of Agricultural Extension to identify upazilas
that were suitable for the rice variety being introduced.13 We randomly selected
20% of the villages with not more than 150 households, resulting in a final sample
of 256 villages. This includes the 192 villages that received the new BD56 rice
variety in the diffusion experiment, as well as 64 control villages that received the
longer duration rice variety for the impact evaluation experiment. This village-level
11Banerjee et al. (2018b) show how to overcome this difficulty by asking a sample of villagers
who are the important people for diffusing information.
12In addition to learning, numerous studies highlight a wide range of explanations, including
behavioral biases, profitability, and risk (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2011; Suri, 2011; Karlan
et al., 2014; Emerick et al., 2016; Cole, Giné, and Vickery, 2017).
13See Figure B.1 for the location of the 11 upazilas included in the study.
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randomization was stratified by upazila.
BD56 has two key features. First, it requires less water, allowing farmers to save
on supplemental irrigation fees and preserving groundwater resources. Second, it
matures approximately 25 days earlier than other varieties commonly planted in
the area, providing farmers with the option of harvesting and selling an additional
crop between the two rice seasons (Aman and Boro rice seasons last from June/July
to October/November and December/January to April/May, respectively). The 64
control villages received a long duration rice variety called BRRI Dhan 51 (BD51)
which was chosen due to its similarity to the most popular variety at baseline.14
2.2.1 Experimental Design
Figure 2.1 summarizes the experimental design for the diffusion and impact evalu-
ation experiments detailed below. The design for the diffusion experiment consists
in the cross-randomization of two dimensions of treatment across 192 villages: the
method used to select the five seed recipients, and the implementation of “demon-
stration plots" by these entry-point farmers.
For the first dimension, the villages were subdivided into three groups of 64
villages each. The types of farmers we selected to receive the seeds (the “entry
points") differed based on the specific treatment arm that village was assigned to.
In the first group of 64 villages, the seeds were distributed to five farmers selected
at random. In the second group, we ranked farmers by landholding sizes and
distributed 5kg minikits of BD56 seeds to the top five farmers. In the third group of
64 villages, we asked the Sub-Agricultural Officer (SAO) to identify five farmers in
the village that would be effective at demonstrating the new variety and provided
BD56 seeds to them.
Within each group of 64 villages, we then selected 32 villages to receive ad-
ditional assistance setting up demonstration plots. We included this additional
dimension in the experiment to determine how this approach to boosting diffusion
rates compared with the alternative of selecting entry points that rely on the un-
derlying social networks to spread information. To this end, we asked farmers to
select a counterfactual variety that they would like to plant beside the new BD56
seeds we distributed. We then provided two sticks to farmers: one with the name
of the new variety (BD56), and another with the name of the variety they had se-
lected to plant beside it. We asked that farmers keep these two signs in their fields
throughout the cropping season to showcase the performance of BD56 relative to
the counterfactual they selected. Farmers in the remaining 32 “non-demonstration"
villages received a single sign for their BD56 plot. The provision of the single sign
ensures that any effect we detect in the demonstration plot villages with two signs
14BD51 is released as “Swarna-Sub1" in India and several other countries. Emerick et al. (2016)
show that Swarna-Sub1 is similar to Swarna, besides Swarna-Sub1 being more flood tolerant. How-
ever, our sample is not a flood prone area. We introduced Swarna-Sub1 in the control villages
because Swarna is not officially released in Bangladesh (and thus not available for sale) despite
being the most popular variety in our sample at baseline. More precisely, 77 percent of farmers in
the village census reported growing Swarna at baseline.
71
goes beyond the attention effect of placing one sign in the field.
For the impact evaluation experiment, we selected up to 15 “counterfactual"
farmers to receive equal sized amounts of BD51 seed in each of the 64 control
villages. This included five farmers with the largest landholdings, five farmers
selected by the SAO, and five farmers selected at random. These sets overlapped in
some cases and therefore the number of farmers per control village is occasionally
less than 15. Identifying these particular farmers in control villages was necessary
in order to compare how the entry points we identified in the treatment groups
cultivated BD56 relative to the longer duration counterfactual we distributed in the
control villages. In the rest of the paper we refer to these counterfactual farmers as
"entry-points" as well.
2.2.2 Timeline and Data Collection
Census with network information of each village
Figure 2.3 presents a complete timeline of the study. We began by performing a
complete census of each village in March 2016. Our field team surveyed 21,926
households over the period of three months. Villages have between 14 and 184
households, 86 on average. We administered a short questionnaire to each member
of the village, asking about their agricultural production (landholdings size, fertil-
izer use, production, and varieties sown), and their social networks (the name of
the person they considered to be the best farmer, and the names of up to 10 farmers
they turn to for advice on rice cultivation). We use these data to identify the largest
farmers in each village, select the random entry-points, compute network statistics,
and to forecast heterogeneous impacts of BD56 as a function of observable covari-
ates.
Seed distribution
The distribution of 5kg minikits to the farmers selected to be entry-points in all 256
villages took place in early June 2016, in time for the Aman season. A total of 1,795
farmers were reached, achieving a response rate of 99 percent.15 During these visits,
the field team carefully explained the features of the seeds being distributed, and
provided farmers with calendars to record the dates crops were sown, harvested, ir-
rigated and applied with inputs. We also supplied farmers in the treatment villages
with sticks and cards to place in their fields as a way of demonstrating to other
farmers the variety they were planting. We briefly visited farmers 6 weeks later to
make sure that we answered any remaining questions they had about the seeds,
and to verify that the sticks were properly displayed in the fields.
Information diffusion survey
In April 2017 we visited all treatment villages, and randomly selected 10 additional
farmers to conduct a small survey to determine if they had any knowledge of the
15The total number of entry points is five per BD56 village, or 960, and up to 15 counterfactual
farmers in the BD51 control villages. All 960 BD56 entry-points were reached, as well as 835
counterfactual farmers.
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BD56 seeds that were distributed to the entry points 9 months earlier. Specifically
we asked whether they had heard about the new variety, which farmers they spoke
to, and whether they could articulate some of the variety’s key features. We use
this information to assess how the diffusion of BD56 knowledge differs based on
the village’s treatment status.
Seed sale
In early June 2017, we visited each treatment village in our sample to sell 5kg and
2kg bags of BD56 seeds at subsidized prices. The field team called a select sample
of farmers in each village to inform them about the date and time of the seed sale.
The sample included the original minikit recipients, and the ten randomly selected
farmers who were surveyed about their BD56 knowledge 2 months prior. The field
team travelled to each village on the pre-determined date, and set-up their truck
in the middle of the village (often at the local market) with a large sign indicating
that the new BD56 seeds were available for purchase and that the main benefit of
the seed is that its shorter duration allows for an additional crop to be grown. They
recorded each sale that was made in a tablet. While we did not record the identity
of the buyer, the survey provides a measure of BD56’s diffusion within the village.
Unfortunately, we ran out of seeds before traveling to all of the villages, and hence
this information is only available for 168 of the 192 villages.
Agricultural surveys of entry-points.
In addition to the main sources of data described above, we conducted a series
of agricultural surveys with the entry-points in all 256 villages. The goal of these
surveys was to rigorously establish the impact of BD56 on agronomic practices, crop-
ping intensity, and annual income. A baseline survey was administered at the time
of the minikit distribution in June 2016. Important outcomes of interest included
area cultivated, plot-level information on crops sown, inputs, and production vol-
umes. We asked farmers to provide this information for 3 of their plots, which we
selected randomly when farmers had more than 3.
This survey was followed by three other rounds in order to fully characterize
annual production. In January-February 2017, we collected detailed information
about the recently harvested Aman rice crop, and recorded whether farmers were
planting a second post-Aman (known as the Rabi season) crop (midline 1). The sur-
vey asked specifically about seed variety choice, planting methods, and production
at the plot level. In April 2017 we collected additional information about the Rabi
crop, and the final Boro rice crop (midline 2). Finally, in August 2017, we asked
farmers about their crop production levels during the Boro rice season, as well as
their crop choice for the 2017 Aman rice season in order to gauge their propensity
to re-plant the new rice variety (BD56) that we had offered them the previous year
(endline). All surveys successfully reached the initial 1,795 farmers, except for two
farmers missing in the April survey.
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2.2.3 Baseline Characteristics from Census Data
Table B.1 presents summary statistics from the household census and verifies ran-
domization balance.16 Our sample consists primarily of farmers cultivating long-
duration rice varieties (only 1.17% of treatment farmers and 2.4% of control farm-
ers planted short-duration varieties in the 2015 crop cycle). While approximately
35% of farmers only grow rice throughout the season, a non-negligible share grow
a Rabi crop (including wheat, potato, pulses, onion, and garlic). Finally, farms
in the sample are small: average area sown with Aman rice (the main crop) is
approximately 1.33 acres.
We asked farmers to provide the names of up to 10 farmers they talked to
about rice farming during last Aman season. We define two farmers as being
connected or being peers if either name the other among the farmers they talk
to. We use this information to create various centrality statistics including degree
centrality (the number of connections a person has), eigenvector centrality and
betweenness centrality (the number of times a node acts as a bridge along the
shortest path between two other nodes). Figure 2.4 displays the distribution of
these three measures for the entire sample of households interviewed during the
census. Farmers have on average 4 connections with whom they talk to about rice
cultivation, though we see a strong right tail with some farmers having up to 26
connections. The distributions of eigenvector and betweenness centrality display
similar patterns with long right tails: while most farmers have a few connections
some have a disproportionately high number. The long right tails in the distributions
provides some initial evidence that the agricultural information networks do have
some highly central farmers that in theory would serve as more effective entry
points.
2.3 Results
We now provide our main results — starting with differences between entry points
in their social network status. We then seek to understand how entry points demon-
strated the attributes of BD56, by comparing them to the farmers growing long-
duration rice in the control villages. Building on these results, we focus on how
the demonstration plots affect awareness and how these effects compare to the
selection treatments. We argue that the efficacy of the demonstration plots is being
driven by their ability to induce new communication links. In contrast, additional
evidence suggests that the standard diffusion model in networks explains much of
the effectiveness of our selection treatments. Finally, we combine our different data
sources to test whether the treatments deliver information to farmers most likely to
capture BD56’s main benefit by increasing cropping intensity.
16Table B.2 further shows randomization balance for the sample of entry points, for the impact
evaluation experiment.
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2.3.1 The network centrality of entry points
Recent literature has tested various mechanisms for identifying the most central
nodes in social networks. These mechanisms include both direct elicitation of
the entire social network (Beaman et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2015) or trying to infer
centrality by asking a sample of individuals who is suitable for diffusing information
(Banerjee et al., 2018b). Compared to eliciting the entire network, our two methods
of selecting entry points are generally less demanding in terms of data; entering
with large farmers requires only administrative data on farm sizes and SAO-based
selection requires only a short interview with an agricultural extension agent. Yet,
despite their ease of implementation, there is no guarantee that either of these two
methods will deliver the entry points that are theoretically optimal for diffusion.
We first check this using our social network survey.
The main measures of network centrality all differ noticeably between random
entry points, those identified by SAO’s, and the largest five farmers in the village.
Table 2.1 displays average characteristics for the 960 entry points across the 192
BD56 treatment villages. The average farmer that was selected randomly has about
4.6 connections with other farmers in the village. The entry points selected by SAO’s
have an average of 8.14 connections and the five largest farmers in each village
have an average degree of 9.04. Eigenvector centrality of entry points increases
by 47 percent when selected by SAO’s and 80 percent when chosen as the five
largest farmers in the village. Banerjee et al. (2013) introduce diffusion central-
ity of farmer i as a measure of the expected number of times that farmers obtain
a piece of information that was introduced with i.17 Comparing to random entry
points, average diffusion centrality of SAO-selected entry points is higher by 0.64
standard deviations and the diffusion centrality of large entry points increases by
0.87 standard deviations. Figure B.2 in the appendix shows the cumulative distri-
bution functions of the different network centrality measures across the selection
treatments. Most importantly, the increases in centrality for large and SAO farmers
occur throughout the distributions.
These findings deliver an important verification that our experiment compares
demonstration plots to meaningful methods of selecting entry points. Put differently,
the SAO and large farmers in theory would be suitable for demonstrating technology
in order to spread awareness. The high centrality of large and SAO farmers —
relative to random entry points — is comparable to other mechanisms to selecting
entry points that have been tested in the literature. For instance, Banerjee et al.
(2018b) find that the median diffusion centrality of people identified by other
villagers as suitable for spreading information is larger than that of other villagers
by around 0.5 to 1 standard deviations. We find that relative to random targeting,
larger farmer targeting would increase median diffusion centrality by around 0.51
standard deviations (Figure B.2).
17This measure requires as parameters the number of periods for the diffusion process and the
probability that an informed agent passes information to their social connections. We set the number
of periods to 5 and the information passing probability to 0.5. We also normalize the measure by
subtracting the village-specific mean and dividing by the village-specific standard deviation.
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Besides network centrality, Table 2.1 also shows how several other observable
characteristics vary across the different types of entry points. There are two no-
table observations. First, SAO-selected entry points tend to be larger farmers: farm
size increases by about 5.9 bigha (3 bigha = 1 acre) for SAO entry points relative
to random farmers. We show in Table B.3 that controlling for farm size reduces
substantially the gaps in network centralities between SAO-selected and random
farmers. Put differently, extension officers could use knowledge of farm size in
selecting entry points, and this explains part of the reason why SAO-selected entry
points are more influential in networks. The ability of extension agents to select
influential entry points contrasts with Beaman et al. (2015) who find that Malawian
extension agents possess little information on the optimal entry points within social
networks. The sharp correlation between farm size — an easily observable char-
acteristic — and network centrality offers one possible explanation for the greater
ability of extension agents in our sample. This phenomenon is visually evident in
Figure 2.5 where we show the network structures for 6 randomly selected villages
with either SAO or large-farmer selection. All three of the large-farmer villages in
the top panel of the figure have at least one relatively larger farmer that is well
connected in the network. Focusing on the SAO-selection villages in the bottom
panel, both village 99 and 224 have medium or larger size farmers that are central
in the network and were selected as entry points by the SAO.
Second, our door-to-door census asked each household to list the “best farmer"
in the village. A random farmer is only named about 0.79 times while SAO entry
points are named 5.27 times, and the five largest farmers in each village 6.4 times.
These numbers further suggest that our selection treatments identify entry points
that are both better networked and that other farmers consider to be knowledgeable
about agriculture.18
2.3.2 How do entry points demonstrate the technology?
In this section, we use the impact evaluation experiment to explore how BD56 affect
farmers’ cultivation practices and profits.
Take up
During the first midline survey we asked farmers whether they planted the seeds
provided to them. We do not find any evidence of differential adoption rates (Table
B.4). Focusing exclusively on treatment villages, we further investigate whether
take up varies across different types of entry points. We find that adoption rates
remain fairly consistent across treatment arms, albeit slightly higher among large
farmers assigned to the demonstration plots (Column 3). This last finding would
suggest that the potential impacts of demonstration plots should be greater among
18The number of nominations as the best farmer is correlated with network centrality. It explains
44 percent of the variation of degree centrality, 32 percent for eigenvector centrality, and 41 percent
for betweenness centrality.
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large farmers because of the higher adoption rates, a result working against our
main findings presented later in the paper.
Cultivation practices and profitability
The intervention affected cropping systems. Farmers planting BD56 harvested those
fields 25 days earlier than farmers sowing BD51 (in late October rather than mid
November) (Table B.5 and Figure B.3). Treatment farmers used this additional
month between their two rice crops to increase the likelihood of planting a post-
Aman (Rabi) crop. On average, BD56 plots were 27.8 percentage points more likely
to be sown with the Rabi crop than BD51 plots (Table B.5). Mustard, pulses, and
potatoes were the most frequent short-season Rabi crop induced by the treatment.
Importantly for knowledge diffusion, this change in cropping systems is hetero-
geneous by type of entry point. The treatment effect for growing the Rabi crop is 17
and 11 percentage points higher for large and SAO farmers, respectively (Table B.6).
Because growing additional crops is such a visible activity, this offers a potential
mechanism as to why knowledge diffuses faster with large and SAO selection — a
possibility we investigate in Section 2.3.4.
While the BD56 treatment led to a sharp increase in cropping intensity, we still
observe that 46 percent of the BD56 plots were left fallow in between the two rice
crops.19 In addition, BD56 naturally leads to lower yields given its shorter duration:
the yield of BD56 plots was 31 percent lower than that of the longer duration BD51
plots. We also discovered that BD56 fetched a slightly lower market price, which
farmers attributed to less familiarity by millers. In combination, profits during the
Aman season were lower by 4,576 taka for BD56 plots, or around 44 percent (Table
B.7).
The average gain in profit from Rabi cultivation is 1,436 taka (60 percent).
Assuming all of these benefits come from the extensive margin of growing the crop,
BD56 led to an increase in Rabi profits of 5,241 taka for farmers that complied
by growing the additional crop afforded by the treatment. This suggests that the
technology was profitable among the subset of farmers who fully complied by
planting the Rabi crop, but was not profitable on average since not all farmers
capitalized on this main benefit of the technology.
2.3.3 How does knowledge diffuse across treatments?
Do demonstration plots increase awareness about new technology? If so, how do
these effects compare to those generated by improved selection of entry points?
The follow up information survey in the 192 BD56 villages allows us to answer
these questions. The farmer-level specification compares awareness across the six
19There are a number of explanations including that farmers were not prepared to grow an
additional crop when the rice matured much earlier than anticipated (despite being told of the
duration when receiving the seeds), an inability to access land with plows when it is surrounded by
maturing rice, and lack of access to capital for planting an additional crop.
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different arms of the diffusion experiment. The corresponding regression is
awareivs = β0 + β1RandomDemovs + β2S AONoDemovs + β3S AODemovs
+ β4LargeNoDemovs + β5LargeDemovs + αs + εivs,
(2.1)
where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether farmer i in village v
and upazila s is aware of BD56, S AONoDemovs is an indicator for villages with
SAO selection and no demonstration plots, and the remainder of the variables are
defined analogously. As in all of the analysis, we include strata (upazila) fixed
effects and cluster standard errors at the village level.
The results in Table 2.2 deliver three insights. First, the demonstration plots
increase knowledge when cultivated by randomly selected farmers. Specifically, the
rate of awareness increases by 7.2 percentage points when random farmers grow
BD56 side by side with a chosen comparison variety. Sixty percent of farmers were
knowledgeable of BD56 in control villages, meaning that the treatment effect of
demonstration plots amounts to a 12 percent effect. The large rate of awareness
in RandomNoDemo villages (the omitted category) shows that information diffuses,
even under the benchmark where entry points are random and demonstration plots
are absent.
Second, the demonstration plots have no effects when cultivated by the better-
connected large and SAO farmers. The estimates of β2 and β3 are nearly identical,
meaning that the demonstration plots didn’t spread knowledge with SAO selection.
Similarly, the estimates of β4 and β5 indicate that adding demonstration plots failed
to increase awareness with large-farmer entry points.
Third, the effect of demonstration plots with random farmers is roughly the
same magnitude as the effects of entering with large and SAO farmers. As we
would expect based on their network connections, entering with large and SAO-
selected farmers increases awareness. Amongst non-demo villages, SAO selection
increases awareness by 6.7 percentage points (11.2 percent) and entering with
the largest farmers increases awareness by 7.4 percentage points (12.3 percent).
These effects are quite similar and statistically indistinguishable from the effect of
demonstration plots with random entry points. Moreover, the demonstration plots
eliminate the effects of targeting more central farmers. Specifically, the estimates
of β1, β3, and β5 are indistinguishable.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.2 show effects on the number of conversations
farmers reported having about BD56. While somewhat noisier, these data are also
consistent with the demonstration plots creating just as much conversation as the
improved selection of entry points. The demonstration plots led to 0.12 more con-
versations per farmer about BD56 when entry points were selected randomly (col.
2), almost all of which with entry points (col. 3). This 14 percent effect is similar
to the effect on knowledge reported in column 1. Focusing on the mean outcomes,
the average respondent in the control villages reported 0.84 conversations about
BD56, 0.72 of which were with the entry points, and by difference 0.12 were with
any of ten other randomly selected farmers that each farmer was asked about. Im-
portantly, the reported conversations should not be interpreted as the total number
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of conversations about BD56, but rather the number of conversations with the 15
farmers asked about in our survey.20
The data on conversations help to rule out an alternative explanation where the
side-by-side comparison — and two markers in the field — was more effective at
simply broadcasting information on the existence of BD56. Instead, the demonstra-
tion plots caused farmers to engage in social learning, rather than just learn about
the new technology from the sign in the field.
2.3.4 What mechanism explains the effects?
We highlight one mechanism which makes the demonstration plots work. Once
allowing for endogenous communication across network links, the demonstration
plots make people pay attention to farmers outside of their immediate network.
This mechanism is consistent with the entry-point selection effects being eliminated
by demonstration plots. The 64 villages with random entry-point selection allow
us to further consider this mechanism. Within these villages, the number of entry
points in a farmer’s network is as good as randomly assigned when conditioning on
the total number of connections of that farmer.21 As a result, the average effect of
being connected to an additional entry point can be estimated with
awareivs = β0 + β1Entry Point Peersivs + β2Total Peersivs + αs + εivs, (2.2)
where Entry Point Peersivs is the variable measuring how many of the five entry
points farmer i is connected to and Total Peersivs is the network degree of farmer i.
Under our framework the demonstration plots should make baseline relationships
less important for awareness, i.e. cause a decrease in β1.
The average peer effects are indeed consistent with social learning. Column
1 in Table 2.3 shows that being connected to an additional entry point increases
awareness by 7.7 percentage points, i.e. about 12 percent. More interestingly, the
second column shows that this social learning only exists in villages without demon-
stration plots. An additional connection to an entry point increases knowledge by
13.5 percentage points without demonstration plots, but when entry points set up
head-to-head demonstrations this effect goes down significantly to only 1.9 percent-
age points. In addition, the demonstration plots only increase learning for farmers
that were unconnected to entry points at baseline. Demonstration plots increase
awareness by 11.3 percentage points for farmers having no baseline connections
to entry points. The effect disappears with just one connection to an entry point
as the coefficient on the interaction term is nearly identical to the coefficient on
the demonstration villages indicator. The similarity of the effects points to how the
demonstration plots substitute for social connections to entry points: the increased
awareness generated by demonstration plots is nearly the same as the peer effects
20We collected information on conversations between the respondent and the five entry points as
well as 10 randomly selected other farmers for each village.
21Miguel and Kremer (2004) use a similar strategy when estimating spillover effects from de-
worming in Kenya.
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in non-demo villages. Lastly, measuring connections with a binary variable for be-
ing connected to at least one entry point does not change the results (columns 3
and 4).
Table B.8 shows the analogous results where the dependent variable is instead
the number of reported conversations between respondents and entry points. The
results are consistent with those on knowledge. The demonstration plots induced
conversations between entry points and farmers that were outside of their baseline
information networks.
Finally, the demonstration plots were only effective for the least networked
farmers. We investigate this by limiting to the random-entry-point villages and
estimating
awareivs = β0+β1Demovs+β2Eigenvectorivs+β3Eigenvectorivs∗Demovs+αs+εivs, (2.3)
where Eigenvectorivs is the baseline eigenvector centrality of farmer i. The estimated
coefficient on the interaction term β3 measures whether the demonstration plots
had a differential effect for farmers that were more central at baseline. Intuitively,
the more connected farmers have a number of ways (both direct and indirect) to
find out about BD56. In contrast, the least central farmers are the most likely to
benefit from making new connections to entry points.
Table 2.4 shows that the effect of demonstrations varies significantly according
to the farmer’s eigenvector centrality. The coefficient on the interaction term (β3)
is negative and precisely estimated. The magnitude of the coefficient is large.
Going from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the eigenvector centrality distribution
causes the effect of demonstrations to go from 0.165 to -0.022. Put another way,
demonstration plots become ineffective for the most central farmers in the network.
This evidence favors the explanation that demonstration plots substitute for
social learning in networks. This substitution also offers an explanation for why the
identities of entry points become irrelevant when they cultivate demonstration plots.
Demonstration plots effectively cause farmers to pay attention, thus “turning off"
peer effects and eliminating the need to rely on information being transmitted from
entry points to other farmers. Rather, the demonstration plots induce information
to flow to people that would have otherwise been excluded from peer-to-peer social
learning.
In contrast to inducing conversations in endogenous social networks, the base-
line network structure explains part of the effects of SAO and large-farmer selection.
Any network-based model of diffusion with an exogenous network would favor tar-
geting more central entry points. As a result, the effects of SAO and large-farmer
selection would be predicted to decrease when conditioning on the average central-
ity of entry points. The data show exactly this. Table 2.5 shows that conditioning on
the average degree centrality of entry points (moving from column 1 to 2) causes
the effects of large and SAO selection to decrease by 43 and 31 percent, respec-
tively.22 In addition, the average degree of entry points is strongly correlated with
22We limit the data to the non-demo villages for this analysis since the selection treatments are
only effective in these villages.
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knowledge diffusion. We of course can not provide a causal interpretation of this
parameter. The exercise instead offers evidence that the ability of large and SAO
entry points to increase knowledge is due to their more central network positions.
Beyond network centrality, the act of growing the additional crop — something
more likely done by large and SAO farmers — appears to have captured attention
and resulted in increased knowledge of BD56. Column 3 shows that the effects of
large and SAO selection also decrease when conditioning on the number of entry
points that planted a Rabi crop on their BD56 plot. The effects of large farmer
and SAO selection are smaller by 63 percent and 51 percent, respectively, when
conditioning on both degree centrality and the choice of growing a Rabi crop.
The villages with random and SAO-based selection also include large farmers
as entry points. At least one of the five largest farmers was selected as an entry
point in 19 of the 64 random villages and 38 of the 64 SAO selection villages. Table
2.6 shows analysis where we compare villages where at least one large farmer was
targeted with those having no large-farmer entry points.23 We find similar results
when exploiting this variation. In column 1, having at least one large-farmer entry
point increases awareness by 7.9 percentage points in non-demonstration villages.
Similar to the previous analysis, conditioning on the average network degree of
entry points and the number growing the Rabi crop absorbs much of this effect
(columns 2 and 3). Introducing demonstration plots makes these effects disappear.
Columns 4-6 show that hitting a large farmer has no effect in demonstration villages
and that the correlation between the degree centrality of entry points and awareness
is much weaker with demonstration plots.24 Consistent with the other findings,
the demonstration plots decrease the relevance of the baseline social network for
knowledge diffusion.
In sum, two attributes explain much of the reason why the selection treatments
were effective. First, large and SAO farmers are more central in the network and
therefore share information with more farmers. Second, these farmers do a better
job of showcasing the benefits of new technology. Nonetheless, despite these two
mechanisms, demonstration plots with random farmers are equally effective at
spreading awareness about new technology.
2.3.5 Effects on seed purchases
Awareness about new technology is our main outcome variable. In addition to
information diffusion, we also obtained data on purchases of BD56 seeds. A local
NGO visited each village prior to the 2017 rainy season — a year after BD56 had
been introduced in the village. The NGO set up a small stand and made BD56 seeds
available to any farmer wishing to purchase. Importantly, the seeds were subsidized
at a rate of 60 percent, and farmers visiting the shop were told that BD56 shortens
23We only worked with SAO’s to select entry points in the 64 SAO villages and the 64 BD51
villages. We therefore can’t repeat this analysis using SAO-identified farmers rather than large
farmers.
24Table B.9 gives the statistical test showing that across all villages, the impact of hitting at least
one large farmer is significantly smaller in demonstration villages.
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the season, gives lower yield relative to longer duration varieties, but allows for an
additional crop to be grown during the year.25 The NGO representative explained
to farmers that a third crop is needed to make BD56 profitable on an annual basis.
Table 2.7 shows regression results akin to Equation (2.1), but at the village
level where the dependent variable is either the number of farmers purchasing or
the adoption rate (number of buyers divided by village size). The point estimates
are much noisier, but the coefficients are sizable and the directions line up with
what we observe on knowledge diffusion. About 1.7 farmers purchased seeds per
village in control villages, and this increased by around 0.67 farmers (40 percent)
when adding demonstration plots. The number of farmers purchasing seeds also
increases in large and SAO villages. Turning to column 2, the degree centrality
of entry points and the number growing the third crop are positively correlated
with the number of purchasing farmers and absorb some of the selection effects.
Columns 3 and 4 show that the pattern remains when considering the share of
farmers purchasing, rather than the absolute number. Overall, the coefficients in
Table 2.7 show a similar pattern to what we observe on awareness creation, despite
being less precisely estimated.
2.3.6 Who becomes informed from the different treatments?
Combining our two experiments (diffusion and impact evaluation experiments)
give a unique opportunity to test whether alternative mechanisms for encouraging
information diffusion deliver information to the people expected to benefit the
most from new technology. Capturing the short-duration benefits of BD56 requires
growing an additional short-season crop — an action that was not universally
taken by farmers in our BD56 treatment group (Table B.5). We next ask two
questions (1) do observable characteristics explain variability across farmers in the
treatment effect of BD56 on the number of crops grown across the year and (2) do
the demonstration plots or the entry-points selection strategies differentially inform
the farmers who, based on these same observable characteristics, are the most likely
to increase their number of crops grown when adopting BD56?
We start by using the impact experiment to estimate a function measuring the
treatment-effect heterogeneity of BD56, which we refer to as the heterogeneity
index. The first step is to implement the method suggested in Chernozhukov et al.
(2018) to generate a linear prediction of the ATE conditional on the observed co-
variates from our door-to-door census, denoted as zi. Our sample of treatment and
control farmers is first divided into two samples: one “training" sample where we
seek to estimate the heterogeneity index, denoted as s0(zi), and another “validation"
sample where we seek to measure whether this estimate sˆ0(zi) is a significant de-
terminant of the heterogeneous treatment effect of BD56 on the number of crops
grown. First for the training sample, we estimate separate LASSO regressions
for the treatment and control groups to pick which of the covariates in z predict
25That year the government rate for BD56 seed ranged between 34 and 40 tk/kg. The NGO sold
the seeds for 15tk/kg.
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the number of crops grown y. Using these covariates, we generate estimates of
the conditional expectations of the number of crops grown as E(yi|Di = 1, zi) and
E(yi|Di = 0, zi).26 The difference between these two conditional expectations serves
as the heterogeneity index, sˆ0(zi).
Turning to the validation sample, we want to verify that the treatment effect
varies according to this measure sˆ0(zi). We do this in two ways. First, we add an
interaction between the treatment indicator and sˆ0(zi) − s¯ in a regression where the
dependent variable is the number of crops grown.27 Second, we estimate separate
treatment effects for the four quartiles of the distribution of sˆ0(zi). Finally, this
process is iterated 100 times, delivering 100 separate sample divisions and 100
estimates of the heterogeneity index.
The observed covariates predict treatment-effect heterogeneity in the validation
sample. Figure 2.6 shows the 100 estimates of the ATE and the linear heterogeneity
term. The heterogeneous effect is almost always larger than zero, suggesting that
the heterogeneity index sˆ0(zi) does proxy for the true heterogenous effect of BD56
on the number of crops grown. In other words, farmers with larger values of sˆ0(zi)
appear more likely to increase cropping intensity if adopting short-duration rice.
Figure 2.7 shows the separate treatment effects by quartile of the heterogeneity
index. Treatment effects increase with the heterogeneity index and are largest in
the top two quartiles of the distribution of sˆ0(zi).
We then return to the diffusion experiment in 192 villages to test whether the
treatment effects differ based on values of the heterogeneity index. We possess 100
estimates of sˆ0(zi) for each of the 1,920 farmers for which we elicited knowledge
of BD56. We take the median of sˆ0(zi) across these 100 sample divisions and esti-
mate whether the treatment effects of demonstration plots or entry-points selection
strategies depend on this predicted heterogeneity index.
Table 2.8 shows the regression results. Columns 1 and 2 interact the treatment
variables directly with sˆ0(zi), while columns 3 and 4 use an indicator for obser-
vations with above-median values of this heterogeneity index. The estimates are
noisy, but the heterogeneity index is positively associated with learning and having
conversations, indicating that information is more likely to flow to farmers with
higher returns when entry points are selected randomly and there are no demon-
strations. For instance, farmers with an above-median heterogeneity index are 10.1
percentage points more likely to learn about BD56 in random and no demo villages
(column 3). From column 4, these same farmers are expected to have .26 more
conversations (about 31 percent). However, the point estimates on the interaction
terms between the heterogeneity index and the treatment indicators are generally
negative and the coefficients on the five treatment indicators are positive and of
similar magnitudes. These findings indicate that while our treatments increased
knowledge by either exploiting existing network structure or triggering conversa-
26We use the OLS regressions with the covariates selected by the two LASSO procedures. The
selected covariates can be different in the treatment and control groups.
27The coefficient on the treatment indicator in this regression measures the average treatment
effect, while the coefficient on the interaction between treatment and sˆ0(zi) − s¯ measures whether
the heterogeneity index predicts actual treatment-effect heterogeneity.
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tions, the gains in knowledge were concentrated amongst farmers that would be
less likely to capitalize on the main benefit of BD56 if adopting.
As examples in column 4, demonstration plots increased conversations about
BD56 for farmers with below-median predicted effects on cropping intensity by
around 0.29, but had no effects for farmers who appeared more likely to increase
cropping intensity if adopting BD56 (0.29 + -0.32). Similarly, seeding with SAO-
selected farmers and with the largest farmers increases conversations for farmers
with below-median values of the heterogeneity index, but had no effect for farmers
that are above the median.
This finding sheds light on who is induced to have conversations and learn when
a policymaker intervenes with either an alternative seeding strategy or demonstra-
tion plots. Put simply, the people impacted by these treatments do not appear to
be those that would be the most likely to enjoy the technology’s main benefit if it
was randomly introduced to them. One reasonable interpretation is that conversa-
tions take place and information is obtained endogenously. Therefore, farmers with
the highest returns from obtaining information are more likely to engage in social
learning regardless of the dissemination strategy. Intervening to trigger the spread
of information only affects those with lower returns, i.e. those who are less likely
to endogenously seek information regardless of the dissemination strategy.
2.4 A model that rationalizes the experimental re-
sults
This section presents a basic diffusion model that allows for endogenous interac-
tion between unlinked agents and can rationalize our experimental findings. Our
goal is not to capture all of the strategic elements of network formation.28 Instead,
we opt for the simplest formulation that captures the tradeoffs introduced by our
treatments. First, the policymaker can introduce information to central entry points
therefore taking advantage of the existing network structure. Or, the policymaker
can seek to induce more communication in a world where communication networks
are endogenous. We show how the two approaches act as substitutes in a way that
is consistent with our empirical findings.
2.4.1 Model Environment
We consider a village with N farmers indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, ...,N}. The village social
network is described by the N × N adjacency matrix G, where gi j = 1 indicates that
28There are several papers looking at different aspects of how information links are formed.
These range from differences between actively sharing information and passively listening (Calvó-
Armengol, Martí, and Prat, 2015), the types of initial network structures that allow for efficient
information aggregation as societies grow large (Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar, 2014), and the
stigma from seeking information when it might signal low ability or understanding (Chandrasekhar,
Golub, and Yang, 2016; Banerjee et al., 2018a).
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farmers i and j have an information-sharing link. In terms of our data, this feature
of the model corresponds to the baseline social network module.
The policymaker first seeds technology with five entry points, indexed by j =
1, ...5. Each entry point is now “informed" and can then spread the information
to others, as in the standard information cascade. We assume, for now, that the
network is fixed and a farmer can only become informed if they receive information
that emanated from an entry point. The parameter q represents the exogenous
probability that any informed farmer passes information to a connected peer. The
probability that a farmer becomes informed, denoted as hi, is a function of the
information-passing probability q and the length of the possible paths between i
and each entry point j. Intuitively, farmers having the greatest number of shortest
paths to entry points become the most likely to be informed. In contrast, a farmer
that is completely isolated from entry points is not informed.
We build on this standard framework by adding the ability to form new links. In
addition to passively waiting for information to arrive from entry points, a farmer
can increase the probability of becoming informed by forming a link with an entry
point. Suppose the cost of forming a new link is c and the probability that an entry
point will pass information is p. A new link between farmer i and entry point j
is denoted as li j = 1 if i chooses to form the link and 0 otherwise. Overall, the
probability of gaining information from one of the two channels, denoted as µi, is
µi = 1 − (1 − hi) ∗
∏
j
(1 − p)li j . (2.4)
Finally, we write v as the utility of being informed and normalize the utility of not
being informed to 0.
2.4.2 The link-formation decision
The simple problem of the farmer is to choose whether to link with each of the entry
points. More formally, the farmer’s optimization problem is written as
max
li j
v
1 − (1 − hi) ∗∏
j
(1 − p)li j
 −∑
j
c ∗ li j. (2.5)
The problem can be simplified to choosing the number of new contacts with entry
points, denoted as m, since each entry point adds the same probability of learning
p. The exact decision rule is that the farmer will link with m entry points if and only
if:
v(1 − hi)p(1 − p)m−1 > c. (2.6)
The farmer seeks to connect directly to entry points for information if the costs
of doing so are low (c is low), or if he is in a poor position to obtain information
via diffusion in the network (hi is low). Increasing the probability that an entry
point shares useful information (p) increases the likelihood of connecting with one
entry point (m = 1). If p is sufficiently large, then increasing p causes the marginal
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benefit of linking with further entry points to decrease because the farmer is likely
to obtain the information from the first entry point newly added to her network.
2.4.3 Consistency between the model and experimental find-
ings
This small modification to a standard diffusion framework predicts treatment effects
that are in line with our RCT results. Put differently, the two mechanisms for being
informed — receiving information via the existing social network or communicating
with an entry point outside the network — can explain the main impacts as well as
the heterogeneity across the sample. The discussion that follows links this simple
theory to our results.
Effectiveness of entering with Large/SAO farmers: By being more central in
networks, large and SAO-selected farmers facilitate diffusion. Holding networks
fixed, the probability hi in equation (2.6) increases, causing the probability of re-
ceiving information to increase. This prediction is the obvious one that supports
network-based approaches to identifying entry points when network structure re-
mains fixed. The main effects of large farmer and SAO-based selection on knowl-
edge, and the sensitivity of these effects to conditioning on centrality of entry points
(Tables 2.2, 2.5, and 2.6) are all consistent with this standard mechanism.
Effectiveness of demonstration plots: We argue that the demonstration plots
convey active experimentation and signal a farmer that is paying attention to how
the new technology performs against its’ relative alternative. This is nontrivial
as Hanna, Mullainathan, and Schwartzstein (2014) show that inattention bias
can hinder what farmers learn from experimentation. As a result, fellow villagers
perceive that farmer to be more likely to pass useful information, i.e. the parameter
p increases with the introduction of demonstration plots. The marginal benefit of
forming a link with a single entry point then increases. Correspondingly, the new
information link increases the likelihood of becoming informed. The main results
on knowledge and reported conversations in Table 2.2 appear consistent with this
reasoning.
Interactions between network-based selection and demonstration plots:
The endogenous network mechanism posits substitutability between seeding with
more central farmers and demonstration plots. Returning to equation (2.6), seeding
with more central farmers increases the probability of learning via existing network
links and therefore reduces the marginal benefit of endogenously seeking informa-
tion from entry points. The findings show this exactly: demonstration plots have
no effect when cultivated by more central farmers and the effect of entering with
more central farmers is eliminated when the policymaker introduces demonstration
plots.
Network effects: Farmers directly connected to entry points gain less from
demonstration plots because the existing network connection increases the like-
lihood of learning through the information-diffusion mechanism. We found that
baseline connections with entry points do increase knowledge, however, demon-
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stration plots eliminate this advantage by giving a channel for unconnected farmers
to learn. This is compatible with equation (2.6) where the benefit of making new
links with entry points declines with hi.
In sum, our experimental findings, along with the simple model, emphasize the
two mechanisms that serve to boost learning in networks: optimizing the selection
of entry points or inducing communication to facilitate learning. The latter mecha-
nism has received less attention in the literature. However, our results suggest that
it gives the policymaker an important alternative for making information diffuse
faster in networks.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
We have shown experimental evidence on a new mechanism for spreading aware-
ness about technology. Demonstration plots — where partnering farmers cultivate
a new technology side by side with an existing one — increase awareness relative
to a control where new technology is demonstrated on its own. We found that
this relatively straightforward method of agricultural extension made an additional
seven percent of farmers aware about a new seed variety. Demonstration plots
raised awareness only for farmers that lacked social connections with adopters. In
addition, the demonstration plots were the most effective for the farmers that were
the most isolated — in terms of their eigenvector centralities — in the baseline
information network. All of these results, when taken together, are consistent with
a model where the effectiveness of demonstration plots is explained by their ability
to facilitate learning by triggering communication in information-sharing networks.
The experiment benchmarked these demonstration plots against scalable and
policy-relevant alternatives where entry points were selected strategically to in-
crease their centralities in the social network. These were entering with the largest
farmers and those hand picked by government extension agents. Indeed, these
methods do increase knowledge compared to random selection. But the gains in
awareness are about the same as the gains from the demonstration plots. And in
contrast to endogenous communication between people without links, the selection
treatments seem to be effective because of how they exploit the structure of the
baseline social network and because the more central entry points did a better job
of demonstrating a key benefit of new technology.
We also showed evidence on who becomes informed. The seed variety we intro-
duced has heterogeneous benefits. Specifically, only some farmers took advantage
of the early maturation by increasing cropping intensity. Applying machine-learning
methods to identify the characteristics associated with taking this action, we found
farmers who are the most likely to grow an additional crop when adopting BD56
are not those learning from demonstration plots. We found the same result for
improved seeding strategies. This finding highlights a tradeoff: intervening to in-
crease knowledge transmission may be ineffective for the highest return individuals
who learn even in the absence of additional intervention by the policymaker.
Overall, our analysis highlights the potential for alternate mechanisms of agri-
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cultural extension, outside of those that rely on information cascades through social
networks. Despite the ample evidence that networks are important for knowledge
transmission, there have been few studies that compare information cascades with
alternative methods of spreading knowledge.29 Focusing on policy, it is important to
consider such alternatives because policymakers may face difficulty in identifying
the entry points that are theoretically positioned for the best spread of information.
Either it could be prohibitively expensive to do a full network survey, or there may
not be observable characteristics (such as farm size) that correlate strongly with
less observable measures of network centrality. Our results show that in these con-
texts, improving learning can be achieved by taking small steps to capture people’s
attention, and get them to communicate and engage in learning from new people.
29Outside of agricultural technology, Banerjee et al. (2018a) is the only paper we are aware of
that compares seeding information about rules for India’s 2016 demonetization with broadcasting
that information more widely.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Differences in baseline characteristics for different entry points
Coefficients and SE:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant SAO Large farmers p-value (2)-(3)
Network Variables:
Degree 4.562∗∗∗ 3.582∗∗∗ 4.481∗∗∗ 0.473
(0.355) (1.042) (0.853)
Eigenvector 0.089∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.030
centrality (0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
Diffusion centrality -0.010 0.643∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 0.157
(0.054) (0.141) (0.110)
Betweenness 164.186∗∗∗ 394.084∗∗∗ 315.640∗∗∗ 0.509
centrality (27.926) (103.540) (69.762)
Household Characteristics:
Area cultivated all 9.013∗∗∗ 5.865∗∗∗ 21.396∗∗∗ 0.000
seasons (bigah) (0.658) (1.368) (2.689)
Times named best 0.790∗∗∗ 4.477∗∗∗ 5.589∗∗∗ 0.275
farmer (0.206) (0.785) (0.707)
Log revenue per 10.061∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.014 0.970
bigah (0.057) (0.077) (0.075)
Number livestock 3.950∗∗∗ -0.008 1.968∗∗∗ 0.000
owned (0.217) (0.284) (0.512)
Number of overseas 0.138∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.026 0.881
migrants (0.031) (0.039) (0.037)
Education 4.647∗∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗ 0.925∗ 0.536
(0.304) (0.464) (0.488)
Age 42.222∗∗∗ 0.712 3.594∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.739) (1.026) (1.078)
Tubewell owner 0.097∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.108
(0.022) (0.036) (0.051)
The data are limited to the 960 selected entry points in the 192 BD56 villages. Each row is the
result from a separate regression where the characteristic is regressed on a constant and indicators
for SAO and large farmer villages. The omitted group is the villages where demonstrators were
selected randomly (meaning the first column is the mean value for random entry points). The
standard errors in each regression are clustered at the village level. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 2.2: Treatment effects on knowledge
(1) (2) (3)
Heard About Conversations Conversations w/
Entry Points
Random w/ demo 0.072∗ 0.116 0.106
(0.041) (0.086) (0.088)
SAO no demo 0.067∗ 0.046 0.042
(0.039) (0.067) (0.071)
SAO w/ demo 0.065 0.074 0.096
(0.040) (0.089) (0.086)
Large no demo 0.074∗∗ 0.123∗ 0.114∗
(0.036) (0.068) (0.066)
Large w/ demo 0.049 0.108 0.113
(0.044) (0.075) (0.079)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Mean in Control 0.60 0.84 0.72
Number of Observations 1919 1920 1920
R squared 0.171 0.212 0.250
The data are for the 10 random farmers per village that were selected for the information survey.
The dependent variable in column 1 is an indicator for having knowledge of BD56. The dependent
variable in column 2 is the number of conversations the farmer had with 15 other farmers about
BD56 (the five entry points and 10 randomly selected farmers). The dependent variable in column
3 is the number of conversations specifically with entry points. Standard errors are clustered at the
village level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Note,
the rates of awareness are similar amongst the different selection arms in demonstration plot
villages, i.e. the estimates on SAO w/ demo, Large w/demo, and Random w/demo are
indistinguishable.
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Table 2.3: Peer effects on knowledge, separate for villages with and without demon-
stration plots
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer connections w/ 0.077∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
entry points (0.034) (0.046)
Peer connections w/ -0.116∗
entry points * Demonstration Village (0.061)
Connected to at 0.092∗ 0.156∗∗∗
least 1 entry point (0.053) (0.059)
Connected to at -0.130
least 1 entry point * Demonstration Village (0.097)
Number of -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 0.002
connections (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005)
Number of 0.000 -0.005
connections * Demonstration Village (0.006) (0.005)
Demonstration 0.113∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
Village (0.045) (0.045)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean in Control 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Number of Observations 635 635 635 635
R squared 0.186 0.199 0.185 0.197
The dependent variable in all regressions is an indicator for having heard of BD56 amongst the 10
randomly surveyed farmers per village. The data are limited to the 64 villages where entry points
where chosen randomly and peer effects can therefore be causally identified. The variable Peer
connections w/ entry points is the number of entry points (from 0 to 5) that the farmer is connected
with while Connected to at least 1 entry point is an indicator variable for being connected to at least
one of the entry points. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 2.4: Effects of demonstration plots as a function of baseline network centrality
(1) (2)
Demonstration 0.072∗ 0.179∗∗∗
Village (0.041) (0.057)
Eigenvector -1.067∗∗∗
Centrality * Demo (0.381)
Eigenvector 0.935∗∗∗
Centrality (0.325)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes
Mean in Control 0.60 0.61
Number of Observations 639 517
R squared 0.183 0.202
The dependent variable in both regressions is an indicator for having heard of BD56. The data are
limited to the 64 villages where entry points were chosen randomly. Eigenvector Centrality is the
baseline network centrality of the respondent. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 2.5: Effects of entry-point treatments when conditioning on observable at-
tributes of entry points
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SAO no demo 0.068∗ 0.047 0.056 0.033
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Large no demo 0.076∗∗ 0.043 0.064∗ 0.028
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Average degree of 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
entry points (0.002) (0.002)
Number entry points 0.020∗ 0.022∗
growing rabi crop (0.011) (0.011)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean in Control 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
Number of Observations 960 960 960 960
R squared 0.173 0.179 0.176 0.182
The data are for the 10 random farmers per village that were selected for the information survey
and are limited to the 96 villages without demonstration plots. The dependent variable in all
regressions is an indicator for being aware of BD56. Standard errors are clustered at the village
level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 2.6: Effects of having at least one large-farmer entry point on BD56 knowledge
Non-Demo Villages Demo Villages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
At least 1 large 0.079∗∗ 0.048 0.035 -0.017 -0.024 -0.025
entry point (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038)
Average degree of 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.003 0.003
entry points (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Number entry points 0.022∗ 0.020
growing rabi crop (0.012) (0.013)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean in Control 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.68 0.68 0.68
Number of Observations 960 960 960 959 959 959
R squared 0.175 0.179 0.182 0.175 0.176 0.180
The data are for the 10 random farmers per village that were selected for the information survey.
The dependent variable is an indicator for being aware of BD56. Column 1-3 are for the villages
without demonstration plots and columns 4-6 are for the demonstration villages. At least 1 large
entry point is an indicator for villages where one of the five largest farmers was selected as an entry
point. The mean in the control group is defined as the mean awareness rate in villages where none
of the entry points were large farmers. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 2.7: Treatment effects on seed purchasing behavior
Number of farmers Share of village
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Random w/ demo 0.673 0.613 0.00622 0.00493
(0.813) (0.807) (0.00916) (0.00917)
SAO no demo 0.697 0.392 0.0116 0.00809
(0.694) (0.690) (0.0107) (0.0104)
SAO w/ demo 0.116 -0.154 0.00411 0.00135
(0.615) (0.640) (0.00744) (0.00774)
Large no demo 0.272 -0.171 0.00817 0.00325
(0.535) (0.621) (0.00782) (0.00868)
Large w/ demo 0.866 0.515 0.0195∗∗ 0.0147
(0.641) (0.654) (0.00946) (0.00914)
Average degree of 0.0642∗ 0.000567
entry points (0.0382) (0.000507)
Number entry points 0.166 0.00291
growing rabi crop (0.156) (0.00214)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean in Control 1.679 1.679 0.019 0.019
Number of Observations 168 168 168 168
R squared 0.085 0.106 0.091 0.106
The data are from seed sales that were carried out for each village prior to the 2017 rainy season.
We are missing data for 24 of the 192 villages because the seed supply ran out before those villages
could be completed. The dependent variables are the number of farmers purchasing BD56 seeds
(columns 1-2) and the share of farmers purchasing (columns 3-4). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 2.8: Heterogeneous effects on knowledge and conversations by predicted
impact of BD56 on number of crops grown
Linear Heterogeneity Effect Above Median
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heard About Conversation Heard About Conversations
Random w/ demo 0.082 0.247∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.294∗∗
(0.069) (0.131) (0.060) (0.128)
SAO no demo 0.073 0.096 0.089 0.125
(0.072) (0.115) (0.060) (0.094)
SAO w/ demo 0.096 0.184∗ 0.111∗ 0.253∗∗
(0.064) (0.110) (0.057) (0.099)
Large no demo 0.148∗∗ 0.247∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.101) (0.053) (0.101)
Large w/ demo 0.094 0.190 0.123∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.116) (0.068) (0.096)
Heterogeneity 0.034 0.236 0.101∗ 0.261∗∗
(0.123) (0.195) (0.057) (0.103)
SAO no demo * 0.001 -0.145 -0.014 -0.111
Heterogeneity (0.164) (0.282) (0.072) (0.115)
SAO w/ demo * -0.096 -0.369 -0.072 -0.337∗∗
Heterogeneity (0.143) (0.227) (0.077) (0.148)
Large no demo * -0.230 -0.386∗ -0.123∗ -0.276∗∗
Heterogeneity (0.152) (0.227) (0.072) (0.135)
Large w/ demo * -0.136 -0.252 -0.124 -0.274∗∗
Heterogeneity (0.192) (0.240) (0.081) (0.119)
Random w/ demo * -0.020 -0.430∗ -0.078 -0.318∗∗
Heterogeneity (0.161) (0.241) (0.077) (0.141)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean in Benchmark 0.60 0.85 0.60 0.85
Number of Observations 1910 1911 1910 1911
R squared 0.174 0.216 0.175 0.219
These regressions test whether the different treatments increase knowledge and spark
conversations more (or less) for farmers that are predicted to have the largest impact of of BD56 on
the number of crops grown. Columns 1 and 2 show linear heterogeneity where the treatment
indicators are interacted with sˆ0(zi) = E(yi|Di = 1, zi) − E(yi|Di = 0, zi) and columns 3 and 4 partition
the sample into farmers that are above and below the median in the distribution of sˆ0(zi). For each
farmer we calculate sˆ0(zi) as the median value across the 100 sample divisions in Figures 2.6 and
2.7. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 3 is an indicator for having knowledge of BD56. The
dependent variable in columns 2 and 4 is the number of conversations the farmer had with 15
other farmers about BD56. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Experimental Design
Sample Villages (N=256)
Treatment
Villages (N=192)
Largest Farmers (N=64)
Demo (N=32)
No Demo (N=32)
SAO Farmers (N=64)
Demo (N=32)
No Demo (N=32)
Random Farmers (N=64)
Demo (N=32)
No Demo (N=32)
Control
Villages (N=64)
Notes: Figure shows a schematic representation of the experimental design. The 192 BD56
treatment villages were divided into three groups for entry-point selection: random selection,
relying on the five largest farmers, and selecting those indicated by the ag. extension officer (SAO).
Demonstration plots were set up on half of the 64 villages within each of these arms.
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Figure 2.2: A visualization of the demonstration plot in comparison to the control
group
A: Demonstration Plot B: Control Plot
Notes: Panel A on the left shows an example demonstration plot. The plot on the left side is the
BD56 plot while the plot on the right is the popular longer duration variety Swarna. Panel B on the
right shows an example from the comparison villages where farmers were only given one marker to
denote the BD56 plot.
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Figure 2.3: A timeline of the experiment and data collection
2016 Seed	distribution
Baseline
Boro	season Aman	season 	(Rabi	season)
Jun
2017 Seed	sale
Boro	season Aman	season
JunJan Feb Mar Apr May Jul Aug
Census
EndlineMidline	2
Information	diffusion	survey
Midline	1
Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov DecMar Apr May
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of centrality measures from social network survey
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Notes: Figure shows the histograms for the 3 centrality measures from the baseline social network
survey with all households (N=21,926).
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Figure 2.6: ATE and heterogeneous effect on number of crops grown
0 .2 .4 .6
Effect on crops grown
Heterogeneity
ATE
 
Notes: The figure shows the average treatment effects and the heterogeneous effect on the number
of crops grown across across 100 equal-sized splits into training and validation datasets datasets.
For each split, we estimate separate LASSO regressions for treatment (BD56) and control (BD51)
farmers in the training dataset. In each case the number of crops grown is regressed on a set of 24
covariates, zi. Using the selected covariates for each group, we calculate the estimated
heterogeneity index for each farmer in the validation dataset as
sˆ0(zi) = E(yi|Di = 1, zi) − E(yi|Di = 0, zi). Using the validation dataset, we then regress the observed
number of crops on the treatment, sˆ0(zi) − s¯0, the interaction between treatment and sˆ0(zi) − s¯0, and
upazila fixed effects. The top bar in the figure shows the distribution of the 100 estimates of the
ATE (the coefficients on the treatment indicator). The bottom bar shows the 100 estimates of the
heterogeneity effect (the coefficient on the interaction between treatment and sˆ0(zi) − s¯0). The
vertical line represents the average across the 100 splits, the box the interquartile range, and the
whiskers give the min and max.
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Figure 2.7: Effects on number of crops grown by quartiles of the predicted effect
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Notes: The figure shows the estimated treatment effects by quartile of the heterogeneity index for
100 equal-sized splits into training and validation datasets. For each split, we estimate separate
LASSO regressions for treatment (BD56) and control (BD51) farmers in the training dataset. In
each case the number of crops grown is regressed on a set of 24 covariates, zi. Using the selected
covariates for each group, we calculate the estimated heterogeneity index for each farmer in the
validation dataset as sˆ0(zi) = E(yi|Di = 1, zi) − E(yi|Di = 0, zi). Using the validation dataset, we then
regress the observed number of crops on the treatment and upazila fixed effects separately for the
four quartiles of sˆ0(zi). The heavy dots show the averages across the 100 sample divisions while the
bands display the range from the 5th to 95th percentiles.
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3 | How do Online Job Portals af-
fect Employment and Search out-
comes? Evidence from India
Chapter abstract: In recent years innovative job market information systems
have emerged in order to match recent graduates with employers via integrated
websites and call center based platforms. We use a randomized control trial
to evaluate the ability of such job-portals to ease search frictions in India. We
partner with Job Shikari, an online platform operating primarily in Northern
India, and upload a randomly selected sample of recent vocational training
graduates onto their platform. A second subset of graduates are uploaded to the
platform, and receive “priority status", which means they subsequently receive
many more text messages than their peers about potentially job opportunities.
We find that being uploaded to the job portal has a negative impact on the
probability of being employed, but no significant impacts on job-search. The
treatment priority group experiences a less strong disemployment effect, but is
much more likely to respond to the treatment by migrating to urban centers.
These results differ by job-seekers’ observable characteristics such as age and
martial status. We interpret our results as evidence that the impact of job-
portals depends significantly on job-seekers beliefs about what the job-portal
can do for them, rather than just on how well the platform can match the
job-seeker with a particular job.
3.1 Introduction
Youth unemployment is a policy priority throughout the developing world. In India,
the importance of solving the youth unemployment problem was buoyed by 2017-
18 job numbers which revealed that youth joblessness in both urban and rural
areas had spiked to approximately 18% (Slater, 2019). These very high joblessness
rates appeared in a context where youth unemployment and the skills gap were
already a governmental priority highlighted in the country’s eleventh five year plan
(Planning Comission, 2012). The policy response sought by the government has
been to expand skills training, with a goal of reaching 500 million youth by 2022.
However, it is unclear whether expanding skills training will be associated with
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new jobs: recent data from Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra suggests that
only 16%, 41%, and 35% of new graduates are wage or self-employed (National
Knowledge Comission, 2009).
Search frictions may explain part of this gap. They also may disproportionately
affect the young (who do not have well-established work networks or detailed CVs)
and the poor (who may lack the resources to pay the costs of undirected search).
A number of recent papers (e.g. Abebe et al. (2018a,b); Beam (2016); Abel et al.
(2019); Crepon et al. (2019); Carranza et al. (2018)) test for the effects of reduc-
ing search frictions on employment in developing countries through interventions
aimed at increasing matches (Abebe et al., 2018b; Beam, 2016); providing infor-
mation about applicants (Abebe et al., 2018a,b; Carranza et al., 2018), or paying
search costs (Abebe et al., 2018a; Crepon et al., 2019). These researcher-led innova-
tions often generate changes in the types of jobs acquired by at least some workers,
but in general have had more muted impacts on employment rates (McKenzie,
2017; Crépon and van den Berg, 2016).
At the same time, modern communication technology has provided a market
solution to the problem of incomplete information in job search. In the last few
years internet access in India has almost tripled (World Bank Data, 2017), which
has facilitated the expansion of online job portals such as Naukri, Monster, Indeed,
Quikr, and Shine, many of which can push SMS messages to users who may not
be active on the internet. Evidence from the US on the role of online job search
has been somewhat mixed. In the early years of internet job search (1998-2000),
Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) find that search durations were if anything longer for
internet users once observable characteristics were controlled for. More recently,
Kroft and Pope (2014) find no evidence that the expansion of Craigslist.com reduced
the unemployment rate. By contrast, Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) find that by 2005-
2008 online job search was associated with large (25%) reduction in unemployment
durations. They conclude that this change in the relationships between internet,
search and unemployment durations may be attributable to an improvement in the
technological capabilities of online portals. Of course, absent exogenous variation
in the use of internet search, it is difficult to distinguish secular trends in portal
capacity from a variety of other explanations, including trends in the sophistication
of portal users and changes in unobservable selection.
This paper investigates whether accessing an online job portal impacts search
and employment outcomes in India using a randomized controlled trial. To this
end, we partner with a new online job portal, and vocational training institutes
that supplied a sample of 2,662 recent graduates. The portal we work with, Job
Shikari.com1, provides SMS information on low-skilled jobs to candidates regis-
tered on the portal. Firms who contract with Job Shikari pay for a certain number
of SMSs to be pushed to the specific registrants that match the skill and locational
requirements of the job. We enroll a randomly selected subset of graduates on the
Job Shikari platform, and send them a brief message indicating that the portal will
1Job Shikari is no longer active as it was ultimately purchased by another job portal after study
completion.
105
be contacting them with information about new jobs unless they opt out. This is our
first treatment group. For a second randomly-selected subset of new graduates, we
provide access to the portal and grant them a priority ranking within Job Shikari’s
algorithm. This priority ranking guarantees that their names will be among the first
given to firms who are matched. We refer to this second sample as the treatment
priority group. Our study ultimately resulted in 1 additional SMS message about
job opportunities being sent to the treatment group, and an additional 16 mes-
sages being sent to the treatment priority group for a truly intensive information
intervention. We can compare these two groups to control respondents who are
not registered (by us) on Job Shikari in order to estimate 1) the causal impact of
portal access on search and employment outcomes, and 2) how these employment
responses change as respondents receive more information from the portal.
We find a strong, but unexpected response to enrollment on the portal: new
graduates are 9 percentage points less likely to be working 6 and 12 months later
when they have access to Job Shikari. This result is consistent with the results in
(Kuhn and Skuterud, 2004), though larger and statistically precise. We also show
that a steady stream of information for the treatment priority job seekers results in
these graduates “catching up” to the control group. Treatment priority job seekers
are only 4 percentage points less likely to be employed than control. This reversal in
employment rates relative to the treatment group is statistically significant. We also
find that this stream of information is productive in one particular - and important
- dimension of search: treatment priority responses are 6 percentage points more
likely to live in a city, suggesting that one piece of useful information provided by
the portal may be the spatial location of jobs (Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak,
2014; McKenzie, 2017).
While these results were initially surprising to the research team, they are con-
sistent with seminal models of job search (McCall, 1970; Jovanovic, 1979) if these
graduates have inaccurate expectations about the effectiveness of the portal. Indeed,
perceptions of access to new sources of job opportunities should boost reservation
wages, and reduce employment if those job opportunities fail to materialize. Inter-
estingly, there is a growing body of work documenting that job-seekers misjudge
their prospects on the labor market. Krueger and Mueller (2016) find evidence that
workers in New Jersey do not accurately predict their probability of employment,
while Abebe et al. (2018b) find that job-seekers have reservation wages well above
what firms in the area can offer. Finally, Rasul et al. (2019) find evidence of inaccu-
rate expectations about job arrival rates in Uganda. However, the treatment priority
group may have been able to overcome this impact by updating their perceptions of
the new job arrival rate more effectively as they received more information about
the characteristics of the jobs offered by the portal, which in general were low paid
and located in urban areas. Alternatively, treatment priority job-seekers may also
have accepted more job-offers and formed new matches. Examining our data, we
find that the positive employment effects are strongest for treatment priority job
seekers who are more likely to be impatient with the new technology: most signif-
icantly, older job seekers, but also married and lower caste job seekers. This plus
descriptive data on the geographic distribution of jobs and respondents leads us to
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conclude that the primary impact of the priority treatment is a quicker reconciliation
of beliefs with the actual effectiveness of these portals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the
proliferation and use of job portals in India, as well as the expansion of vocational
training programs. Section 3.3 details the field experiment and the data we col-
lected. Section 3.4 discusses each of our results. We then discuss the implications
of the findings and conclude in the final section.
3.2 Context
3.2.1 The Internet and Job Portals in India
India has one of the largest and fastest growing populations of internet users in the
world. An estimated 500 million Indians use the internet, up from 6 million in 2001
(World Bank Data, 2017). Internet usage is growing by almost 20% annually as
millions of Indians go online every day, using the Internet to make purchases, access
financial services and education, and interact with friends and family (Kantar IMRB,
2018). The proliferation of the internet has also made it an increasingly popular
tool for millions of job seekers searching for work throughout the country. At the
forefront of this surge, are job portals connecting prospective employees with poten-
tial employers. The popularity of these portals has grown significantly in the last 10
years, evidently responding to the growing need to better link these two groups. In
India, there are over 10 job portals currently operating nation-wide that are trying
to meet job-seekers’ demand for alternatives solutions to establishing connections
with prospective employers (including LinkedIn, Naukri, Shine, Monster, Indeed,
Timesjob, Quikr).
While the use of the internet and the prevalence of job portals has surged, the
existing platforms are primarily focused on servicing white collar jobs including
marketing/sales roles, IT (software-engineer) positions, and banking/finance jobs.
When we launched our experiment, Job-Shikari was one of the only job-portals
that was advertising employment opportunities for job-seekers from lower socio-
economic backgrounds. It is also important to note that despite being easily ac-
cessible, job-seekers’ efficiency at using these platforms likely varies dramatically
by socio-economic status. As we will see below, the majority of job-seekers in our
sample are from lower socio-economic strata and may not have had substantial
experience with other job-portals.
3.2.2 Vocational Training Institutes in India
Our sample of job-seekers is drawn from vocational training institutes. These voca-
tional institutes are part of a program that the Ministry of Skill Development and
Entrepreneurship (MSDE) launched in July 2015. The Skill India Campaign was de-
signed to dramatically improve access to high quality skills training as quickly and
efficiently as possible. As part of these efforts, they created the National Skill De-
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velopment Corporation - a public-private partnership that supports NGO’s, business
associations, skill development organizations and private companies in their efforts
to bolster vocational training initiatives (National Skill Development Corporation,
2019). One of the NSDC’s largest programs is the Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas
Yojana (PMKVY) scheme, which encourages youth to sign up for training programs
by offering them monetary rewards upon successful completion of the program.
Trainees are instructed to sign up for a course of their choosing that is offered by
one of the NSDC’s training partners. Students are required to complete the program
and take an assessment in order to receive the funds from the NSDC, which are
deposited directly into their bank accounts. The assessments are carried out by ap-
pointed Assessment Agencies, which operate independently of the training provider,
to ensure impartiality. Nevertheless, placement rates for the 1 million graduates
per year from existing government affiliated institutes are low. Available data from
three states, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, show that only 16%, 41%
and 35%, respectively, of new graduates were wage or self-employed as of 2009
(National Knowledge Comission, 2009). Recent work by Banerjee and Chiplunkar
(2018) suggests that part of this phenomenon may be explained by the inefficient
placement services that graduates receive upon completion of the training.
3.3 Experimental Design and Data Collection
3.3.1 Design
Our experiment was run in partnership with a job-matching platform, Job Shikari,
where employers payed the company to post job opportunities, and the portal sent
SMS messages to qualified candidates. Employees then followed up directly with
the employer to set up interviews. All SMSs were constructed in the following way:
JOB: Data Entry Operator in Delhi, Salary 11500 Rupees, Please call +91********
- www.Job Shikari.in. Interested job-seekers contacted the phone number listed in
the SMS to proceed with the next stages of the interview process. Job Shikari was
not involved in any of these later stage discussions.
Our sample of job-seekers was comprised of recent graduates from vocational
training institutes that offer courses through the NSDC’s PMKVY program. We ran-
domly assigned these graduates to one of three groups, stratifying by location and
their registered trade. Job-seekers assigned to the treatment group were uploaded
to the platform, and received a welcoming SMS introducing them to the platform.
While they were then eligible to receive many SMSs about various job opportunities,
in practice they did not receive more than 1. Job-seekers assigned to the treatment
priority group were provided with priority access on the portal by appearing first
on the list of job-seekers who matched the portal’s query for a given job opportunity.
Job Shikari would only send text messages to the first 100 job-seekers that matched
their query for a particular job. As a result, appearing first on these lists meant
receiving many more SMSs about new job opportunities. Finally, job-seekers in the
control group were not enrolled on the platform at all.
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Table 3.1 presents the number of SMSs that job-seekers in our sample received
by treatment status. The impact for job-seekers in the treatment group relative to
the control group is captured by the “treatment" indicator, while the impact for
job-seekers in the treatment priority group relative to control group is recovered
by adding the “treatment" to the “treatment priority" group indicator. While job-
seekers in the treatment group were eligible to receive more text messages, the
portal placed a premium on sending job advertisements to the treatment priority
group. Column 1 demonstrates that job-seekers in the treatment group received 1
text message on average, while job-seekers in the treatment priority group received
an average of 17 text messages over the course of the year. This translates into a
32 percentage point increase in the probability of receiving a text message in the
case of the treatment group, and a 58 percentage point increase in the probability
of receiving a text message in the case of the treatment priority group (Column
2). Finally, we also surveyed job-seekers about the number of text messages they
received. Treatment job-seekers were 4 percentage points more likely to report
receiving a text message about job opportunities than the control group. This
number increases to 8 percentage points in the treatment priority group. This last
column reveals that some of the text messages we were sending to job-seekers
were likely being overlooked. This is not altogether surprising as most marketing
initiatives in India overload subscribers with text messages, and job-seekers may
have missed some of the specific ones sent by Job Shikari.
3.3.2 Data
The NSDC agreed to provide the names and contact information of recent PMKVY
graduates from 98 training institutes spanning the entire country, which meant
that we received information for over 829,812 recent graduates from October 2014
to March 2015. We only selected training centers that belonged to one of 4 pre-
selected trades (Telecom, Logistics, Sales and Security). These trades had the most
employers and the highest rate of job offers on Job Shikari’s portal. Next, we
restricted the sample to job seekers located in India’s (broadly) Northern States, in
order to avoid any language barriers between the enumerators and the respondents.
This includes: Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand,
Chandigarh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Himachal Pradesh. We
categorized these states into four broad geographic zones: Delhi-NCR, North, South-
West and East India. Finally, within each training center, we randomly selected 30
graduates to call. This resulted in a sample of 15,268 observations. Over 80% of
the calls did not lead to a completed interview: the phone numbers either did not
exist, no one would pick up, or the number did not belong to the respondent we
had on file. We ultimately completed 2,662 surveys between April and July 2015.
Once the surveys were completed for all respondents, we randomly assigned
them to one of the two treatment groups, and the control group. We stratified by
geographic zone and trade. Job-seekers assigned to the treatment group were up-
loaded to Job Shikari and received a text message introducing them to the platform.
Job seekers in the treatment priority group were also uploaded to the platform and
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received the introductory text message. They were, however, more prominently fea-
tured on the platform and received more SMSs about job opportunities. Job-seekers
in the control group were not uploaded to the platform.
We proceeded with a midline survey 9 months later, between December 2015
and April 2016, and we managed to reach 83% of respondents. The endline was
conducted between June and September 30, 2016, and we managed to reach 71%
of respondents. We do not see differential attrition (Table C.1). All of the surveys
were completed over the phone. Enumerators first sent an SMS to each respondent.
The message included a greeting, a brief sentence about the research, and details
of the mobile recharge they would receive upon completing our surveys. The
enumerators then followed up by calling the respondents directly. An integrated
digital data collection software system was custom made for the purposes of this
research project. The software used a cloud telephonic service, Exotel, to make calls
to the respondents. To minimize enumerator errors, the software produced a list of
numbers for each enumerator to call, which updated periodically. It included the
phone numbers of people we had not reached yet, as well as the numbers of people
who had stopped the survey mid-way through and needed to be contacted again
to complete the survey. Finally, the software processed the mobile recharges upon
successful completion of the surveys. Conducting surveys over the phone made it
possible to reach job-seekers that were geographically spread out. It was, however,
a challenge to reach our sample in a timely manner. Job-seekers were often busy,
and did not always have the time to take the survey. The field team took special
care to call job-seekers back multiple times and assure respondents that they would
be immediately compensated for their time.
The surveys collected basic demographic information, including gender, educa-
tion, language fluency, parents’ education and occupation, caste and religion, and
place of birth/current residence. We also collected detailed information on formal
skills trainings, and employment history (including details about the trade, location,
wage, and benefits of all jobs held in the last two years). Finally, we asked questions
about job search strategies, the usefulness of respondent’s occupational network,
and knowledge/use of job portals. We also elicited their reservation wages.
Finally, we also rely on a dataset shared by Job Shikari that has every text
message that was ever sent to job-seekers (both in and outside of our sample) over
the course of the study period. This dataset presents the time and date the SMS was
sent, the job-role that was being advertised, the location of the job, the educational
requirements of the job, the wage offered, and the exact content of the text message
that was sent.
3.3.3 Sample characteristics
Table 3.3 provides information about the basic demographic characteristics of the
graduates in our sample. Most of our sample is male - only 11% of the respon-
dents are female. The job-seekers we are working with have recently graduated
from their vocational training institutes after completing a college degree. They
are relatively young, approximately 23 years of age, and only a third of the sample
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is married. These vocational training programs typically cater to households from
disadvantaged backgrounds, and over 60% of our sample comes from STs, SCs, or
OBCs. Only 30% of the sample is employed, and 65% say they are actively looking
for work. While the vast majority of graduates have access to the internet (approxi-
mately 76-80%), and many say they use the internet to find job opportunities, fewer
than 35% were able to provide the name of an active job portal when we asked. We
try to capture job-seekers’ reservations wages, which suggest that 12,000 rupees
(172 USD) is the lowest wage rate job-seekers in our sample would be willing to
accept for a particular type of job. Note that while most of the differences between
each treatment group are small and insignificant, there remains some imbalance
across caste, reservation wage, and access to the Internet. Table C.2 in the Ap-
pendix presents the same balance table for the NSDC sample after controlling for
strata, training institute, and education. The imbalance we see across these few
observables largely disappears, confirming the importance of including individual
fixed effects in our main specifications.
Table 3.4 provides some basic statistics about the jobs in our sample. Taken
together the evidence demonstrates that the jobs on the portal are typically low
wage, urban jobs. Over 90% of the jobs only require a high-school education, and
the average salary being offered is 9863 rupees per month (141 USD). As can be
seen in Figured 3.1 the job advertisements were primarily for positions such as
data entry operators, telecallers, and field executives (who perform a variety of
administrative roles related to sales). The figure is subdivided into four panels,
where each panel demonstrates the number of SMSs about a particular job role
going out to job-seekers in our sample based on the geographic zone they were
drawn from at baseline (North, South-West, East and Delhi-NCR). The job-seekers
in Delhi-NCR are receiving relatively more data entry positions, while job-seekers
in the other three zones are seeing just as many, if not more, field executive roles.
Finally, Figure 3.2 displays the locations of the jobs that Job-Shikari was advertising
throughout the study period. The figure is subdivided into the same four panels,
where each panel demonstrates the location of jobs and job-seekers in our sample
based on the geographic zone they were drawn from at baseline. Job-seekers in the
Delhi-NCR region (panel a) are mostly concentrated in Delhi, as are the jobs they
are receiving text messages about. Job-seekers in the North (panel b) are primarily
seeing jobs in Delhi as well. Job-seekers in the South (panel c) and the East (panel
d) are seeing jobs in Delhi, but also in Mumbai and a few in Kolkata.
Figure 3.3 presents the average wage offers from the Job Shikari platform rel-
ative to the baseline wages that we collected from job-seekers during our phone
surveys. The figure has the same four panels we presented above. The jobs on the
platform were advertising wages that were below the average accepted wages for
job-seekers in Delhi. In the North, the distributions of wage offers and baseline
wages look fairly similar. Finally, in the South and East the wage offers appear
slightly higher. These figures suggest that job-seekers perceptions of what the job-
portal can do for them may depend on the types of jobs they are seeing, as well as
their own wage offers/reservation wages.
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3.3.4 Estimation
We estimate the effects of our intervention by pooling the two follow-up survey
rounds and running the following regression:
yit = β0 + β1Tit + β2TPit + γi + δt + uit
where yit is an outcome of interest for job-seeker i in time period t (baseline,
midline or endline). T is a dummy equal to 1 if the job-seeker was assigned to either
of our treatments; TP is an indicator equal to 1 for being in the treatment priority
group specifically; γ represents individual fixed effects; and δt represents an time
fixed effect (survey round). The coefficients of interest are β1, which represents
the average effect of being uploaded to the portal across all survey rounds, and
β2, which represents the average effect of receiving additional text messages as
a result of being in the treatment priority group (relative to treatment) across
all survey rounds. We cluster all regressions at the individual level (our unit of
randomization).
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Main effects on Employment
We first investigate the impacts of joining a job portal on job-seekers’ employment
probabilities. A priori, the impact of job-portals on employment rates is ambiguous.
On the one hand, job-portals are designed to ease search frictions by increasing the
arrival rate of jobs. Job-seekers should respond to the notification that they were
uploaded to a job portal by increasing their reservation wage, which will increase
the probability that they are employed at a higher wage rate if these jobs materialize
over the course of the study period. To the best of our knowledge only one paper in
the US documents this type of effect (Kuhn and Mansour, 2014). On the other hand,
if job seekers have unrealistic expectations about what job portals can do for them,
and over-estimate the arrival rate of jobs, they may remain unemployed for longer
durations as they wait for jobs that fail to materialize. Previous work by Kuhn and
Skuterud (2004); Kroft and Pope (2014) suggests that job-portals have negative or
no impacts on unemployment durations, respectively. The notion that job-seekers
have incorrect beliefs about the arrival rate of jobs, or their employment prospects
more broadly, has been increasingly documented in the literature. Krueger and
Mueller (2016); Abebe et al. (2018b); Rasul et al. (2019), find evidence that
workers do not accurately predict their probability of being employed in the short-
run, their likelihood of receiving a favorable wage offer, and the arrival rate of jobs,
respectively.
Table 3.5 presents our first results. Treatment job-seekers are informed about
their enrollment on the job portal, and can only adjust their expectations about the
new arrival rate of jobs. As such, we hypothesize that job-seekers will react to
Job Shikari’s enrollment notification by increasing their reservation wage as they
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anticipate gaining better access to higher paying jobs through the portal. However,
the treatment group only received 1 text message on average. With so few SMSs,
it is unlikely that the jobs they were expecting, materialized. This intuition is con-
firmed in our data. We we see that treatment job-seekers’ labor supply decreases
in response to the notification that they were uploaded to the Job Shikari portal:
the probability that a job-seeker in the treatment group is employed falls by 9.2
percentage points (Column 1). This disemployment effect is muted in the treatment
priority group, which only experiences a 4.8 percentage point decrease relative to
control. This could be because the probability of receiving a wage offer above their
reservation wage increases with the number of text messages they receive. Alterna-
tively, as they receive more information about the types of jobs that the platform
provides access to, they may be re-adjusting their expectations downwards.
We have suggestive evidence that reservation wages respond in the way we
would predict. Table 3.6 presents the results on four different measures of beliefs
that we gather from job-seekers. We find that being uploaded to the job portal leads
to a small (1.3%) increase in reservation wages for the treatment group relative
to control (Column 1). This is consistent with our hypothesis that job-seekers
respond to the notification that they were uploaded to the portal by forming positive
expectations about what the portal will do for them. We also hypothesize that beliefs
about the effectiveness of the intervention can be reversed once job-seekers have
more information about the types of jobs that the portal is providing access to, and
the arrival rate of these jobs. We see that reservation wages decrease significantly
in the treatment priority group, by approximately 4.1%. Similar trends, albeit
not statistically significant, are visible in Column 2, which displays the treatment
and treatment priority’s assessment of the wages they can expect in their current
location. In the last three columns of table 3.6 we ask job seekers to estimate the
probability they can get a job in their current location that pays 10,000, 16,000 and
20,000 rupees respectively. The stronger negative effects on the treatment priority
group seem to suggests that job-seekers who receive more text messages have a
more negative assessment of their probability of actually getting a job at these wage
rates.
Next, we look at the impacts of the portal on actual wages for employed job-
seekers, and overall earnings for the full sample. Table 3.5 presents the results
on log wages (column 2), wages (column 3) and earnings (column 4) - where
we impute a zero for the earnings of unemployed job-seekers. The results suggest
that being in the treatment group is associated with a negative impact on wages.
The 11% decrease is difficult to interpret, however, because of selection: access to
the portal changes who is employed, and only the employed report wages. It is
conceivable that job-seekers in the treatment group experience higher reservation
wages on average, and only the lower ability types decide to accept lower-paying
jobs. This would reduce the average wages we see in the treatment group. The
effect of treatment priority relatively to treatment is positive, but is not statistically
significant. As treatment priority job-seekers receive more text messages about jobs,
they adjust their expectations about what the job portal can do, thereby lowering
their reservation wages and increasing the probability they accept a job. If more
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job-seekers (not just low-ability types) are accepting jobs, we might expect to see
this positive result. The results on earnings (Column 4) follow the same trends as
those on wages.
3.4.2 Main effects on Job-Search
We consider two main dimensions of job-search. First, we look at where people
are living. Specifically, we are interested in whether job-seekers have moved to
urban centers in response to the interventions. We find that job-seekers in the
treatment group are slightly less likely to be located in a city, but this result is
small and imprecise (Column 1, Table 3.7). These particular job-seekers were
not receiving any information about where the jobs were located. It is unlikely
that the notification of being uploaded to the portal could have induced a strong
migratory response from this sample. In the treatment-priority group, however, we
see many more job-seekers moving to the city. Treatment priority job-seekers are 6
percentage points more likely to be in cities relative to treatment, and 4 percentage
points more likely than the control group. This sample was seeing many more jobs,
advertised exclusively in urban hubs including Delhi, Mumbai and in some cases
Kolkata. This may have prompted a subset of job-seekers to migrate to areas they
felt more confident would have significantly more employment opportunities.
We also look at whether job-seekers spend more or less time searching and ap-
plying for jobs when they have access to the job portal. We find that being uploaded
to the portal has no significant impacts on whether job-seekers are searching for a
job, the number of hours that they search, or the number of applications that they
submit (Table 3.8). This is true for both employed and unemployed job-seekers.
While these results suggest that job-seekers are not spending more or less time
searching for work, we interpret these results with some caution. We are not able
to measure job-seekers’ intensity of search on different platforms, and it could be
that Job Shikari changes the amount of effort and emphasis job-seekers place on
certain job-search tools over others.
3.4.3 Heterogeneity effects on Employment
We have shown that job-seekers have biased beliefs in our sample: everyone re-
sponds to being added to the portal by increasing their reservation wage, which
reduces the probability that they are employed as jobs fail to materialize. This
highlights a fundamental challenge with these matching platforms as a whole be-
cause it suggests that their effectiveness depends on job-seekers’ beliefs, which will
then affect their reservation wages. If job-seekers’ beliefs about what the portal can
do are wrong, the portal may lead to lower match rates, as they do in our data.
Nevertheless, job-seekers’ beliefs about the effectiveness of the intervention can
be updated if they have more information about what the intervention is actually
doing. We see evidence of this among our treatment priority group graduates. This
process of ‘updating’ is going to differ, however, based on how job-seekers are pro-
cessing the incoming information. This heterogeneity in job-seekers’ responses is
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what we investigate next.
We begin by examining whether the treatment priority effects differ by the
different geographical zones that workers come from. We stratified on geographic
zone, as we anticipated that the appeal of the Job Shikari jobs might differ based on
job-seekers’ location of origin. A job-seekers’ location affects how far they have to
move for the jobs they see on the portal, and how attractive these jobs are because
of spatial differences in the wage setting. This is confirmed by our data, which
shows that the distribution of wage offers is differentially attractive across geo-
zones because of the prevailing baseline wage in the given location (Figure 3.3).
Wage offers from Job Shikari are more appealing in the SouthWest and East where
the baseline wages are lower. Table 3.9 presents the main results on employment
broken out by geographic zone. We see that the negative employment effects are
visible in the full sample of treatment graduates, albeit strongest in the SouthWest.
The effect of being in the treatment priority group, however, is only detected in the
SouthWest and the East. Job-seekers in the SouthWest experience a 8.9 percentage
point increase in the probability of being employed relative to treatment job-seekers
from the same zone. Similarly, job-seekers in the East experience a 7.5 percentage
point increase in the probability of being employed relative to treatment. The
treatment priority effects in the North and DelhiNCR are approximately 0 and
imprecisely estimated.
These results are surprising at first glance because many more SMSs were sent
to job-seekers in DelhiNCR and the North (Table 3.2). On average job-seekers
in the SouthWest received 4 SMSs while job-seekers in the East received 13 SMS.
This is relatively low compared to the sample in Delhi who received upwards of
50 SMS and, to a lesser extent, the sample in the North that received 19 SMS. To
validate that the results we see on employment are indeed concentrated among
those who received SMSs in these regions, we include an indicator for whether
the treatment priority job-seekers received 0 SMS in our standard specifications.
If the treatment priority job-seeker did not receive any SMSs, we would expect
them to look similar to the treatment group. As such, adding the estimates of
being in the treatment priority group and being in the treatment priority group but
receiving no SMS, should yield a coefficient close to zero. Table 3.9 displays the
treatment effects broken up by geo-zone, including an indicator for whether the
treatment priority job-seeker received 0 SMS (“TP0"). The coefficient on TP0 for
the SouthWest is negative and of similar magnitude to the treatment priority group,
which is consistent with what we would expect. The estimate on the East is negative
as well but imprecisely estimated. This confirms that the employment effects are
concentrated among those in the treatment priority group who are receiving SMSs.
The job-seekers’ geo-zone matters because it determines how far they have to
move to find the advertised jobs, and how attractive those jobs look based on their
previous wages. Nevertheless, geography also matters because job-seekers demo-
graphic characteristics differ significantly across regions. Table C.3 confirms that
job-seekers in the SouthWest for example are much older than those in DelhiNCR.
Similarly, there are many more general caste job-seekers in DelhiNCR than any-
where else. Given the paucity of jobs being sent to job-seekers, it is likely that
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their personal characteristics more heavily influenced their beliefs about what they
could expect on the job-portal, rather than the features of the jobs themselves (e.g
distance and wage offers). Furthermore, we can show that the differences between
geographical zones are explained by a set demographic characteristics. Table 3.13
presents regressions of our main outcomes of interest (employment status, living in
a city, and hours spent searching) broken out by geo-zone. The treatment priority
effects for employment are particularly pronounced in the South and East, while
the migration results are stronger for treatment priority job-seekers in the North.
The next three columns take these same regressions and control for a predicted
geo-zone measure, which we constructed by regressing indicators for being in these
zones on a set of demographic characteristics (including age, gender, caste, educa-
tion, martial status, religion and whether they lived in a village at baseline). The
treatment priority effects across zones are no longer significant when we do so.
This confirms that differences across geo-zone are explained by these demographic
characteristics, the importance of which we investigate next.
It is difficult to draw broader policy conclusions from the fact that people in
the South-West react more or less strongly than their counterparts in the North
for example. Rather, it is more informative to learn about whether different socio-
demographic characteristics affect job-seekers’ responses to these types of matching
interventions. Individual characteristics (age, marriage, gender, education, ru-
ral/urban) should affect how responsive job-seekers’ beliefs and reservation wages
are to the information from the job portal. We anticipate that this, in turn, will
affect how likely certain types of job-seekers are to be employed throughout the
study. In our sample we have two measures in particular that are relevant, namely
job-seeker’s age, and their marital status. Indeed, we anticipate that older and
married job-seekers cannot be as patient, and may revise their beliefs about the
portal more quickly than their younger, single counterparts. Table 3.14 shows that
age does indeed matter. Column 1 presents the results for older job-seekers who
are above 23 years of age (the mean age in the sample). Column 2 presents the
results for younger job-seekers who are below 23 years of age. We see that the older
treatment priority group is much more likely to react to the text messages than the
younger job-seekers. The negative employment effect disappears altogether from
this older treatment priority group (adding the treatment and treatment priority
coefficients yields a point estimate of 0.014). Moreover, the difference between
younger and older treatment priority job-seekers is large (7 percentage points) and
statistically significant (Column 3). The impact of age becomes even more stark
as we focus on older cohorts (Figure 3.4). The coefficient on treatment priority
increases from 0.09 to 0.20 as we move from 23 year olds to 28 year olds in the
sample.
Next, we consider another important characteristic, namely marital status. Table
3.15 presents the results on employment status for job-seekers who are married (col-
umn 1) versus single (column 2). We see similar patterns as above, where married
job-seekers are more likely to respond to treatment priority status. This cohort ex-
perience a 9.6 percentage point increase in employment relative to treatment. This
number falls to 3 percentage points for single treatment priority job-seekers relative
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to treatment. While the impact for married job-seekers is less strong than for older
ones, it remains statistically significant. This suggests that married job-seekers are
more likely to revise their beliefs downwards, and accept a job, relative to single
job-seekers. This is likely because they have dependents and cannot afford to wait
as long. The difference between married and single treatment priority job-seekers
is not statistically significant (column 3), but we take this as suggestive evidence
that a characteristic like marital status can indeed matter.
There are other demographic characteristics that could affect how quickly job-
seekers revise their beliefs about their employment prospects on this platform,
which we present in the appendix. For example, we might expect that job-seekers
who are based in villages at baseline to have fewer social connections in the cities,
and fewer outside options for finding employment opportunities. As such, they may
react to the additional information from the portal by lowering their reservation
wages and accepting jobs more quickly. Similarly, lower caste households are typi-
cally at a disadvantage relative to others when it comes to finding jobs. While they
may be overly-optimistic about their prospects on the portal at first, they are likely
to adjust relatively quickly because the cost of unemployment is high. Finally, we
might expect education to matter as well: highly educated households are typically
richer and may be able to afford to wait longer. Our evidence is largely consistent
with these trends. Table C.6 suggests that the disemployment effect is less pro-
nounced among treatment priority job-seekers living in villages at baseline (though
the difference is not statistically significant). Similarly the coefficient on treatment
priority for low caste job-seekers is more positive (by a factor of 10) than the effect
for general caste (Table C.7). Finally, the impact of receiving more information
from the portal is largely the same between high and and low educated job-seekers
(Table C.8). This is perhaps not altogether surprising in our sample because the
level of education remains low across the board.
3.4.4 Heterogeneity effects on Job Search
Overall, the employment results suggest that the heterogeneity we are seeing re-
volves around structural features of search rather than on just how well the job-
seeker matches to the jobs on the portal. We investigate similar dynamics for
job-search behavior. Specifically, we have characteristics that are typically asso-
ciated with lower migration costs: namely age, marital-status, and caste. Young,
single job-seekers typically do not have families that depend on them. Lower-caste
households often have fewer job-prospects in any location, and may be more pre-
pared to migrate in search of employment as the cost of unemployment is high.
Our results demonstrate that the migration effects are stronger among these sub-
groups, but not significantly so. Younger job-seekers are 6 percentage point more
likely to migrate than their older counterparts (Column 6, Table 3.14). Similarly,
single job-seekers are 2 percentage points more likely to migrate than married job
seekers (Column 6, Table 3.15). Finally, lower caste households are 1 percentage
point more likely to migrate (Column 6, Table C.7). While these dimensions of
heterogeneity are not as strong as they were for employment, they do suggest that
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job-seekers decision to migrate in response to the information from a job portal can
depend on the their inherent characteristics. Any policy that tries to improve match
rates will need to take this into consideration if it is to have it’s intended impacts.
3.5 Conclusion
According to the International Labour Organization, global youth unemployment
rates currently stand at 13%. Finding jobs for this segment of the labor market is
of growing concern worldwide, but primarily in developing countries where the
consequences of unemployment are often more severe.2 Paradoxically in countries
like India, employers also complain that they cannot fill positions. According to the
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (2011), employers fre-
quently complained about the difficulty of filling vacant positions despite pervasive
unemployment among semi-skilled laborers, and the glut of recent technical and
vocational graduates.
A candidate explanation for this skills gap is search frictions: firms may not
succeed in hiring qualified workers because of the difficulties generating a match
between a worker and a job. Traditionally job seekers have had to rely on social
connections and informal networks to find employment opportunities. These job
search methods are costly and tend to favor the well-connected, thereby entrenching
existing inequalities and preventing companies from finding the best worker for
a vacancy (e.g. Beaman and Magruder, 2012; Loury, 2006; Ioannides and Loury,
2004; Magruder, 2010; Munshi 2003; Wang, 2011). Recently however, job portals
- which connect prospective employees with potential employers - have emerged
to provide a potentially new technological solution to this problem. Job portals
in India work in a variety of ways: some allow applicants to post CVs online, or
firms to post vacancies. Most create an algorithm to match workers with firms
and then connect the two either on-line or through SMS. Compared to informal
networks, which may exclude disadvantaged groups (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson,
2004) and which may fail to transmit information across geographical space, job
portals potentially foster the connections for equitable access to growth. Given that
India has one of the largest and fastest growing populations of internet users in the
world (an estimated 37% of Indians use the internet, up from 7% in 2001) there is
reason to believe that job portals may help smooth search frictions sharply, reducing
vacancy rates and increasing access to jobs for the poorly connected.
To date, there has been little focus on understanding how job portals actually
benefit job seekers in the developing world. This project provides a rigorous assess-
ment of the value of job portals - examining their effect on labour market outcomes
for job seekers, as well as on job search behaviors. To this end, we designed a
randomized control trial that brings a randomly selected group of recent vocational
training graduates onto a job portal. A second group of graduates are uploaded and
given priority access on the portal, which means they received more text messages
2The region will continue to record the second highest percentage of youth in working poverty,
after sub-Saharan Africa, at close to 50 per cent in 2016 (ILO, 2016)
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about available job opportunities. A priori, it is difficult to predict the impact that
the job-portal should have. On the one hand, portals should increase the number
of job opportunities people see, thereby reducing search frictions in the labour mar-
ket. In that case, we anticipate job-seekers will engage more actively in job-search
activities and find employment more easily. On the other hand, the impacts of the
platform will depend on it’s ability to generate a match, on the types of people who
are searching on these platforms, and their expectations about what the platform
will do for them. These factors could potentially lead to negative or no impacts on
employment and job-search. The literature is scarce but finds more evidence of the
latter. Our results are consistent with these papers. We find that being uploaded to
the job portal has a negative impact on the probability of being employed, but no
significant impacts on job-search. The treatment priority group experiences a less
strong disemployment effect, but is much more likely to respond to the treatment
by migrating to urban centers. These results differ by job-seekers’ observable char-
acteristics such as age and martial status. We interpret our results as evidence that
the impact of job-portals depends significantly on job-seekers beliefs about what
the job-portal can do for them, rather than just on how well the platform can match
the job-seeker with a particular job.
From a policy standpoint these results suggest that more needs to be done to set
expectations for job-seekers joining these platforms, and to encourage job-seekers
to be more active on these platforms so they can learn about the quality of jobs,
and the distribution of offer rates, in the locations and trades they are interested
in. Work by Kuhn and Mansour (2014) also suggests that as these portals improve
their search algorithms, and job-seekers learn how to use them more effectively,
their overall ability to generate positive matches will improve significantly.
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Table 3.4: Job Characteristics
N = 88327
Wage
mean 10025.8784719291
sd 2602.36182023563
median 9500
min 4000
max 90000
Education
10th Pass 32,612 (36.92%)
12th Pass 12,530 (14.19%)
Graduate 2,070 (2.34%)
Missing 40,947 (46.36%)
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Table 3.5: Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employed Log(Wage) Wage Earnings
Treatment -0.092∗∗∗ -0.041 -1535.257∗ -1203.818∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.071) (869.750) (379.156)
Priority Treatment 0.048∗∗ 0.069 441.202 537.997
(0.021) (0.078) (628.434) (337.995)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 6866 2311 2326 6475
Column 1, 4 include all respondents in the sample while column 2,3 only includes respondents who
were employed at the time of survey. The dependent variables are an indicator for whether the
respondent is employed (column 1), the log of wage (column 2), wage winzorised at the 1%
(column 3), and earnings (imputing a zero for job-seekers who aren’t working) (column 4).
Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at
the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
Table 3.6: Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reservation Wage Expected Wage Prob10 Prob16 Prob20
Treatment 187.539 108.962 -0.010 -0.165 0.099
(278.021) (503.221) (0.216) (0.192) (0.175)
Priority Treatment -582.858∗∗ -2906.627 -0.399∗ -0.239 -0.252
(278.150) (2250.205) (0.207) (0.187) (0.178)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 6504 6442 6337 6179 6097
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Table 3.7: Migration
(1)
In-City
Treatment -0.020
(0.024)
Priority Treatment 0.060∗∗∗
(0.022)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes
Number of Observations 6889
Column 1 includes all respondents in the sample. The dependent variables are an indicator for
whether the respondent is currently living in a village (column 1). Standard errors are clustered at
the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 3.9: Employment by Geo-Zone
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employed Log(Wage) Wage Earnings
Treatment East -0.051 0.135 -774.347 -424.456
(0.037) (0.258) (2697.790) (526.487)
Treatment DelhiNCR -0.112∗ -0.204 -966.679 -1764.012
(0.059) (0.143) (2151.995) (1560.625)
Treatment North -0.087∗∗ -0.057 -1645.476 -1604.703∗∗
(0.039) (0.139) (1759.242) (713.562)
Treatment SouthWest -0.144∗∗∗ -0.023 -1997.511∗ -1411.199∗∗
(0.046) (0.090) (1134.047) (660.371)
Priority Treatment 0.075∗∗ 0.147 1381.046 537.017
East (0.033) (0.156) (2179.476) (492.131)
Priority Treatment -0.013 -0.007 -615.323 -793.814
DelhiNCR (0.055) (0.069) (1149.475) (1224.249)
Priority Treatment 0.016 0.189 1177.870 756.536
North (0.039) (0.211) (1458.986) (644.556)
Priority Treatment 0.089∗∗ -0.021 4.454 956.908
SouthWest (0.044) (0.091) (696.587) (634.144)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geo-Specifc Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 6866.0000 2311.0000 2326.0000 6475.0000
Column 1, 4 include all respondents in the sample while column 2, 3 only includes respondents
who were employed at the time of survey. The dependent variables are an indicator for whether the
respondent is employed (column 1), the log of wage (column 2), wage winzorised at the 1%
(column 3), and earnings (imputing a zero for job-seekers who aren’t working) (column 4).
Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at
the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 3.10: Migration by Geo-Zone
(1)
In-City
Treatment East 0.002
(0.044)
Treatment DelhiNCR 0.046
(0.032)
Treatment North -0.038
(0.043)
Treatment SouthWest -0.061
(0.048)
Priority Treatment 0.029
East (0.042)
Priority Treatment 0.014
DelhiNCR (0.033)
Priority Treatment 0.120∗∗∗
North (0.040)
Priority Treatment 0.042
SouthWest (0.048)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes
Geo-Specifc Time Trend Yes
Number of Observations 6889
Column 1 includes all respondents in the sample. The dependent variables are an indicator for
whether the respondent is currently living in a village (column 1). Standard errors are clustered at
the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 3.11: Employment controlling for TP0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employed Log(Wage) Wage Earnings
Treatment East -0.051 0.134 -777.520 -424.485
(0.037) (0.258) (2700.079) (526.614)
Treatment DelhiNCR -0.112∗ -0.204 -966.679 -1764.012
(0.059) (0.143) (2153.395) (1560.988)
Treatment North -0.086∗∗ -0.058 -1648.515 -1604.182∗∗
(0.039) (0.140) (1760.498) (713.802)
Treatment SouthWest -0.144∗∗∗ -0.023 -1997.524∗ -1411.344∗∗
(0.046) (0.090) (1134.794) (660.406)
Priority Treatment 0.087∗∗ 0.278 1801.050 477.762
East (0.039) (0.207) (2376.764) (492.599)
Priority Treatment -0.013 -0.007 -615.323 -793.814
DelhiNCR (0.055) (0.069) (1150.223) (1224.533)
Priority Treatment 0.011 0.058 757.796 632.780
North (0.040) (0.162) (1450.042) (656.438)
Priority Treatment 0.199∗∗∗ 0.050 138.606 2582.342∗∗
SouthWest (0.063) (0.129) (857.419) (1290.245)
Priority Treatment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DelhiNCR, 0 SMS (.) (.) (.) (.)
Priority Treatment -0.025 -0.242 -775.905 132.628
East, 0 SMS (0.050) (0.164) (1320.196) (561.692)
Priority Treatment 0.038 0.801∗ 2563.435 879.434
North, 0 SMS (0.068) (0.451) (1759.033) (886.533)
Priority Treatment -0.152∗∗ -0.104 -195.492 -2206.719∗
SouthWest, 0 SMS (0.063) (0.137) (810.754) (1229.903)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geo-Specifc Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 6866 2311 2326 6475
Column 1, 4 include all respondents in the sample while column 2, 3 only includes respondents
who were employed at the time of survey. The dependent variables are an indicator for whether the
respondent is employed (column 1), the log of wage (column 2), wage winzorised at the 1%
(column 3), and earnings (imputing a zero for job-seekers who aren’t working) (column 4).
Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at
the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 3.12: Migration controlling for TP0
(1)
In-City
Treatment East 0.002
(0.044)
Treatment DelhiNCR 0.046
(0.032)
Treatment North -0.038
(0.043)
Treatment SouthWest -0.061
(0.049)
Priority Treatment 0.032
East (0.050)
Priority Treatment 0.014
DelhiNCR (0.033)
Priority Treatment 0.113∗∗∗
North (0.039)
Priority Treatment 0.110∗
SouthWest (0.065)
Priority Treatment 0.000
DelhiNCR, 0 SMS (.)
Priority Treatment -0.007
East, 0 SMS (0.062)
Priority Treatment 0.049
North, 0 SMS (0.089)
Priority Treatment -0.093
SouthWest, 0 SMS (0.071)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes
Geo-Specifc Time Trend Yes
Number of Observations 6889
Column 1 includes all respondents in the sample. The dependent variables are an indicator for
whether the respondent is currently living in a village (column 1). Standard errors are clustered at
the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table 3.13: Controlling for Predicted Geo-zone
Main Predict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Emp City Hours Emp City Hours
Treatment East -0.051 0.002 -1.470 -0.278 -1.438∗∗∗ 3.373
(0.037) (0.044) (1.172) (0.329) (0.232) (9.551)
Treatment DelhiNCR -0.112∗ 0.046 2.534∗ -0.325 -1.097∗∗∗ 5.998
(0.059) (0.032) (1.513) (0.321) (0.219) (9.120)
Treatment North -0.087∗∗ -0.038 -0.010 -0.314 -1.402∗∗∗ 4.006
(0.039) (0.043) (1.082) (0.333) (0.230) (9.516)
Treatment SouthWest -0.144∗∗∗ -0.061 -0.042 -0.354 -1.421∗∗∗ 4.227
(0.046) (0.048) (1.239) (0.332) (0.227) (9.625)
Priority Treatment 0.075∗∗ 0.029 -0.245 0.372 0.326 -12.411
East (0.033) (0.042) (1.170) (0.437) (0.350) (12.402)
Priority Treatment -0.013 0.014 0.613 0.264 0.362 -9.742
DelhiNCR (0.055) (0.033) (1.305) (0.425) (0.334) (12.031)
Priority Treatment 0.016 0.120∗∗∗ 0.397 0.320 0.478 -11.002
North (0.039) (0.040) (0.985) (0.442) (0.346) (12.313)
Priority Treatment 0.089∗∗ 0.042 -0.995 0.335 0.429 -13.012
SouthWest (0.044) (0.048) (1.230) (0.440) (0.344) (12.583)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 6866 6889 6444 5478 5479 5187
Columns 1, 2 and 3 represent the results from regressions of our main outcomes of interest
(Employment, City, and Hours worked). Columns 4,5,6 represent the results from these same
regressions when we control for the predicted geo-zone that job-seekers are in. Standard errors are
clustered at the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and
10% ∗ levels.
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Figure 3.1: Job types by Geozone
(a) DelhiNCR
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Figure 3.2: Job seekers and job offers by Geozone - Pincode
(a) DelhiNCR
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Figure 3.3: Base Wages and Salary Offers by Geozone
(a) DelhiNCR
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Figure 3.4: TP by age
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A.1 Tables
Table A.1: Submitting daily survey report
(1) (2)
Owner report submitted Driver report submitted
Info treatment group 0.042 0.029
(0.040) (0.037)
Control Mean of DV 0.45 0.55
Day FE Y Y
Route FE Y Y
Matatu N 255 255
Matatu-Day N 46,920 46,920
The data are from the owner and drivers that submitted data throughout the study period. The
dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the owner (Column 1) or driver (Column 2)
submitted a report that day. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table A.2: Differential Revenue Reporting
(1) (2)
Revenue Revenue
Mileage 8.848∗∗∗
(1.089)
Info treatment group -259.461
(267.894)
Mileage X Treat 1.241
(1.491)
Mileage quartile 1 -1489.213∗∗∗
(209.834)
Mileage quartile 2 -1248.806∗∗∗
(203.465)
Mileage quartile 3 -552.104∗∗∗
(180.865)
Mileage quartile 1 X Treat -331.924
(266.860)
Mileage quartile 2 X Treat 30.419
(181.920)
Mileage quartile 3 X Treat -119.329
(204.766)
Mileage quartile 4 X Treat 38.374
(235.454)
Control Mean of DV 7126.94 7126.94
Day FE Y Y
Route FE Y Y
Matatu N 241 241
Matatu-Day N 22,436 23,514
The data are from days where we have both the driver reports (reported revenue), and the tracking
data (number of miles). The dependent variable is the amount of revenue the driver reports. In the
first column we regress revenue on the number of miles the vehicle travelled, and indicator for
treatment, and an interaction between the two terms. The interaction captures the differential
relationship between mileage and reported revenue between treatment and control. We might be
concerned that drivers are reporting differently in the treatment than the control group. The
coefficient on the interaction term is not significant however. Column 2 further investigates
whether there is differential reporting across different quartiles of the mileage distribution. Again,
the interaction terms are all insignificant. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5%
∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Note there are 14 drivers that did not report revenue at all during the 6
months of the study.
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Table A.3: Contract
(1) (2) (3)
Daily Target Daily Target Daily Target
Treat X Month1 -35.141
(68.842)
Treat X Month2 -46.502
(91.193)
Treat X Month3 -63.407
(86.703)
Treat X Month4 -94.940
(83.842)
Treat X Month5 -120.861
(92.118)
Treat X Month6 -134.693
(97.085)
Treat X First 3 months -51.322
(79.284)
Treat X Last 3 months -112.564
(86.747)
Treat X Trend -9.332
(17.225)
Control Mean of DV 3057.38 3057.38 3057.38
Controls Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y N
Route FE Y Y Y
Matatu N 237 237 237
Matatu-Day N 15,884 15,884 15,542
This table shows the results of three different regression specifications. The first column shows the
treatment effects broken out by treatment month, as specified in the main body of the paper
(through figures). The second column pools the first three months and the last three months - to
show the effects in the “early" versus “later" months of the experiment. The final column
demonstrates the results of a regression of the outcome of interest on a linear time trend,
treatment, and the interaction of the two. The interaction term reveals how treatment trended
differently over time relative to the control group. The outcome of interest in this table is the target.
Note there are 237 matatus included in these regressions because 18 owners failed to report the
target throughout the study (balanced between treatment and control). Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table A.4: Deviceon
(1) (2) (3)
Hours device on Hours device on Hours device on
Treat X Month1 -0.842
(0.658)
Treat X Month2 0.623
(0.590)
Treat X Month3 0.986∗
(0.554)
Treat X Month4 0.691
(0.640)
Treat X Month5 1.468∗∗
(0.715)
Treat X Month6 1.474∗
(0.757)
Treat X First 3 months 0.388
(0.503)
Treat X Last 3 months 1.119∗
(0.637)
Treat X Trend 0.177
(0.207)
Control Mean of DV 14.79 14.79 14.79
Controls Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y N
Route FE Y Y Y
Matatu N 254 254 254
Matatu-Day N 45,654 45,654 44,444
This table shows the results of three different regression specifications. The first column shows the
treatment effects broken out by treatment month, as specified in the main body of the paper
(through figures). The second column pools the first three months and the last three months - to
show the effects in the “early" versus “later" months of the experiment. The final column
demonstrates the results of a regression of the outcome of interest on a linear time trend, treatment,
and the interaction of the two. The interaction term reveals how treatment trended differently over
time relative to the control group. The outcome of interest in this table is the number of hours the
device was on (as a proxy for effort). Note there are 254 matatus included in these regressions
because 1 device was faulty (the matatu was in an accident). Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table A.5: Mileage
(1) (2) (3)
Kilometers Kilometers Kilometers
Treat X Month1 -4.302
(5.966)
Treat X Month2 2.053
(5.601)
Treat X Month3 7.802
(5.318)
Treat X Month4 4.411
(5.700)
Treat X Month5 9.640
(6.386)
Treat X Month6 13.132∗
(6.917)
Treat X First 3 months 2.911
(5.095)
Treat X Last 3 months 8.365
(5.793)
Treat X Trend 1.533
(1.650)
Control Mean of DV 96.64 96.64 96.64
Controls Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y N
Route FE Y Y Y
Matatu N 254 254 254
Matatu-Day N 45,654 45,654 44,444
This table shows the results of three different regression specifications. The first column shows the
treatment effects broken out by treatment month, as specified in the main body of the paper
(through figures). The second column pools the first three months and the last three months - to
show the effects in the “early" versus “later" months of the experiment. The final column
demonstrates the results of a regression of the outcome of interest on a linear time trend, treatment,
and the interaction of the two. The interaction term reveals how treatment trended differently over
time relative to the control group. The outcome of interest in this table is the number of hours the
device was on (as a proxy for effort). Note there are 254 matatus included in these regressions
because 1 device was faulty (the matatu was in an accident). Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table A.6: Repair Cost
(1) (2) (3)
Repair Cost Repair Cost Repair Cost
Treat X Month1 67.838
(70.046)
Treat X Month2 -50.802
(73.520)
Treat X Month3 -125.119
(79.387)
Treat X Month4 -186.449∗∗
(89.291)
Treat X Month5 -187.876∗∗
(94.119)
Treat X Month6 -226.720∗∗
(104.752)
Treat X First 3 months -46.459
(70.294)
Treat X Last 3 months -187.616∗∗
(89.675)
Treat X Trend -40.116∗
(20.406)
Control Mean of DV 483.48 483.48 483.48
Controls Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y N
Route FE Y Y Y
Matatu N 238 238 238
Matatu-Day N 15,881 15,881 15,539
This table shows the results of three different regression specifications. The first column shows the
treatment effects broken out by treatment month, as specified in the main body of the paper
(through figures). The second column pools the first three months and the last three months - to
show the effects in the “early" versus “later" months of the experiment. The final column
demonstrates the results of a regression of the outcome of interest on a linear time trend,
treatment, and the interaction of the two. The interaction term reveals how treatment trended
differently over time relative to the control group. The outcome of interest in this table is the
amount of repairs the owner incurred. Note there are 238 matatus included in these regressions
because 17 owners failed to report the target throughout the study (balanced between treatment
and control).Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table A.7: Repair Cost (Binary)
(1) (2) (3)
Large Repairs Large Repairs Large Repairs
Treat X Month1 0.033
(0.030)
Treat X Month2 -0.019
(0.030)
Treat X Month3 -0.030
(0.032)
Treat X Month4 -0.048
(0.033)
Treat X Month5 -0.066∗∗
(0.033)
Treat X Month6 -0.081∗∗
(0.038)
Treat X First 3 months -0.010
(0.029)
Treat X Last 3 months -0.060∗
(0.032)
Treat X Trend -0.009
(0.006)
Control Mean of DV 0.17 0.17 0.17
Controls Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y N
Route FE Y Y Y
Matatu N 238 238 238
Matatu-Day N 15,881 15,881 15,539
This table shows the results of three different regression specifications. The first column shows the
treatment effects broken out by treatment month, as specified in the main body of the paper
(through figures). The second column pools the first three months and the last three months - to
show the effects in the “early" versus “later" months of the experiment. The final column
demonstrates the results of a regression of the outcome of interest on a linear time trend,
treatment, and the interaction of the two. The interaction term reveals how treatment trended
differently over time relative to the control group. The outcome of interest in this table is the
number of large repairs the owner incurred. Note there are 238 matatus included in these
regressions because 18 owners failed to report the target throughout the study (balanced between
treatment and control).Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗
levels. Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table A.8: Made Target
(1) (2) (3)
Made Target Made Target Made Target
Treat X Month1 -0.099∗∗
(0.045)
Treat X Month2 -0.013
(0.046)
Treat X Month3 0.068
(0.048)
Treat X Month4 0.125∗∗
(0.051)
Treat X Month5 0.083
(0.053)
Treat X Month6 0.059
(0.053)
Treat X First 3 months -0.010
(0.043)
Treat X Last 3 months 0.084∗
(0.048)
Treat X Trend 0.028∗∗
(0.011)
Control Mean of DV 0.43 0.43 0.43
Controls Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y N
Route FE Y Y Y
Matatu N 237 237 237
Matatu-Day N 15,888 15,888 15,546
This table shows the results of three different regression specifications. The first column shows the
treatment effects broken out by treatment month, as specified in the main body of the paper
(through figures). The second column pools the first three months and the last three months - to
show the effects in the “early" versus “later" months of the experiment. The final column
demonstrates the results of a regression of the outcome of interest on a linear time trend,
treatment, and the interaction of the two. The interaction term reveals how treatment trended
differently over time relative to the control group. The outcome of interest in this table is whether
or not the driver made the target. Note there are 237 matatus included in these regressions because
17 owners failed to report the target throughout the study (balanced between treatment and
control).Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard
errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table A.9: Under-report
(1) (2) (3)
shade shade shade
Treat X Month1 -6.782
(51.685)
Treat X Month2 -89.596∗
(48.896)
Treat X Month3 -103.442∗∗
(52.358)
Treat X Month4 -105.062∗∗
(53.112)
Treat X Month5 -66.293
(59.854)
Treat X Month6 -106.336∗
(61.400)
Treat X First 3 months -69.041
(47.008)
Treat X Last 3 months -88.403∗
(52.955)
Treat X Trend -15.213
(12.967)
Control Mean of DV 521.20 521.20 521.20
Controls Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y N
Route FE Y Y Y
Matatu N 215 215 215
Matatu-Day N 7,426 7,426 7,320
This table shows the results of three different regression specifications. The first column shows the
treatment effects broken out by treatment month, as specified in the main body of the paper
(through figures). The second column pools the first three months and the last three months - to
show the effects in the “early" versus “later" months of the experiment. The final column
demonstrates the results of a regression of the outcome of interest on a linear time trend, treatment,
and the interaction of the two. The interaction term reveals how treatment trended differently over
time relative to the control group. The outcome of interest in this table is the amount revenue
drivers under-report. Note there are 215 matatus included in these regressions because 17 owners
failed to report the target throughout the study (balanced between treatment and control); and 14
drivers didn’t report their revenue/salary (balanced between treatment and control) - both of which
are required to compute this measure - as detailed in the main figures. We also needed both owners
and drivers to report in a particular day to compute this measure. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table A.10: Revenue
(1) (2) (3)
Revenue Revenue Revenue
Treat X Month1 -338.338
(229.414)
Treat X Month2 -61.938
(187.910)
Treat X Month3 -6.492
(180.413)
Treat X Month4 124.687
(184.769)
Treat X Month5 54.217
(193.679)
Treat X Month6 -207.192
(205.937)
Treat X First 3 months -131.349
(176.217)
Treat X Last 3 months -6.992
(177.277)
Treat X Trend -26.140
(58.137)
Control Mean of DV 7126.94 7126.94 7126.94
Controls Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y N
Route FE Y Y Y
Matatu N 241 241 241
Matatu-Day N 22,436 22,436 22,107
This table shows the results of three different regression specifications. The first column shows the
treatment effects broken out by treatment month, as specified in the main body of the paper
(through figures). The second column pools the first three months and the last three months - to
show the effects in the “early" versus “later" months of the experiment. The final column
demonstrates the results of a regression of the outcome of interest on a linear time trend, treatment,
and the interaction of the two. The interaction term reveals how treatment trended differently over
time relative to the control group. The outcome of interest in this table is reported revenue. Note
there are 241 matatus included in these regressions because 14 owners failed to report the revenue
throughout the study (balanced between treatment and control).Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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Table A.11: Profits
(1) (2) (3)
Gross Profits Gross Profits Gross Profits
Treat X Month1 -178.812
(233.078)
Treat X Month2 55.929
(206.280)
Treat X Month3 83.617
(217.394)
Treat X Month4 441.369∗∗
(222.362)
Treat X Month5 451.597∗∗
(212.750)
Treat X Month6 172.690
(227.400)
Treat X First 3 months -13.173
(191.659)
Treat X Last 3 months 361.696∗
(196.326)
Treat X Trend 51.548
(75.291)
Control Mean of DV 3275.61 3275.61 3275.61
Controls Y Y Y
Day FE Y Y N
Route FE Y Y Y
Matatu N 216 216 216
Matatu-Day N 10,406 10,406 10,277
This table shows the results of three different regression specifications. The first column shows the
treatment effects broken out by treatment month, as specified in the main body of the paper
(through figures). The second column pools the first three months and the last three months - to
show the effects in the “early" versus “later" months of the experiment. The final column
demonstrates the results of a regression of the outcome of interest on a linear time trend,
treatment, and the interaction of the two. The interaction term reveals how treatment trended
differently over time relative to the control group. The outcome of interest in this table is profits.
Note there are 216 matatus included in these regressions because 18 owners failed to report the
target throughout the study (balanced between treatment and control); and 14 drivers didn’t report
their revenue/salary (balanced between treatment and control) - both of which are required to
compute this measure - as detailed in the main figures. We also needed both owners and drivers to
report in a particular day to compute this measure. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the
1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels. Standard errors are clustered at the matatu level.
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A.2 Model derivation
Step 1: Owner’s punishment
We assume the owner’s signal is noisy but unbiased, so that qˆ is defined as follows:
qˆ = q − σ
σ ∼ U
(
−1
α
,
1
α
)
f (qˆ) =
1
q + 1
α
−
(
q − 1
α
) = α
2
where α is the precision of the owners’ signal about true revenue. Any monitoring
technology we introduce will provide more information to the owner about driver
behavior. This will increase the precision of the owner’s signal about what revenue
should be, which gives the driver less leeway to significantly under-report revenue
on a particular day. In the case of our monitoring technology specifically, the owner
can observe the number of kilometers driven, and where the driver was operating
at any point in time. Owners can use this information to estimate the number of
trips to and from the city center, which provides a more accurate measure of total
daily revenue.1 With qˆ defined in this way, the owners can be sure that real revenue
q falls in the interval: [
qˆ − 1
α
, qˆ +
1
α
]
On days when the driver reports making the target, the owner receives the target
amount and does not punish the driver. On days when the driver does not report
making the target, the owner will punish them if they can be sure the driver is
lying to them. In other words, they will punish if the reported revenue comes
in below the possible range for q. This assumes the owner is really unwilling to
punish a driver incorrectly, which makes sense because firing costs are high in this
setting. The actual punishment applied is some function of the difference between
this lower bound, qˆ − 1
α
, and the reported amount q˜ (owners are less upset on days
where the driver reports below the target and they know for a fact that conditions
were difficult). We assume for simplicity that this function is linear.
E[punishment] = E
[(
qˆ − 1
α
)
− q˜ | qˆ − 1
α
> q˜
]
· Pr
(
qˆ − 1
α
> q˜
)
= E
[
qˆ − q˜ − 1
α
| qˆ > q˜ + 1
α
]
· Pr
(
qˆ > q˜ +
1
α
)
=
∫ q+ 1α
q˜+ 1α
(
qˆ − q˜ − 1
α
)
· f (qˆ)dqˆ
1While they do not know the exact number of passengers that board, they know that the vehicle
generally waits at the terminal until it fills up.
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=
α
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∫ q+ 1α
q˜+ 1α
(
qˆ − q˜ − 1
α
)
dqˆ
=
α
2
[
qˆ2
2
−
(
q˜ +
1
α
)
qˆ
∣∣∣∣q+ 1α
q˜+ 1α
]
=
α
2
12
(
q +
1
α
)2
−
(
q˜ +
1
α
) (
q +
1
α
)
− 1
2
(
q˜ +
1
α
)2
+
(
q˜ +
1
α
)2
=
α
2
12
(
q +
1
α
)2
−
(
q˜ +
1
α
) (
q +
1
α
)
+
1
2
(
q˜ +
1
α
)2
=
α
4
(q + 1
α
)2
− 2
(
q˜ +
1
α
) (
q +
1
α
)
+
(
q˜ +
1
α
)2
=
α
4
(q + 1
α
)2
−
(
q˜ +
1
α
)2
=
α
4
(q − q˜)2
Step 2: Solve the agent’s optimal shading amount
Below we provide the full derivation of the optimal shading amount
∂UD
∂q˜
= −1 + α
2
(q − q˜) = 0
α
2
(q − q˜) = 1
2
q − q˜ = 2
α
−q˜ = −q + 2
α
q˜ − q = 2
α
Step 3: Switch point
Below we provide the full derivation of the switch point
q − T − βr = (q − q˜) − α
4
(q − q˜)2 − βr
q − T =
(
q − q + 2
α
)
− α
4
(
q − q + 2
α
)2
q − T = 2
α
− α
4
(
4
α2
)
q − T = 1
α
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q∗ = T +
1
α
Step 4: Driver’s optimal choice of effort and risk
The driver chooses effort to maximize his utility
max
e,r
E[(q − T − βr) | q ≥ q∗] · Pr(q ≥ q∗) + E[(q − q˜)−
α
4
(q − q˜)2 − βr | q < q∗] · Pr(q < q∗) − h(e, r)
Simplifying
max
e,r
E
[
(q − T − βr) | q ≥ q∗] (1 − F(q∗)) + E [1
α
− βr | q < q∗
]
· F(q∗) − h(e, r)
Expressing in terms of exogenous variable
max
e,r
E
[
(e + rε − T − βr) | ε ≥ q
∗ − e
r
]
·
(
1 − Fε
(
q∗ − e
r
))
+
E
[
1
α
− βr | ε < q
∗ − e
r
]
· Fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
− h(e, r)
Using integral notation:
L =
∫ ∞
q∗−e
r
(e + rε − T − βr) fε(ε)dε +
∫ q∗−e
r
0
(
1
α
− βr
)
fε(ε)dε − h(e, r)
Taking the derivative with respect to e
∂L
∂e
=
∫ ∞
q∗−e
r
1 · fε(ε)dε +





1
r
(q∗ − T − βr) fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
+ 0 −



1
r
(
1
α
− βr
)
fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
− h′e
=
∫ ∞
q∗−e
r
fε(ε)dε − h′e
→ 1 − Fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
− h′e︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
F.O.C
= 0
Taking the derivative with respect to r
∂L
∂r
=
∫ ∞
q∗−e
r
(ε − β) · fε(ε)dε +
((((
((((
((((
((((
(
q∗ − e
r2
)
(q∗ − T − βr) fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
+
∫ q∗−e
r
0
(−β) · fε(ε)dε −




(
q∗ − e
r2
) (
1
α
− βr
)
fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
− h′r
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q∗−e
r
ε fε(ε)dε − h′r − β
∫ ∞q∗−e
r
fε(ε)dε +
∫ q∗−e
r
0
fε(ε)dε

→
∫ ∞
q∗−e
r
ε fε(ε)dε − h′r − β︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
F.O.C
= 0
Next we investigate how a change in T affects effort and risk:[
∂e
∂T
∂r
∂T
]
= −
[
∂2L
∂e2
∂L
∂r∂e
∂L
∂e∂r
∂2L
∂r2
]−1 [ ∂L
∂T∂e
∂L
∂T∂r
]
= − 1
Determinant︸           ︷︷           ︸
S .O.C for Hessian > 0
[
∂2L
∂r2 − ∂L∂r∂e
− ∂L
∂e∂r
∂2L
∂e2
] [
∂L
∂T∂e
∂L
∂T∂r
]
Taking each term in turn:
∂2L
∂r2
= 0 − ∂
∂r
(
q∗ − e
r
) (
q∗ − e
r
)
fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
− h′′rr − 2β
=
(
q∗ − e
r2
) (
q∗ − e
r
)
fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
− h′′rr − 2β
=
1
r
(
q∗ − e
r
)2
fε(·) − h′′rr︸                      ︷︷                      ︸
S .O.C < 0
∂2L
∂e2
= fε(·)
(
1
r
)
− h′′ee
=
1
r
fε(·) − h′′ee︸        ︷︷        ︸
S .O.C < 0
∂L
∂e∂r
= 0 −
[
−1
r
(
q∗ − e
r
)
fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)]
− h′′er
=
(
q∗ − e
r2
)
fε(·) − h′′er︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
< 0
∂L
∂r∂e
= − fε(·)
(
q∗ − e
r2
)
− h′′er︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
< 0
∂L
∂T∂e
= −1
r
fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
= −1
r
fε (·)︸   ︷︷   ︸
< 0
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∂L
∂T∂r
= 0 − 1
r
(
q∗ − e
r
)
fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
= −
(
q∗ − e
r2
)
fε(·)︸            ︷︷            ︸
> 0
We can sign most of these terms because of 1) second order conditions and 2) the
shape of the distribution of revenue (q), which is skewed to the left, and the fact
that drivers make the target 44% of the time. This means (q∗ − e < 0). Note, we
would expect the cross partial to be negative because as the driver increases risk
(fatter tails), they are less likely to make the target, which means the returns to
making the target decrease and effort will be reduced. Putting it altogether:
∂e
∂T
= − 1
Determinant︸           ︷︷           ︸
+

−︷︸︸︷
∂2L
∂r2
·
−︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂T∂e
−
−︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂r∂e
·
+︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂T∂r

< 0
∂r
∂T
= − 1
Determinant︸           ︷︷           ︸
+
−
−︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂e∂r
·
−︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂T∂e
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂2L
∂e2
·
+︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂T∂r

> 0
Next we investigate how a change in α affects effort and risk:[
∂e
∂α
∂r
∂α
]
= −
[
∂2L
∂e2
∂L
∂r∂e
∂L
∂e∂r
∂2L
∂r2
]−1 [ ∂L
∂α∂e
∂L
∂α∂r
]
= − 1
Determinant︸           ︷︷           ︸
S .O.C for Hessian > 0
[
∂2L
∂r2 − ∂L∂r∂e
− ∂L
∂e∂r
∂2L
∂e2
] [
∂L
∂α∂e
∂L
∂α∂r
]
Computing the additional terms
∂L
∂α∂e
= fε
(
q∗ − e
r
) (
1
r · α2
)
=
1
α2 · r fε(·)
∂L
∂α∂r
= 0 +
1
r · 4α2
(
q∗ − e
r
)
fε
(
q∗ − e
r
)
=
1
α2 · r
(
q∗ − e
r
)
fε(·)
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Putting it altogether:
∂e
∂α
= − 1
Determinant︸           ︷︷           ︸
+

−︷︸︸︷
∂2L
∂r2
·
−︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂α∂e
−
−︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂r∂e
·
+︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂α∂r

> 0
∂r
∂α
= − 1
Determinant︸           ︷︷           ︸
+
−
−︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂e∂r
·
−︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂α∂e
+
−︷︸︸︷
∂2L
∂e2
·
+︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂α∂r

< 0
Finally we investigate how a change in β affects effort and risk:[ ∂e
∂β
∂r
∂β
]
= −
[
∂2L
∂e2
∂L
∂r∂e
∂L
∂e∂r
∂2L
∂r2
]−1 [ ∂L
∂β∂e
∂L
∂β∂r
]
= − 1
Determinant︸           ︷︷           ︸
S .O.C for Hessian > 0
[
∂2L
∂r2 − ∂L∂r∂e
− ∂L
∂e∂r
∂2L
∂e2
] [
0
−1
]
Putting it altogether:
∂e
∂β
= − 1
Determinant︸           ︷︷           ︸
+

−︷︸︸︷
∂L
∂r∂e
·
+︷︸︸︷
1

> 0
∂r
∂β
= − 1
Determinant︸           ︷︷           ︸
+

−︷︸︸︷
∂2L
∂e2
·
−︷︸︸︷
(−1)

< 0
Step 5: Owner’s optimal reporting choice
Constrained case
The owner chooses T to maximize his utility:
max
T
T · Pr(q ≥ q∗) + E[q˜ | q < q∗] · Pr(q < q∗) − γ(r) s.t
E
[
q − T − βr | q ≥ q∗
]
· Pr(q ≥ q∗) + E
[
q − q˜ − α
4
(q − q˜)2 − βr | q < q∗
]
· Pr(q < q∗) − h(e∗, r∗) > R
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Expressing in terms of exogenous variables:
max
T
T · Pr
(
ε ≥ q
∗ − e∗
r
)
+ E
[
e + rε − 1
2α
| ε < q
∗ − e∗
r
]
· Pr
(
ε <
q∗ − e∗
r
)
− γ(r) s.t
E
[
(e + rε − T − βr) | ε ≥ q
∗ − e
r
]
· Pr(ε ≥
(
q∗ − e
r
)
+ E
[
1
α
− βr | ε < q
∗ − e
r
]
· Pr
(
ε <
q∗ − e
r
)
− h(e, r) ≥ 0
Translating into integral notation:
L = T
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
fε(ε)dε︸             ︷︷             ︸
A
+
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
(
e + rε − 1
2α
)
fε(ε)dε︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
B
−γ(r)+
λ

∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
(e + rε − T − βr) fε(ε)dε︸                                  ︷︷                                  ︸
C
+
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
(
1
α
− βr
)
fε(ε)dε − h(e, r)︸                                     ︷︷                                     ︸
D

Taking the derivative with respect to T
=
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
fε(ε)dε + T
[
0 − ∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
)
fε(·)
]
︸                                                   ︷︷                                                   ︸
A′
+
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
(
∂e
∂T
+
∂r
∂T
ε
)
fε(ε)dε +
∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
) (
T − 1
α
)
fε(·)︸                                                                        ︷︷                                                                        ︸
B′
−γ′(r) ∂r
∂T
+ λ
[ ∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
(
∂e
∂T
+
∂r
∂T
ε − 1 −
(
β · ∂r
∂T
))
fε(ε)dε − ∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
)
1
α
fε(·)︸                                                                                  ︷︷                                                                                  ︸
C′
+
∫ q∗−e
r
0
−
(
β · ∂r
∂T
)
fε(ε)dε +
∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
)
1
α
fε(·) − h′
(
∂e
∂T
+
∂r
∂T
)
︸                                                                                 ︷︷                                                                                 ︸
D′
]
= 1 − Fε(·) −



T
∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
)
fε(·)︸                                   ︷︷                                   ︸
A′
+
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∂e
∂T
Fε(·) + ∂r
∂T
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
ε fε(ε)dε +



∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
) (
T − 1
α
)
fε(·)︸                                                                            ︷︷                                                                            ︸
B′
−γ′(r) ∂r
∂T
+ λ
[
−(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂e
∂T
(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂r
∂T
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
ε fε(ε)dε −


∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
)
1
α
fε(·)︸                                                                                             ︷︷                                                                                             ︸
C′
+


∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
)
1
α
fε(·) − h′
(
∂e
∂T
+
∂r
∂T
)
︸                                           ︷︷                                           ︸
D′
−β ∂r
∂T
]
= 1 − Fε(·)︸    ︷︷    ︸
A′
+
∂e
∂T
Fε(·) + ∂r
∂T
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
ε fε(ε)dε − ∂
∂T
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
) (
1
α
)
fε(·)︸                                                                      ︷︷                                                                      ︸
B′
−γ′(r) ∂r
∂T
+ λ
−(1 − Fε(·)) +
∂e
∂T
(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂r
∂T
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
ε fε(ε)dε︸                                                              ︷︷                                                              ︸
C′
+
∂r
∂T
(−β) − h′
(
∂e
∂T
+
∂r
∂T
)
︸           ︷︷           ︸
D′
 = 0
Taking the derivative with respect to λ∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
(e + rε − T − βr) fε(ε)dε +
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
(
1
α
− βr
)
fε(ε)dε − h(e, r) = 0
Next we apply the IFT to understand how T changes with α.[
∂T
∂α
∂λ
∂α
]
= −
[
∂2L
∂T 2
∂L
∂λ∂T
∂L
∂T∂λ
∂2L
∂λ2
]−1 [ ∂L
∂α∂T
∂L
∂α∂λ
]
= − 1
Determinant
[
∂2L
∂λ2
− ∂L
∂λ∂T
− ∂L
∂T∂λ
∂2L
∂T 2
]−1 [ ∂L
∂α∂T
∂L
∂α∂λ
]
= − 1
Determinant
[
0 − ∂L
∂λ∂T
− ∂L
∂T∂λ
∂2L
∂T 2
]−1 [ ∂L
∂α∂T
∂L
∂α∂λ
]
Taking each term in turn:
∂L
∂λ∂T
= −(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂e
∂T
(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂r
∂T
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
ε fε(ε)dε +
∂r
∂T
(−β) − h′
(
∂e
∂T
+
∂r
∂T
)
= −(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂e
∂T
(
1 − Fε(·) − h′e
)
︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
F.O.C = 0
+
∂r
∂T
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
ε fε(ε)dε − h′r − β
︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
F.O.C = 0
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= −(1 − Fε(·))︸        ︷︷        ︸
< 0
∂L
∂α∂λ
=
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
(
∂e
∂α
+
∂r
∂α
ε − β ∂r
∂α
)
fε(ε)dε −





∂
∂α
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
) (
1
α
− βr
)
fε(·)
−
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
(
1
α2
+ β
∂r
∂α
)
fε(ε)dε +





∂
∂α
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
) (
1
α
− βr
)
fε(·) − h′
(
∂e
∂α
+
∂r
∂α
)
=
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
(
∂e
∂α
+
∂r
∂α
ε − β ∂r
∂α
)
fε(ε)dε −
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
(
1
α2
+ β
∂r
∂α
)
fε(ε)dε − h′
(
∂e
∂α
+
∂r
∂α
)
=
∂e
∂α
(1 − Fε(·)) + ∂r
∂α
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
ε fε(ε)dε −
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
(
1
α2
)
fε(ε)dε − h′
(
∂e
∂α
+
∂r
∂α
)
− β ∂r
∂α
=
∂e
∂α
(1 − Fε(·) − h′e)︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
F.O.C = 0
+
∂r
∂α
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
ε fε(ε)dε − h′r − β
︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
F.O.C = 0
−
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
(
1
α2
)
fε(ε)dε
= − 1
α2
Fε(·)︸     ︷︷     ︸
<0
Putting it all together:
∂T
∂α
= − 1
0 −
(
∂L
∂T∂λ
)2 [− ∂L∂λ∂T · ∂L∂α∂λ
]
=
1(
∂L
∂T∂λ
)2︸  ︷︷  ︸
+
− ∂L∂λ∂T︸︷︷︸
−
· ∂L
∂α∂λ︸︷︷︸
−

< 0
We can also apply the IFT to understand how T changes with β.[∂T
∂β
∂λ
∂β
]
= −
[
∂2L
∂T 2
∂L
∂λ∂T
∂L
∂T∂λ
∂2L
∂λ2
]−1 [ ∂L
∂β∂T
∂L
∂β∂λ
]
= − 1
Determinant
[
∂2L
∂λ2
− ∂L
∂λ∂T
− ∂L
∂T∂λ
∂2L
∂T 2
]−1 [ ∂L
∂β∂T
∂L
∂β∂λ
]
= − 1
Determinant
[
0 − ∂L
∂λ∂T
− ∂L
∂T∂λ
∂2L
∂T 2
]−1 [ ∂L
∂β∂T
∂L
∂β∂λ
]
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We compute the only new term required:
∂L
∂β∂λ
=
∫ ∞
q∗−e∗
r∗
−r fε(ε)dε −





∂
β
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
)
(q∗ − T − βr) fε(·)
+
∫ q∗−e∗
r∗
0
−r fε(ε)dε +





∂
β
(
q∗ − e∗
r∗
) (
1
α
− βr
)
fε(·)
= −r
Putting it all together:
∂T
∂β
=
1(
∂L
∂T∂λ
)2︸  ︷︷  ︸
+
− ∂L∂λ∂T︸︷︷︸
−
· ∂L
∂β∂λ︸︷︷︸
−

< 0
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Figure B.1: Location of study area
Notes: The figure shows the location of the 11 study Upazilas within Rajshahi district of
Bangladesh. The shading corresponds to elevation, measured in meters.
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Figure B.2: Cumulative distributions of network statistics for different types of entry
points
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Notes: Each graph shows the cumulative distribution function of the relevant network statistics,
separately for the three different types of entry points. The network centrality measures are
calculated for each entry point using the baseline social network survey.
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Figure B.3: Annual land allocation for plots grown with either BD56 or BD51
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Notes: The data are for the plots where either BD56 or BD51 was planted by the entry points. The
vertical axis gives the share of plots that were allocated to the crop on the date corresponding to
the horizontal axis. The sold lines are for the treatment (BD56) farmers and the dashed lines are
for the control (BD51) farmers.
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Table B.1: Balance of household characteristics across treatment arms
Treatment Arm:
Control Large SAO Random Large + SAO + Random + Joint
Demo Demo Demo p-value
Education 4.235 3.951 4.663 4.604 4.216 4.368 4.768 0.381
(4.314) (4.202) (4.521) (4.293) (4.125) (4.466) (4.235)
Age 41.356 41.908 41.660 41.650 41.820 40.938 41.261 0.829
(12.407) (11.926) (12.348) (12.300) (12.143) (12.023) (12.039)
Owns Shallow 0.103 0.149 0.160 0.085 0.072 0.086 0.115 0.356
Tubewell (0.304) (0.356) (0.367) (0.278) (0.259) (0.280) (0.319)
Aman Rice Area 4.071 4.293 5.029 4.221 4.678 4.775 4.265 0.770
(Bigah) (5.656) (5.550) (12.429) (6.027) (5.530) (5.983) (5.152)
Aman Other Crop Area 0.348 0.375 0.319 0.462 0.300 0.236 0.395 0.682
(Bigah) (1.567) (1.893) (1.478) (9.638) (1.676) (0.794) (1.412)
Boro Rice Area 3.328 3.002 3.812 3.344 2.515 3.289 2.889 0.383
(Bigah) (4.264) (4.296) (5.847) (5.312) (4.171) (4.699) (4.060)
Boro Other Crop Area 1.125 1.252 1.332 1.140 1.478 1.100 1.346 0.840
(Bigah) (2.454) (2.513) (3.325) (2.362) (3.043) (2.219) (2.358)
Aman Urea Fertilizer 21.427 21.953 21.260 22.161 20.644 21.313 20.588 0.843
(KG per Bigah) (15.109) (15.459) (21.673) (21.759) (17.417) (25.641) (14.648)
Aman DAP Fertilizer 15.834 16.110 15.519 16.435 14.889 15.813 15.157 0.326
(KG per Bigah) (11.660) (15.169) (20.073) (13.662) (6.739) (15.346) (10.332)
Aman Rice Yield (KG 17.756 17.499 18.063 17.989 17.477 17.570 17.837 0.927
per Bigah) (3.814) (4.180) (3.263) (3.089) (3.280) (3.851) (3.483)
Grows Short-Duration 0.011 0.035 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.018 0.008 0.831
Rice (0.102) (0.185) (0.085) (0.066) (0.081) (0.135) (0.088)
Grows Wheat 0.236 0.260 0.243 0.190 0.372∗∗ 0.231 0.286 0.353
(0.425) (0.439) (0.429) (0.393) (0.483) (0.422) (0.452)
Grows Mango 0.086 0.063 0.071 0.093 0.076 0.076 0.063 0.958
(0.280) (0.242) (0.256) (0.290) (0.265) (0.266) (0.244)
Grows Potato 0.083 0.052 0.086 0.082 0.074 0.061 0.077 0.872
(0.275) (0.222) (0.281) (0.274) (0.261) (0.239) (0.266)
Grows Pulses 0.047 0.103 0.095 0.076 0.077 0.075 0.048 0.518
(0.212) (0.305) (0.293) (0.265) (0.266) (0.264) (0.215)
Grows Onion 0.049 0.037 0.050 0.021∗ 0.047 0.039 0.057 0.275
(0.215) (0.188) (0.219) (0.144) (0.211) (0.194) (0.232)
Grows Garlic 0.017 0.009 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.017 0.006 0.429
(0.128) (0.096) (0.118) (0.113) (0.095) (0.130) (0.078)
The summary statistics are calculated using the door-to-door census with 21,926 households. Each
column shows mean values of each variable for either the control group or one of the six treatment
groups. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below each mean value. Asterisks indicate
a statistically significant difference (1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ ) between that arm and the control
arm, where p-values are calculated by regressing each variable on a constant and indicators for
each of the six treatment groups (standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village level). The
final column shows the joint p-value of each of these regressions. Aman refers to the wet season
prior to the door-to-door baseline (2015) and Boro refers similarly to the most recent dry season
(2015-2016). 1 Bigah = 0.33 Acres.
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Table B.2: Balance of household characteristics for entry points
Control (BD51) BD56 Treatment p-value
Education 5.361 5.392 0.832
(4.620) (4.643)
Age 43.326 43.690 0.577
(12.585) (12.225)
Owns Shallow 0.178 0.191 0.528
Tubewell (0.383) (0.393)
Aman Rice Area 8.553 8.977 0.523
(Bigah) (11.097) (10.494)
Aman Other Crop Area 0.514 0.616 0.415
(Bigah) (1.648) (2.037)
Boro Rice Area 6.483 6.247 0.795
(Bigah) (7.781) (8.606)
Boro Other Crop Area 2.063 2.299 0.454
(Bigah) (3.709) (3.951)
Aman Urea Fertilizer 21.879 21.316 0.541
(KG per Bigah) (24.672) (15.565)
Aman DAP Fertilizer 16.363 15.978 0.735
(KG per Bigah) (17.281) (18.909)
Aman Rice Yield (KG 17.888 17.566 0.207
per Bigah) (3.797) (3.881)
Grows only rice 0.389 0.337 0.132
(0.488) (0.473)
Grows Short-Duration 0.017 0.024 0.488
Rice (0.129) (0.153)
Grows Wheat 0.304 0.312 0.946
(0.460) (0.464)
Grows Mango 0.126 0.117 0.792
(0.332) (0.322)
Grows Potato 0.121 0.098 0.359
(0.327) (0.297)
Grows Pulses 0.078 0.111 0.127
(0.268) (0.314)
Grows Onion 0.048 0.068 0.323
(0.215) (0.252)
Grows Garlic 0.013 0.028 0.065
(0.115) (0.166)
The analysis uses the door-to-door census conducted at the beginning of the experiment. Data are
limited to the 1,747 entry points that consented to participate. Each column shows mean values
and standard deviations are reported in parentheses below. The final column shows the p-value for
the comparison of means, based on a regression of each characteristic on the treatment indicator
and Upazila (strata) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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Table B.3: Differences between SAO selected and random farmers, adjusting for
farm size
Degree Eigenvector Betweenness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SAO-based selection 3.582∗∗∗ 1.917∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 394.084∗∗∗ 281.922∗∗∗
(1.044) (0.838) (0.012) (0.011) (103.649) (89.698)
Farm Size 0.284∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 19.124∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.000) (4.634)
Mean in random group 4.56 4.56 0.09 0.09 164.19 164.19
Number of Observations 639 639 511 511 639 639
R squared 0.037 0.221 0.036 0.175 0.033 0.094
The data are limited to the 640 selected entry points in the random and SAO villages. The
dependent variables are degree centrality (columns 1-2), eigenvector centrality (columns 3-4), and
betweenness centrality (columns 5-6). Farm size is the total sum of cultivated area (across all three
agricultural seasons). The omitted group in each regression is the villages where demonstrators
were selected randomly. The standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table B.4: Analysis of take up by entry points
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment village -0.025
(0.035)
Demo Village 0.060
(0.039)
Random + Demo 0.085
(0.062)
SAO 0.076
(0.066)
SAO + Demo 0.067
(0.067)
Large 0.053
(0.067)
Large + Demo 0.157∗∗
(0.068)
Strata (Upazila) Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Mean in omitted group 0.71 0.65 0.69
Number of Observations 1795 953 953
R squared 0.046 0.059 0.064
The data are from the first midline with 1,795 entry points. Column 1 uses all observations and
columns 2 and 3 use only observations from treatment (BD56) villages. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10%
∗ levels.
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Table B.5: Cultivation practices by treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Harvest Date 2nd Crop Boro Crop N Crops
Treated Village -25.350∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ -0.035 0.243∗∗∗
(1.384) (0.035) (0.039) (0.046)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean in Control 8.64 0.24 0.82 2.06
Number of Observations 1242 1242 1242 1242
R squared 0.381 0.284 0.257 0.278
The data are limited to the plots where either BD56 or BD51 was planted by the entry points. The
dependent variable in column 1 is the date of the harvest, measured in days after November 10,
2016. The dependent variables in columns 2 and 3 are indicators for whether the plot was sown
with the Rabi (in-between) crop and the Boro (dry-season) crop. The dependent variable in column
4 is the total number of crops grown across all seasons. Standard errors are clustered at the village
level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table B.6: Cultivation practices by treatment and type of entry point
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Harvest Date 2nd Crop Boro Crop N Crops
Treated Village -25.315∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ -0.073 0.102
(1.603) (0.048) (0.051) (0.072)
Treatment Village * -0.219 0.110∗ 0.100∗ 0.210∗∗∗
SAO (2.518) (0.061) (0.056) (0.079)
Treatment Village * 0.533 0.173∗∗∗ 0.002 0.174∗∗
Large (2.302) (0.065) (0.062) (0.085)
SAO 1.535∗ -0.040 -0.047 -0.087∗∗
(0.796) (0.033) (0.029) (0.035)
Large 0.784 -0.051 -0.014 -0.065∗
(0.801) (0.031) (0.029) (0.034)
Mean in Control 8.64 0.24 0.82 2.06
Number of Observations 1242 1242 1242 1242
R squared 0.382 0.291 0.262 0.286
The data are limited to the plots where either BD56 or BD51 was planted by the entry points. The
dependent variable in column 1 is the date of the harvest, measured in days after November 10,
2016. The dependent variables in columns 2 and 3 are indicators for whether the plot was sown
with the Rabi (in-between) crop and the Boro (dry-season) crop. The dependent variable in column
4 is the total number of crops grown across all season. Standard errors are clustered at the village
level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table B.7: Profitability of BD56 and BD51 plots
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aman Rabi Boro Total
Treated Village -4576.411∗∗∗ 1518.881∗∗∗ -882.748 -4161.562∗∗∗
(248.751) (451.867) (619.309) (767.897)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean in Control 10309.28 2508.40 11900.65 24954.19
Number of Observations 1200 1205 1228 1156
R squared 0.396 0.438 0.314 0.380
The data are limited to the plots where either BD56 or BD51 was planted by the entry points. The
dependent variables are profits per bigah, measured in Bangladeshi Taka (BDT). Approximately 80
BDT=1USD and 3 bigah = 1 acre. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks
indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table B.8: Peer effects on the number of conversations with entry points, separate
for villages with and without demonstration plots
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peer connections w/ 0.050 0.179∗
entry points (0.064) (0.105)
Peer connections w/ -0.261∗
entry points * Demonstration Village (0.137)
Connected to at 0.093 0.284∗
least 1 entry point (0.098) (0.147)
Connected to at -0.383∗
least 1 entry point * Demonstration Village (0.215)
Number of 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.005
connections (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.009)
Number of 0.003 -0.005
connections * Demonstration Village (0.011) (0.009)
Demonstration 0.176∗∗ 0.220∗∗
Village (0.087) (0.087)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep Variable 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
Number of Observations 636 636 636 636
R squared 0.301 0.310 0.301 0.312
The dependent variable in all regressions is the number of entry points that the respondent spoke
to about BD56. The data are limited to the 64 villages where entry points where chosen randomly
and peer effects can therefore be causally identified. The variable Peer connections w/ entry points is
the number of entry points (from 0 to 5) that the farmer is connected with while Connected to at
least 1 entry point is an indicator variable for being connected to at least one of the entry points.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1%
∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table B.9: Effects of hitting a large-farmer entry point
(1) (2)
All Villages Random Villages
At least 1 large 0.079∗∗ 0.123∗
entry point (0.032) (0.071)
At least 1 large -0.101∗∗ -0.131
entry point * Demonstration Village (0.048) (0.104)
Demonstration 0.078∗∗ 0.119∗∗
Village (0.038) (0.047)
Strata fixed effects Yes Yes
Mean of Dep Variable 0.67 0.64
Number of Observations 1919 639
R squared 0.171 0.189
The data are for the 10 random farmers per village that were selected for the information survey.
Column 1 is for all 192 BD56 villages, column 2 is for the 64 villages where entry points were
selected randomly. At least 1 large entry point is an indicator for villages where one of the five
largest farmers was selected as an entry point. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table C.1: Attrition
(1) (2)
Midline Endline
Treatment 0.017 -0.017
(0.017) (0.021)
Priority Treatment 0.024 0.018
(0.017) (0.021)
Number of Observations 2662 2662
R squared 0.0019 0.0004
Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at
the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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Table C.4: Job Search by Geo-Zone
Unemployed Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Searching Hours Applications Searching Hours Applications
Treatment East -0.077 -2.445∗ 0.682 -0.203 -3.054∗∗ -1.826∗
(0.050) (1.474) (0.516) (0.135) (1.528) (1.011)
Treatment DelhiNCR 0.021 0.629 -1.263 0.110 3.023 0.011
(0.150) (2.122) (1.061) (0.118) (1.874) (1.209)
Treatment North -0.007 -0.146 -0.641 0.094 1.225 0.758
(0.065) (1.671) (0.502) (0.096) (1.165) (0.744)
Treatment SouthWest 0.072 -2.769 -0.239 -0.116 -1.170 0.023
(0.089) (2.280) (0.745) (0.079) (1.484) (0.690)
Priority Treatment -0.011 -0.274 -0.947∗ 0.102 1.335 -0.568
East (0.052) (1.434) (0.539) (0.132) (2.220) (1.046)
Priority Treatment 0.039 0.346 0.679 -0.055 1.386 1.061
DelhiNCR (0.119) (1.968) (1.032) (0.124) (1.680) (1.340)
Priority Treatment 0.030 2.647∗ 0.634 -0.121 -1.618 0.180
North (0.066) (1.477) (0.513) (0.096) (1.206) (0.686)
Priority Treatment -0.066 -1.700 0.767 0.029 -0.280 -0.212
SouthWest (0.077) (2.374) (0.827) (0.077) (1.469) (0.543)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geo-Specifc Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4134 3848 3870 2694 2596 2505
Columns 1, 2 and 3 include all unemployed respondents in the sample, while columns 4, 5 and 6
include all employed respondents in the sample. The dependent variables are an indicator for
whether the respondent is actively searching for employment (column 1/4), the number of hours
spent searching in the past week - where people who aren’t searching are assigned a value of 0
hours (column 2/5), the number of job applications submitted in the last 3 months (column 3/6).
Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at
the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
185
Table C.5: Job Search controlling for TP0
Unemployed Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Searching Hours Applications Searching Hours Applications
Treatment East -0.202 -3.045∗∗ -1.828∗ -0.077 -2.443∗ 0.682
(0.135) (1.530) (1.012) (0.050) (1.474) (0.516)
Treatment DelhiNCR 0.110 3.023 0.011 0.021 0.629 -1.263
(0.118) (1.875) (1.210) (0.150) (2.123) (1.062)
Treatment North 0.094 1.229 0.757 -0.007 -0.149 -0.642
(0.096) (1.166) (0.745) (0.065) (1.672) (0.503)
Treatment SouthWest -0.116 -1.170 0.023 0.072 -2.769 -0.239
(0.079) (1.485) (0.691) (0.089) (2.281) (0.746)
Priority Treatment 0.027 -0.099 -0.168 0.007 0.681 -1.085
East (0.158) (2.769) (0.945) (0.061) (1.673) (0.671)
Priority Treatment -0.055 1.386 1.061 0.039 0.346 0.679
DelhiNCR (0.124) (1.681) (1.341) (0.119) (1.969) (1.032)
Priority Treatment -0.126 -1.199 0.107 0.034 2.887∗∗ 0.686
North (0.100) (1.204) (0.708) (0.067) (1.463) (0.537)
Priority Treatment -0.001 -0.241 0.053 -0.024 -1.409 1.114
SouthWest (0.113) (1.432) (0.408) (0.124) (4.216) (0.778)
Priority Treatment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DelhiNCR, 0 SMS (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Priority Treatment 0.154 2.865 -0.709 -0.042 -2.194 0.333
East, 0 SMS (0.152) (2.618) (1.163) (0.077) (1.723) (0.851)
Priority Treatment 0.028 -2.926 0.470 -0.032 -1.839 -0.433
North, 0 SMS (0.149) (2.171) (0.695) (0.133) (4.230) (0.450)
Priority Treatment 0.043 -0.059 -0.371 -0.053 -0.363 -0.461
SouthWest, 0 SMS (0.117) (1.357) (0.473) (0.124) (4.432) (0.838)
Respondent Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Round Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geo-Specifc Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2694 2596 2505 4134 3848 3870
Columns 1, 2 and 3 include all unemployed respondents in the sample, while columns 4, 5 and 6
include all employed respondents in the sample. The dependent variables are an indicator for
whether the respondent is actively searching for employment (column 1/4), the number of hours
spent searching in the past week - where people who aren’t searching are assigned a value of 0
hours (column 2/5), the number of job applications submitted in the last 3 months (column 3/6).
Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at
the 1% ∗∗∗, 5% ∗∗, and 10% ∗ levels.
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